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Taxation of the Trust Annuity: The
Unitrust Under the Constitution and
the Internal Revenue Code
LOUIS A. DEL COTTO0 AND KENNETH F. JOYOE '
Introduction
THE interests of the beneficiaries in a trust are usually ex-
pressed in terms of income and principal. Thus, the current bene-
ficiary normally has an interest in the income of the trust, and fu-
ture beneficiaries in the principal. The different interests
involved compete with one another and create a conflict of interest
between the income beneficiary and the remainderman. This con-
fliet causes serious problems, such as:
1. An allocation of receipts and expenditures between income
and principal is required. In the conventional trust, because of the
conflicting interests of the income beneficiary and remainderman,
the trustee is under a duty to allocate receipts and expenditures
fairly between principal and income. Such allocations depend to a
substantial degree on difficult legal principles and may require
lengthy and expensive fact finding processes.
2. Investment policy is distorted. Under present law, trustees
must invest so as to assure the income beneficiary a reasonable in-
come. This shapes investment policy in favor of assured income in-
vestments, such as bonds and mortgages, rather than growth in-
vestments, such as corporate stock. Such a policy is the reverse of
one that would be pursued by the individual investor who wants the
higher return and tax advantage of stocks.
3. Expensive accountings are required. The conflict of interest
between the income beneficiary and the remainderman requires the
trustee to submit regular and complicated accounts, which are time
consuming and expensive, thus depleting both the energies of the
trustee and the assets of the trust.
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
**Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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The troublesome factor which creates these problems-the con-
flict of interest between the remainderman and the income bene-
ficiary-would be removed if the interests of the beneficiaries were
not in the competing funds of principal and income, but were,
rather, in exactly the same fund. This result may be accomplished
by giving current shares in the nature of an annuity, rather than
an interest in income.
The most sophisticated proposal along these lines has been made
by Robert Al. Lovell who has presented the unitrust as a solution
to the problems created by conflicting interests in the same fund.1
Under a unitrust instrument, all income as received would be com-
bined with principal in a single fund and there would be no distinc-
tion between income and principal. All items received, whether they
be dividends, rents or splits, would be termed "receipts," and all
items paid out would be termed "payouts." The payout would be
directed in fractions or in specific dollar amounts-for example,
five per cent of the market value of the total fund as of the first day
of the fiscal year, but no more (or less) than a specific dollar
amount-and no one interested in the trust would have merely an
interest in income or principal.
The unitrust thus removes any conflict of interest between the
parties benefically interested in the trust. Many advantages result.
There is no longer any need to allocate receipts and expenditures
between principal and income since these separate funds are irrele-
vant to any purpose or need of the trust or its beneficiaries. Ac-
counting requirements are simplified and time and money are
saved. Most important, any requirement that the trustee must in-
vest for yield is eliminated; the trustee is no longer required to pro-
duce a reasonable income. Since the current beneficiary's interest is
expressed as a share of the value of the entire fund, both income
and principal, the trustee may invest for growth and obtain the
highest return on invested capital to the benefit of all persons inter-
ested in the trust.
Lovell also contends that the unitrust provides a more favorable
vehicle for tax savings than does the conventional trust. By avoid-
ing high yield investments for the growth variety, substantially
more of the income of the trust will be in the form of capital gains
rather than ordinary income. And, Lovell emphasizes, the usual
2 Lovell, The Unitrust, 105 TRUSTS & ESTATES 215 (1966). Robert MkI. Lovell is retired
Senior Vice-President, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, New York. A similar
suggestion was made in Carpenter, A Modernized Trust Plan, 64 TRUST COmPANmE 421
(1937).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 23 :TAX I ANV RLVOW
TAXATION OF A UNITRUST
advantage of the trust as an additional tax paying entity remains.
Although the existence of this last advantage is somewhat glibly
assumed by Lovell, his conclusion is substantially, if not entirely,
verified in the capital gains portion of this article.
There can be little quarrel with Lovell's analysis respecting
problems revolving around conflict of interest. Removing this con-
flict would most certainly simplify trust administration in the
principal-income area, largely eliminate difficult problems of ac-
counting, and promote an investment policy leading to the largest
long run return on invested capital. The burden of this article is
not to illuminate any dark corners which may lurk in these areas,
but rather to make a thorough investigation of the tax problems
surrounding the unitrust, including an examination of the power of
Congress to tax a unitrust payout under the sixteenth amendment
of the Constitution. These problems, it would seem, are the most
important and most difficult problems surrounding the unitrust.
An examination of the tax aspects of the unitrust will also serve
to indicate the areas where this trust form is of value and when it is
of limited usefulness. For example, the unitrust would appear to be
a most advantageous form to use for the common inter vivos trust
in which the grantor does not retain an interest, and for the testa-
mentary trust which is the second part of a "two trust" plan. It is
not, however, an unmixed blessing. As this discussion will show,
even in the trust where the grantor retains no interest, difficult
problems arise concerning the tier system of trust taxation. And a
grantor trust in the form of a unitrust can raise almost insoluble
problems of tax law because the applicable provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code are couched in terms more appropriate to the
ordinary income-principal dichotomy than that of the unitrust.
Also, the unitrust raises unique problems concerning the taxation
of capital gains realized by the trust. And, where a trust provides
for a gift to charity, the unitrust may be a somewhat clumsy ve-
hicle. Valuations of interests passing in trust are necessary to
establish the amount of any transfer to charity, yet such valuations
are normally made in terms of income and remainder interests. But
the unitrust form will have eliminated such interests. Thus, the uni-
trust may create serious valuation problems. The unitrust also may
have limited usefulness as a marital deduction trust since it may
not entirely qualify under the life estate, power of appointment
exception to the nondeductible terminable interest rule.
The authors wish to point out most emphatically that the unitrust
is essentially an annuity trust. The only real difference between
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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it and the conventional trust is that the unitrust will be exclusively
an annuity trust, whereas today the trust annuity, where used at
all, is used in a more limited manner. This difference should not
mislead the reader and he should understand that the ensuing
discussion has application to the trust annuity even when it is
coupled with more conventional trust provisions.
Taxation of the Unitrust Share:
Constitutional, Legislative and Decisional Background
THE NATURE OF TIM UITRUST SHARE
The unitrust share can be regarded as the beneficiary's right to
receive an amount, either in terms of a specific number of dollars,
or, perhaps more commonly, in terms of a sum equal to a particular
percentage of the value of the trust corpus after the addition of
current income. Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
regarding taxation of trusts, such a share, whether expressed in
dollars or as a percentage, would seem to be twxed as an annuity,
payable at all events and without regard to income. Where the
share is expressed in a specific dollar amount, there is no question
under the decided cases that it is such an annuity.2 This follows
from the usual definition, as expressed by these authorities, that an
annuity is a fixed amount to be paid absolutely and without contin-
gency.
Where the share is expressed as a percentage of corpus there is
little doubt but that it also creates an annuity. It is true that
generally an annuity is expressed in terms of a fixed number
of dollars which does not vary with the value of the trust or
estate. It does not appear, however, that the number of dollars
must be fixed in order that a gift or bequest be classified as an
annuity. The crucial point would seem to be that there must be a
grant of an amount which is a charge against the whole estate and
payable at all events, regardless of income. The fact that the
amount may vary from year to year would seem to be irrelevant.
Thus, a bequest in terms of an amount equal to a particular per-
centage of the value of the corpus of a trust, after adding net in-
come thereto, would seem to satisfy the definition of an annuity,
since, the grant of "an amount," etc., is the same as a grant of a
particular number of dollars measured by the percentage of the
principal of the trust. This is the holding of the cases in the marital
2 E.g., Helvering v. Pardee, 290 U.S. 365 (1933); Burnot v. Whitohouso, 283 U.S. 148
(1931).
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deduction area where a marital deduction grant, whether outright
or in trust, is in terms of "an amount equal to one-half of the ad-
justed gross estate," or "an amount equal to the maximum amount
of the marital deduction allowable to my estate for federal estate
tax purposes." 3 The grant is one that simply measures the dollar
amount or value of the gift. It creates a specific dollar amount mea-
sured by one half the value of the adjusted gross estate at death,
and this dollar amount is a fixed amount which will not vary with
appreciation or depreciation in the value of the estate. Accordingly,
where the unitrust share is expressed in terms of an amount equal
to a percentage of the value of trust corpus, it should be held to be
an annuity. This is because, after application of the formula, the
claim of the beneficiary is to a dollar amount payable at all events
and without regard to the presence of income. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine how else the share could be taxed.
The purpose of the above discussion has been to determine the
nature of a unitrust share as a preliminary step in determin-
ing how a beneficiary should be taxed on a distribution in
satisfaction of such a share. However, the following discussion
does not deal with problems concerning realization of gain or loss to
the trust or to the beneficiary because the distribution may effect a
sale or exchange of property. These problems will be discussed
later.4 It should also be noted here that it has been assumed that the
unitrust beneficiary has been given a pecuniary or dollar amount
share and not a so-called "fractional share" whereby the benefi-
ciary would receive a direct interest in every asset of the trust. The
tax implications of a fractional share will also be discussed later.'
TAxATiox or Ax AiNxTrrY U.TDEu
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The 1942 Amendments
Prior to the 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code,
the Supreme Court, in Burnet v. Wliitelouse0 and Helvering
3 Polasky, Marital Deduction Formnula Clauses in Estate Planning-Estato and Icome
Tax Considerations, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 809, 813 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Polashy];
In re Gilmour's Estate, 18 App. Div. 2d 1542 238 N.Y.S.2d 624 (3a DepLt 1903); In re
Estate of Gauff, 27 Misc. 2d 407, 211 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.C. 1980). Of. Belle
Goldstine Frankel, 3 T.C. 231, aff'd, 144 F.2d 1023 (8th Cir. 1944). See Coleman v.
Comm'r, 151 F.2d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 1945) for a criticism of the Franl:el case.
4 See text accompanying notes 64 to 75 infra.
s ee text accompanying notes 72 to 75 infra.
G 283 U.S. 148 (1931).
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v. Pardee,7 held that an annuity was not income to the beneficiary
of a trust. Although the payments received by the trust beneficiary
were in fact made from income, the Court held that the amounts
were received as a tax-exempt bequest since they were payable at
all events and without regard to the presence of income.' In 1942,
however, Congress changed the law to provide that a gift, payable
at intervals regardless of income, would be taxable to the donee if
paid out of income.9 In addition, the law was changed to treat any
distribution, regardless of its source, as if paid out of income if the
trust had current income.10 These changes were intended to reverse
the result of Whitehouse, 1 and, after 1942, annuities payable re-
gardless of the availability of income were taxed to the beneficiary
pursuant to the 1942 amendments.1
2
Smith v. Westover
Since the 1942 solution for the annuity problem-i.e., to tax the
beneficiary of current distributions to the extent that there is trust
income of the current year regardless of the source of the distribu-
tion-was adopted by section 662(a) of the 1954 Code, it is appro-
priate to analyze the provisions of the 1942 amendments in certain
respects. The focus for this analysis will be the case of Smith v.
Westover,3 in which the instrument provided that net income was
to be added to corpus and thereafter "be considered as principal of
the trust," and that the trustees were to pay to the taxpayer an-
nually five per cent of the market value of the trust corpus as de-
termined upon appraisal. As can be seen, this case considered what
we now call a unitrust, and appears to be the only reported case
dealing with such a trust.
Smith v. Westover considered a situation where, in 1944, when
the net income of the trust was $24,000, $18,000 was distributed to
7 290 U.S. 365 (1933).
s Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1931). Dhitehouso was consistently
followed in cases involving annuities payable at all events. See Coleman v. Comm'r, 151
F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1945) and cases therein cited.
9 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 111, 56 Stat. 798, 809-10 (amending §§ 22(b) (3)
and 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
10 See SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOlmE, TAXATio 906-07, n.3 (1960 ed. integ.
with 1961 supp.) [hereinafter cited as SuRRE;Y & WARREN].
11 S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1942) reprinted at 1942-2 CUm. BULL.
504; Coleman v. Comm'r, 151 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1945).
12 Mary R. Milleg, 19 T.C. 395 (1952); Alice M. Townsend, 12 T.C. 692 (1949), aff'd
per curiam, 181 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1950); Milleg v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 658 (E.D.
N.Y. 1950); Dunn v. United States, 86 F.Supp. 861 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
is 89 F.Supp. 432 (S. D. Cal. 1950), aff'd per ouriam, 191 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1951).
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the taxpayer as five per cent of the value of the entire trust assets.
Taxpayer argued that she was not taxable on the distribution, con-
tending that, under the sixteenth amendment, section 162(d) (1) of
the 1939 Code, the predecessor of section 662(a) of the 1954 Code,
could not be constitutionally applied to tax the distribution as in-
come because the distribution was an annual payment of a certain
percentage of the corpus of the trust. The Ninth Circuit responded:
The contention proceeds on the assumption that the power of Con-
gress is limited by the nomenclature used by the testator. Both parties
agree that in the year in question the trust received net income. To say
that Congress was without power to prescribe that a portion of that
income should be taxed to the appellant beneficiary is manifestly un-
tenable.14
The Legislative History
There is little question that the facts of Smith v. Westover
caused the case to fall squarely within the language of section
162(d) (1) of the 1939 Code, as amended in 1942. Since the trust
had net income of $24,000, and the beneficiary received distribu-
tions from the trust of $18,000, with no other beneficiary being
present, the fact that under Burnet v. Whitezouse the amount may
have been payable without regard to the presence of income was
irrelevant under a statute which provided that the distribution to
the beneficiary was treated as income of the trust provided the
trust income was equal to or in excess of the distribution.'5 Section
162(d) (1) went even further than necessary to change the result
of Burnet v. Whitehouse. In that case, at least according to the
Commissioner's contention, payments were directed to be paid out
of income, and corpus was to be invaded only if income were inade-
quate. The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it was
the intent of Congress not only to tax the beneficiary in such a case
14 191 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1951).
L5 After the 1942 amendment, section 162(d) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
provided, inter alia:
[W]here the amount paid . . . can be paid . . . out of other than income, tho
amount paid. during the taxable year of the. . . trust ahal bo considered as
income of the . . . trust which is paid .. if the aggregato of such amounts so
paid . does not exceed the distributable income of the . . . trust for its taxable
year. If the aggregate of such amounts so paid . . . during the taxable year of
the . . . trust in such cases exceeds the distributable income of the . . . trust
for its taxable year, the amount so paid. to any. benefieiary shall be con-
sidered income of the . . . trust for its taxable year which is paid . . . in an
amount which bears the same ratio to the amount of such distributable incomo as the
amount so paid. to the. beneficiary bears to tho aggregate of such amounts
so paid to . . . beneficiaries for tho taxablo year of the trust.
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but also to tax him where the payments were directed to be made
solely from corpus to the extent the trust income was equal to or in
excess of the distribution.
16
Apparently then, the 1942 amendments which added section
162(d) were intended to deal not only with the problem of Burnet
v. Whitehouse, i.e., cases where an annuity was payable out of in-
come with principal to be used only to the extent income was un-
available, but with any case where an annuity was payable, whether
out of either income or corpus, or even solely out of corpus. This
result seems to have been premised upon the notion that the re-
sult under the Whitehouse and Pardee cases allows "tax avoidance
by the beneficiary and in some cases results in hardship to other
beneficiaries whose share of trust income is reduced by the taxes
paid for the benefit of another." 17
This statement in the Senate Finance Committee report is a
curious one at best. Taken together with the position of the Ninth
Circuit in Smith v. Westover, to the effect that it is untenable to
argue that Congress has no power to tax current distributions as
income, there seems to be an underlying assumption that there is
something about the nature of current distributions from a trust
which makes them inherently income. This assumption is difficult
to understand. If the grantor or settlor of a trust intends that the
current beneficiary be a beneficiary of corpus payments and that
income be accumulated for the benefit of the remainderman, there
is certainly nothing inherently impossible about the arrangement.
Nor will it do to say, as the Senate Finance Committee report sug-
gests, that hardship may result to other beneficiaries whose share
of the trust is reduced by the income taxes paid by the trust. If
the intent of the grantor is that the income be the remainderman's,
then the remainderman should in effect bear the income taxes
through the trustee. This arrangement merely expresses the inten-
tion of the grantor as to who shall bear the expense of the tax.
26 S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted at 1942-2 Cum. BuLL. 504.
The Senate Finance Committee report states:
Section 162(a) (1) applies to all cases in which the executor or trustee can or
must... pay the whole or any part of a gift.., out of other than income .... It
applies in all cases of annuities where any deficiency in the amount to be paid can
be made up by a payment out of corpus of the trust. It also applies in cases where
amounts are to be paid or credited at intervals and the executor or trustee has dis-
cretion whether to pay or credit such amounts out of income or corpus, regardless
of the source (income or corpus) to which the executor attributes such amount.
S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted at 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504, 50.
17 S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted at 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504,
558-59.
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Since there is nothing inherently impossible about this arrange-
ment, and since no inequities result if that arrangement is the in-
tent of the grantor of the trust, there must be some other reason,
if there is a reason at all, for the treatment provided by the 1942
amendments and the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. A possible
ground is the statement in the Senate Finance Committee report
that the rule of Burnet v. WIMtehouse and Helvering v. Pardee fur-
nish an instrument for tax avoidance by the beneficiary. This
statement seems to suggest that as a matter of substance the cur-
rent beneficiary is really receiving income and is avoiding the tax
thereon simply by reason of the form in which the transaction is
cast. There is certainly ample authority that form will not be
allowed to control substance in matters of taxation, and that in-
come will be taxed to him who receives its economic benefit regard-
less of niceties of legal title or the form in which the transaction
is cast.i'
The Character of a Trust Annuity and a Unitrust Share
Who, then, is the real beneficiary of the income? Takdng the situa-
tion of Burnet v. Whitehouse, where the fixed sum annuity is
payable first out of income and then out of principal to the
extent necessary, the remainderman and not the current bene-
ficiary appears to receive the benefit of the income. This is so
because the annuity is payable at all events. Therefore the presence
of income is irrelevant to the current beneficiary and any income
which is earned by the corpus necessarily can benefit only the
remainderman. Hence it is only proper that the current bene-
ficiary not be taxed and that the trust, and of course eventually
the remainderman, beax the burden of the income tax. This was the
holding of the Court in Burnet v. Whitehouse. This analysis, how-
ever, would seem to have validity only to the extent that the total
of the annuity payments to the current beneficiary do not exhaust
the initial principal of the fund. For example, if in Burnet v. White-
house a $5,000 yearly annuity was to be paid solely out of initial
corpus, and if in the year of the payment prior payments had ex-
hausted the corpus, then the annuitant would have had the benefit
of income. Even if in that year sufficient corpus remained to pay the
annuity, if payments would exhaust corpus before the end of the
life expectancy of the annuitant, arguably some portion of the
annuity would be income. The problem then becomes whether to
is E.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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exempt from tax all distributions up to the amount of the initial
corpus and thereafter tax to the annuitant the remainder of the
distributions, or to treat some portion of each distribution as tax-
able depending upon the life expectancy of the beneficiary and the
amount of corpus in the trust.19 The point to be made here is that,
in all events, at least some part, if not all, of the current distribu-
tion will be a distribution of corpus. This is because it can be paid,
and it is directed to be paid, without regard to current or accumu-
lated income. The income, or at least a large part of it is, in effect,
directed to be held for the benefit of the remainderman. There
would seem to be no reason why this is not the substance of the
transaction in Whitehouse and not merely its form.
In the case of the unitrust, where the beneficiary's share is ex-
pressed as a fixed sum annuity, the analysis is identical. Where the
share, however, is expressed in terms of a percentage of the value
of trust corpus after addition of current income thereto, it seems
clear that the beneficiary is the beneficiary of income to some ex-
tent. Since the share is a percentage of every trust asset, the dis.
tribution received is a benefit in the nature of income to the extent
that it is based upon the value of trust income for the year and
accumulated income from prior years. Hence, it would seem that
the percentage share unitrust beneficiary is, in substance, the bene-
ficiary of income in the ratio that trust income, current and ac-
cumulated, bears to the value of all trust assets. This portion of the
distribution to him is income, but the balance of the distribution is,
in substance, a distribution of corpus only. This treatment, of
course, is different from that suggested for the distribution in-
volved in Burnet v. Whitehouse, where the annuity was a stated
number of dollars. A stated number of dollars can be. allocated, both
theoretically and practically, first to corpus. However, where the
share is stated as a percentage of the total value of trust corpus, in-
cluding income, then it would seem to be not only the intention of
the testator that the share be allocated ratably to both corpus and
income, but also a necessary result from the fact that each trust
asset is utilized in computing the beneficiary's share. Such utiliza-
tion, in substance, makes one the recipient of the item utilized so
that the beneficiary is properly treated as receiving a pro rata por-
29 This problem merely parallels that encountered by the Congress and the Treasury
since the inception of the income tax as to how to tax the payment of commercial annu-
ities. See generally Egtvedt v. United States, 112 Ct. C1. 80 (1948); 1 MMTENS, LAW
or FEw i AT IicomE TAxATior § 6A.05 (1962); Magill, The Income Tax Liability of
Annuities and Similar Periodical Payments, 33 YALE L.J. 229 (1924).
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tion of each trust asset.20 Even if the instrument directed that the
entire share be paid first from corpus, the substance of the trans-
action would remain the same. Such a direction would indeed be
labelled "form" instead of "substance," and would involve what
the Senate Finance Committee called "tax avoidance by the bene-
ficiary," since the "corpus distribution," to the extent that it rep-
resents the value of income, does not actually deplete corpus, be-
cause, to this extent, corpus is restored simultaneously by the
transfer of income to it.
The suggested method of taxing a percentage unitrust share,
that is, to tax the distribution as if received ratably from income
and corpus, seems to accord -with the substance of the transaction
and with the intention of the testator that there be no distinction
between income and principal and that all beneficiaries share in
both funds alike. Thus, the trust, and hence the remainderman,
bears the income tax burden of the income from which the current
beneficiary does not benefit. In substance, then, under Burnet v.
Thitehou-se, the current beneficiary can be said really to receive
the benefit from a pro rata share of all trust assets, and hence to
receive only a pro rata share of the income, current and accumu-
lated, rather than all of the income up to the amount of the dis-
tributable net income, and the remainderman likewise to have re-
ceived the benefit of ratable shares of income and corpus.
The Constitutional Problem
Under the above analysis of the fixed sum and the percentage
unitrust share, the effect of the 1942 amendment adding section
162(d), and the effect of section 662(a) (2) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, is to do more than merely disallow the gift and in-
heritance exemption for gifts and inheritances of income. In the
situation of Smith v. Westover and in the case of the unitrust, the
exemption would also be removed for gifts of corpus where distri-
butions thereof are periodic, whether the gift be by way of a fixed
dollar annuity, or a percentage share annuity. This directly raises
the constitutional issue of whether Congress has the power, under
the sixteenth amendment, to tax, without apportionment, a gift, be-
quest, devise, or inheritance of principal.2 ' This constitutional issue
20 See Reg. See. 1.643(a)-3 (1956).
21 The constitutional issue also can arise in the case of the conventional trust since all
distributions, even of corpus, not exempted by section 603 of the Internal Revenue Code,
can be taxed up to the distributable net income of tho trust. The issue, however, seems
never to have been raised in the case of the conventional trust. This is understadable
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has been discussed by one of the authors elsewhere and it was there
concluded that:
... Congress [has the power] to impose the income tax, without ap-
portionment, upon receipts of gifts and inheritances of principal. The
receipt is in the nature of "income" and the sixteenth amendment dis-
penses with apportionment of a tax upon income although it be a direct
tax. In all events, such a tax would probably be held to be indirect, a
tax requiring no apportionment although the receipt is not "income."
Hence, both the 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, and the provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which
abolish the rule of Burnet v. Whitehouse and tax an annuity paid to a
trust beneficiary without regard to its source, would appear to be con-
stitutional exercises of congressional power. In the case of such an
annuity, which is in effect a charge on corpus, the exclusion from in-
come provided in section 102 for gifts and inheritances of principal has
been rendered inapplicable. The provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 may be applied to the trust annuity without lilitation.' "
Taxation of a Unitrust Share Under the
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
THE STATUTORY PATTERN
In General
The taxation of trusts and their beneficiaries is governed by sub-
parts A through D of subchapter J. Under these provisions, the
trust is treated as a conduit. Although it is a taxable entity under
section 641, the trust is given a special deduction for amounts of
income required to be distributed to the beneficiary, and for all
other amounts distributed or required to be distributed, but the
deduction may not exceed the distributable net income of the
trust.2 3 The beneficiary is required to include these amounts in his
income. 24 The top limit of income to the beneficiary is thus dis-
tributable net income,2 5 and each item of trust income retains its
original character in the hands of the beneficiary.2 6
Under section 643, distributable net income is the taxable
since the current beneficiary generally receives income rather than an annuity. Also,
where there is more than one beneficiary, the separate share rule of section 603(c),
allowing separate shares to be treated as separate trusts under certain circumstances,
tends to prevent taxation of corpus as such.
22Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity as Income: The Constitutional Prolem of Taying
Gifts and Be quests as Incrne, 23 TAx L. REv. 231, 256 (1968).
2sLR.C. §§ 643(a), 651, 661(a) (1954). All citations to sections in this article are
to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to (late of publication,
unless otherwise indicated.
24 I.R.C. 99 652(a), 662(a).
25I.R.C. 9§ 652(a), 662(a)(2).
2e I.R.C. 99 652(b), 662(b).
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income of the trust for the year with minor modifications. The
function of the distributable net income concept is to prevent the
beneficiary from being taxed upon a distribution of corpus. This
protection is a function of the exemption from income tax
for gifts and bequests, provided under section 102(a). This exemp-
tion is not, however, extended to income from property, nor to
gifts or bequests of such income. Section 102(b) specifically limits
the exemption so that it does not protect such income. The pro-
visions of section 102(b) resulted from an amendment in 1942 to
incorporate the rule of Irwin v. Gavit.27 There the Supreme Court
held that the income of a trust was not entitled to the gift exemp-
tion, and required the income beneficiary to pay the tax on the in-
come in his hands. Thus no part of the gift exemption was allo-
cated to the income interest, and the corpus received the benefit of
the entire exemption. This result avoids the difficulties inherent in
a division of the exemption, and, in effect, places the current bene-
ficiary into the income shoes of the remainderman, as if a single
person owned both the income and the remainder interest.
For purposes of the corpus-income distinction, section 102 pro-
vides that any amount included in the income of a beneficiary under
subchapter J shall be treated as a gift of income. Section 273 pre-
vents any amortization of this interest. Subchapter J requires the
beneficiary to include as income all amounts either distributed or
required to be distributed, up to distributable net income. Thus,
all these amounts are treated as income without regard to their
source, and even though in fact they may be a charge upon corpus.
Gifts of a specific sum of money or specific property which are paid
in not more than three installments are excepted from this
treatment by section 663 (a).
The Simple Trust
The foregoing describes the general pattern of trust taxation.
However, the Code distinguishes between simple trusts-trusts in
which all of the income must be currently distributable to the bene-
ficiaries, with no distributions of corpus in the present year, and
no charitable beneficiaries-which are taxed under subpart B, and
complex trusts-trusts in which the trustee must or may accumu-
late some income instead of distributing all of it currently, trusts
which distribute some corpus amounts, and trusts which have
charitable beneficiaries-which are taxed under subparts C and D.
The basic pattern of trust taxation is established by subpart B
27 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
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together with subpart A. As indicated above, where all of the trust
income is to be distributed, the beneficiary is taxed upon that in-
come and the trust, because of its special deduction, is not. Under
section 643(b), the income to be distributed by the trust to the
beneficiary is the income of the trust required to be distributed
under the terms of the trust instrument and local law. The amount
taxable to the beneficiary is no more than the distributable net
income of the trust, and, under the conduit principle, the character
of the amounts received by the beneficiary is the same as in the
hands of the trust. Thus, for example, tax-exempt interest retains
its character in the beneficiary's hands.2 8 The measuring rod of
distributable net income, which determines the maximum amount
taxable to beneficiaries and deductible to the trust, is defined in
section 643(a) as the trust taxable income with some minor
modifications. The most important of these modifications is that
capital gains and losses are excluded in determining distributable
net income. This is because such gains and losses are normally al-
locable to corpus and not to income under terms of the governing
instrument or state law. Hence, capital gains are excluded from
distributable net income and are taxed not to the beneficiary, but to
the trustee, unless they are in fact distributed or required to be
distributed to the beneficiary.
The Complex Trust
In the case of the simple trust where all the income is required
to be distributed currently, the problem of allocating the trust
income between the trust and the beneficiary, or beneficiaries, is a
relatively easy one. The beneficiaries as a group are taxed to the
full extent of the distributable net income of the trust, and any
amounts distributed in excess of such distributable net income are
protected from taxation by the exemption for gifts and bequests.
The same result follows for the complex trust where all the income
is required to be distributed currently, or is in fact distributed.
However, since a complex trust will generally be allowed or re-
quired to accumulate income, distributions from such a trust may
be of such accumulated income. If there is only a single beneficiary,
the problem of allocation of income between the beneficiary and the
trust is relatively minor. It is merely a quantitative problem and is
solved by the quantitative measuring rod of the current distribu-
table net income. But where there are several beneficiaries and
various types of distribution which go to different beneficiaries,
28.1.C. §§ 652(b), 662(b).
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then in each beneficiary's hands the distribution may have a dif-
ferent quality and the qualitative problem is introduced. To solve
this problem, the 1954 Code provides for a tier system. Basically,
there is a two tier system of priorities, supplemented by certain
exclusions, for the application of the distributable net income
measuring rod.
Under sections 662(a) (1) and 643(b), the first tier is the trust
income (as defined by the instrument and local law) for the taxable
year which is required to be distributed currently. This income has
the highest taxable priority, so that beneficiaries who receive first
tier income are taxable to the extent of the distributable net income
of the current year.
Section 662 (a) (2) describes the second tier which includes any
amounts, other than first tier distributions, which are distributed,
whatever their nature. This tier catches all discretionary distribu-
tions of current income, all distributions of accumulated income
whether discretionary or mandatory, and all corpus distributions
whether discretionary or mandatory, except for amounts excluded
under section 663. The distributions falling in this tier are taxed
proportionately to the beneficiaries to the extent of the distribu-
table net income remaining after deducting therefrom the first tier
income.
Excluded from the tiers are amounts which qualify for the gift
exemption, because they are basically distributions of corpus. Un-
der section 663, distributions which are nonperiodie in nature are
not included as income within any of the tiers. Thus, under sec-
tion 663(a) (1), an amount distributed in satisfaction of a gift or
bequest of either a specific sum of money or of specific property, is
tax-free to the beneficiary if payable out of accumulated income or
corpus and if paid in not more than three installments. However,
if the amount can be paid only from income, it is not protected by
the exemption for gifts and bequests. Thus, a bequest or devise of
an amount other than income, such as a general dollar bequest or a
devise of a parcel of real property, would qualify for the gift ex-
emption. 2 9
The Problem of Accumulated Income:
The Five-Year Throwback Rule
Although the distributable net income measuring rod both elimi-
nates problems of tracing and taxes beneficiaries up to the amount
29 For an excellent example of how the tier system operates, see Suiuy & WAnnm: at
908-09.
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of distributable net income regardless of the source of the payment,
there is still an avoidance possibility in the use of the year and a
day trust. This is the so-called Dean trust, which, as in Commis-
sioner v. Dean,30 will accumulate its income in one year and dis-
tribute that accumulation, together with current income, in the
next year. In this way the beneficiary would not be taxed on more
than the distributable net income in the second year and the rest
of the income would have been taxed to the trust in the prior year.
The 1954 Code attempts to meet this problem in sections 665 to 668.
These sections apply to complex trusts but not normally to simple
trusts, and not to estates in any case. In general, if the dis-
tribution to the beneficiary exceeds the distributable net income of
the year of distribution, then the excess is treated as having been
distributed in the preceding year. Therefore, if the trust had
accumulated income in the previous year, the effect of the accumu-
lation is eliminated and the beneficiary will be required to include
that excess in his income for the preceding year. If there had been
no accumulation in the preceding year, the distributable net income
for that year will have been used up and no amount could then bo
taxed to the beneficiary on the excess received in the current year,
as income of the preceding year. However, any excess of the dis-
tributable net income of the current year is treated as having been
distributed in the second preceding year, and this process is re-
peated for the third, fourth and fifth years preceding the taxable
year. Thus, if in any of the preceding five years there has been an
accumulation of income, then the beneficiary is taxed as if the
amount accumulated had been distributed to him in the year of
accumulation up to the amount of the excess. Thus the Code pro-
vides the same tax result where income is being distributed cur-
rently and where it is accumulated for one to five years and then
distributed. The effect is to average the accumulated income of up
to five years, the beneficiary thereby paying at the same tax rates
as if the distributions had been made currently.3
APPLICATION OF THE 1954 CODE
PROVISIONS TO THE UNITRUST
The Tier System
The unitrust will normally direct payments to be made to bene-
ficiaries in terms of a percentage of the market value of the uni-
trust assets, or in terms of a certain number of dollars. Under such
30 102 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1939).
31 See generally SuRRFY & WAREN at 916-25.
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directions, the trust cannot be a simple trust since its terms do not
provide that all of its income is required to be distributed cur-
rently. In any year in which the trust distributes amounts other
than amounts of income in the trust accounting sense, it would also
be precluded from being a simple trust. The unitrust, therefore,
will not be controlled by sections 651 and 652, but by sections 661
to 669 (subparts 0 and D) which govern complex trusts.
-Where there is only one current beneficiary of a unitrust, the
application of the Code provisions is relatively simple. Under sec-
tion 662 such beneficiary will be taxed on all distributions to the
extent they do not exceed the distributable net income of the trust.
Where, however, there are several current beneficiaries, con-
sideration must be given to the application of the tier system.
Under the provisions of sections 661 and 662, "the amount of in-
come for the taxable year required to be distributed currently to
such beneficiary" will be included in the income of the beneficiary
as a first tier distribution. Since the direction in the unitrust is one
to pay what amounts to an annuity, the taxation of the distribution
would be controlled by the last sentence of section 662(a) (1) : 3
For purposes of this section, the phrase "the amount of income for
the taxable year required to be distributed currently" includes any
amount required to be paid out of income or corpus to the extent such
amount is paid out of income for such taxable year.
Thus, where an annuity is payable out of income or corpus, under
a literal reading of the statute it would not be a first tier distribu-
tion, that is, it would not be payable out of "income," unless it was
actually paid out of income for trust accounting purposes. This
would require a tracing to the actual source of the distribution,
and an annuity would not be a first tier distribution unless in fact
paid out of income. The regulations, however, in section 1.662(a)-
2(c), and the examples in section 1.662(a)-2(e), seem to indicate
that the amounts payable as an annuity out of income or corpus are
first deemed to be paid out of income if there is enough trust in-
come to support taxation of the distribution as income.- Under this
interpretation of the regulations, amounts distributed as an an-
nuity would be a first tier distribution to the extent of trust income,
regardless of the source of the distribution.
Where the shares paid to the various unitrust beneficiaries are
of the same quality, the result will be the same under both the
32 See HX. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A200 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CoDD
CONG. & AD. NEws, 4025, 4339-40 (1954); SURREY & WAnmnE at 907.
33 See Sum= & WAnEx at 909.
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statute, read literally, and the regulations. Suppose, for example,
that the trust is funded with $200,000 worth of assets, and has three
beneficiaries, A, B, and C, each of whom is entitled to a current
distribution of two per cent of the value of the corpus after addi-
tion thereto of all income. Further, suppose that the trust at the end
of the first year is worth $210,000 and has taxable income of $5,000,
which is also the amount of its distributable net income. Each bene-
ficiary is entitled to a distribution of $4,200 and each will pay a tax
upon $1,667, one-third of the distributable net income. Since all
beneficiaries receive shares of the same quality, it does not matter
whether the distributions are in the first or second tier:
(1) If the distributions are in the first tier to the extent of the
income of the trust, then the first tier distribution to each bene-
ficiary will be $1,667, which will exhaust the distributable net in-
come of the trust so that nothing will be taxed in the second tier.
This would seem to be the result required by the regulations.
(2) If the last sentence of section 662(a) (1) is read literally,
then the amount which is first tier income will be only the amount
which is in fact distributed from income for trust accounting pur-
poses, and tracing will be required to determine this fact. Assum-
ing the trustee distributes pro rata from income and principal,
then each beneficiary will receive two per cent of the income and
two per cent of the principal. In other words, each beneficiary will
receive $100 out of income, and $4,100 out of the corpus of the
trust. Only the $100 distribution to each beneficiary would be con-
sidered a first tier distribution and the balance would be a second
tier distribution. However, since all beneficiaries take the same
qualitative shares, they will still each pay tax on $1,667, $100 as a
first tier distribution, and $1,567 as a second tier distribution.
(3) If the distributions were considered to be made entirely
from corpus, which is theoretically possible if the trustee charges
the payments to corpus for trust accounting purposes, then there
would be no first tier distributions to deplete distributable net in-
come and all amounts would be taxed in the second tier. Each
beneficiary would still be taxed on $1,667 since each receives the
same qualitative share.
But, assume that each beneficiary receives a required distri-
bution of two per cent, or $4,200, and also that in the current year
the trustee makes a discretionary payment to A (under a power
to sprinkle trust assets, or a similar discretionary power), whereby
A receives an additional share of $4,200. Since the second share
received by A is not required to be distributed, it is clearly not a
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first tier distribution and hence will fall into the second tier. Now
the shares received by A, B and C are not all of the same quality
and different treatment wM result depending upon in which tier
the required payments are taxed:
(1) If the required payments are in the first tier to the extent
of the available income, then A, B and 0 will each pay a tax on
$1,667. The discretionary share of $4,200 received by A will bear
no part of the tax since the first tier distributions will exhaust dis-
tributable net income.
(2) If the required payments are paid ratably from income and
principal, and are so treated for trust accounting purposes, and
taling the last sentence of section 662(a) (1) literally, then $100 of
each required payment will be a first tier distribution and $4,100
will be a second tier distribution. In this situation, $800 of distrib-
utable net income will be used up in the first tier, leaving $4,700
available for taxation in the second tier. B and 0 each have second
tier distributions of $4,100, and A has second tier distributions of
$8,300-$4,100 remaining from his required share, and $.4,200 from
his discretionary share. Since A has received slightly over 50 per
cent of second tier distributions, he will pay tax on slightly over
one-half of $4,700, and B and C will each pay tax on slightly under
one-quarter of $4,700. Thus, A will pay tax on a little over $2,400
in the second tier, and B and C will each pay tax on a little under
$1,150 in the second tier. This means that A pays tax on a total of a
little more than $2,500, while B and 0 each pay tax on a total of a
little less than $1,250.
(3) If the required distributions are all in the second tier, as
-where the trustee charges the payments to corpus, A will pay a tax
on $2,500, and B and C will each pay a tax on $1,250.
In a situation where distributable net income is less than current
income, the second tier rather than the first tier beneficiaries may
obtain the advantages of the reduced distributable net income.
Assuming, in this example, that there had been a $1,000 commis-
sion expense allocable to corpus, the reduction of distributable net
income of $4,000 benefits only the second tier were amounts taxed
in the first tier are $4,000 or less.
Other examples can be imagined, but the above clearly illustrate
the problem. The question becomes whether the last sentence of
section 662(a) (1) is to be read literally so as to require tracing of
the source of a distribution which is payable out of income or
corpus, or whether any distribution so payable is deemed to be
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paid out of income to the extent available, which is the position
taken by the regulations. The question is fundamental and can
perhaps best be approached by a review of the development of the
tracing concept under the various revenue acts.
Prior to 1942, under the 1939 Code, trust beneficiaries were
generally taxed on only those amounts that were distributed or dis-
tributable out of current income of the trust. In the Revenue Act
of 1918 the beneficiary was taxed on his "distributive share" of the
net income of the trust.34 In the Revenue Act of 1921, the act under
which Burnet v. Whitehouse was decided, the language was
changed so as to tax the beneficiary on "income of the ... trust
for its taxable year which.., is distributable to such beneficiary,
whether distributed or not." 35 Under section 162 of the 1939 Code,
the beneficiary was taxed on the amount of income of the trust
for its taxable year which was currently distributable and also on
amounts which were properly paid or credited to the beneficiary
for the year." This scheme of taxation required distributions which
could not be traced to trust income for the year of distribution to
be treated as payments from corpus, not taxable to the beneficiary
and not deductible to the trust. This result followed from section
22(b) (3), which provided an exemption for gifts and bequests of
corpus (except for income from property given or bequeathed),
and from sections 162(b) and (c), which allowed the fiduciary a
deduction and taxed the beneficiary on amounts to be distributed
currently or properly paid or credited to a beneficiary, if these
amounts were current income of the trust.
In 1942, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1942, section 111
of which amended section 22(b) (3) of the 1939 Code to provide that
if a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance is to be paid at intervals,
then to the extent it is paid out of income from property, it is tax-
able to the recipient. In order that section 162(b) or (c) would be
applicable if an annuity were paid from corpus of an estate or
trust, section 162(d) was added. Subsection (d) in effect provided
that, where an amount was paid or payable out of other than in-
come, the amount distributed (unless it was a gift or inheritance
which was not to be paid or distributed at intervals) "shall be con-
sidered as income of the estate or trust which is paid, credited, or
34 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 219(d), 40 Stat. 1057. See 6 MERTENS, LAW or FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION § 36.14 (1957).
351Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(d), 42 Stat. 227. See 6 IEIWTrtNS, LAW or
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 36.14 (1957).
36 See 6 MERTENS, LAW Or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 36.14 (1957).
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to be distributed if the aggregate of such amounts so paid, credited,
or to be distributed does not exceed the distributable income of the
estate or trust for its taxable year." Thus, the beneficiary was
taxed to the extent that there was trust income in the year of dis-
tribution. The tracing concept was abandoned for corpus distri-
butions and the distribution was treated as one of current income
regardless of the actual source. This solution for the annuity prob-
lem is essentially the solution adopted in the 1954: Code for all
cases.
37
The net result of the 1942 amendments was to create a three tier
system of taxation in which all current income distributions,
-whether required or discretionary, were in the first tier; annuities
and other nonexcepted. principal distributions were in the second
tier; and past accumulated income distributed after the first 65
days of the year were in the third tier.' Although the effect of sec-
tion 162(d) was largely to eliminate a requirement to trace to
current income, tracing was still required for vurposes of the tier
system-i.e., whether a distribution was from current income or
corpus-and also to determine whether prior years' accumulations
were being distributed. 39
With the adoption of the 1954 Code, the necessity for tracing was
even further abandoned. In its place there was substituted a gen-
eral rule which taxes the beneficiary upon a distribution whether
or not its source is trust income of the current year, but limits the
amount taxable to the distributable net income of the year of distri-
bution. This principle is embodied in section 662(a) (2) which in-
cludes in the beneficiaries' income "all other amounts" distributed.
The use of this phrase eliminates any problem of tracing to current
income.
The committee reports for the 1954 Code show clearly the intent
of Congress to eliminate tracing as a general requirement.40 The
37 See generally SURREY & WARRE at 900-07; SUmnY & WAnErM , FMML IzICO=
TAXOTio 676-79 (1953 ed.); Kamin, Surrey & Warren, The Intcrnal 2crcenue Code of
1954: Trusts, Estates and .Beneficiaries, 54 CoLum. L. R-v. 1237, 1246-48 (1954); Hol-
land, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, A Proposed .Rcvision, of the Federal Income Taz
Treatment of Trusts and Estates-Anzerican Law Institute Draft, 53 CoL, r!. L. R L,-v.
316, 338-39 (1953).
sI.:R.C. § 162(d) (1939); M]cHAESO , Ixconn- TA=TIOn op EsTATs A-TD Tauszs
13 (1966 rev. ed.).
39 See Kamnin, Surrey & Warren, The Internzal Revenue Code of 1954: TrLsts, Estates
and Beneficiaries, 54 CoLum~. L. REv. 1237, 1242 (1954).
40 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE CoI;u. &
A3D. NEws 4025 (1954) states:
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detailed discussion of section 662, however, also makes it clear the
tracing requirement was not entirely to be abandoned. Here the
committee reports state that it is:
possible largely to avoid the necessity for tracing of income which
exists generally under existing law.... This principle is similar to the
determination of whether a dividend has been distributed, i.e., that
every distribution made by a corporation is deemed to be out of earn-
ings and profits to the extent thereof and from tile most recently accu-
mulated earnings and profits.
41
Note that the language is "largely to avoid" the tracing re-
quirement and not "entirely to avoid" it. This seems to indicate
that all tracing was not intended to be eliminated. The last sen-
tence of section 662(a) (1) would seem to retain a tracing require-
ment for purposes of the tier system. This is confirmed by the
language of the report:
Included within the provisions of this paragraph is an annuity which
is required to be paid at all events (either out of income or corpus)
but only to the extent that it is satisfied out of income.
42
In other words, such an annuity is a first tier distribution only to
the extent it is satisfied out of income. This interpretation is rein-
forced by the statement in the report's discussion of second tier
distributions that included in the second tier is:
an annuity which is required to be paid at all events but which is pay-
able only out of corpus [which] is treated as an "other amount a
required to be distributed." 43
This approach represents a basic departure from the general rule of the existing
law that taxable distributions must be traced to the income of the estate or trust
for the current year.
The approach adopted by the bill eliminates the necessity, in determining the
taxability of distributions, of tracing such distributions to the income of the estate
or trust for the current taxable year. The simplicity of this general principle makes
it possible to eliminate the so-called 65-day and the 12-month rules of existing law.
Under the bill, except to the limited extent provided under the throwback rule (dis-
cussed later) which is designed to eliminate a loophole of existing law, amounts
distributed in 1 year will not be considered to have been distributed in a preceding
year, and the source of a distribution, whether made from the income of the current
year or of a preceding year, is immaterial in determining the taxability of the dis-
tribution in the hands of the beneficiary. Furthermore, amounts not included in the
gross income of the estate or trust will generally not be taxable to the bonoficiarles.
Id. at 60-61, reprinted at 4086-87.
41H.R. RP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A199 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nmws 4339 (1954).
42 Id. at A200, reprinted at 4339.
43Id. at A200, reprinted at 4340. This rule is adopted by eg. See. 1.662(a)-3(b)
(1956).
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Thus, although tracing as a requirement was generally abandoned
by the 1954 Code, section 662(a) (1) appears to have retained the
tracing requirement, as regards payment of annuities, for pur-
poses of the tier system. The 1954 Code provisions shift discre-
tionary income distributions from the first to the second tier and
place in the first tier the amount of an annuity which is actually
paid out of income for the year. As noted above, the regulations,
section 1.662(a)-2(e) and the examples in section 1.662(b)-2(e),
seem to abandon tracing even as to annuities when they are pay-
able out of income or corpus, but this treatment appears to have no
support either in the statute or the legislative history.
Assuming that these regulations are invalid, it would seem that
whether the distribution of a unitrust share will be a first tier or
second tier distribution will depend upon the trustee's accounts,
and if the distribution is charged only in part to income, only that
part would be considered as a first tier distribution. When, how-
ever, these principles are applied to the unitrust share, difficulties
arise because the trust instrument does not make the traditional
distinction between corpus and income. All receipts are added to
principal and since each beneficiary shares in the entire fund, there
is no purpose to be served by labeling the fund in the usual way.
No purpose, that is, except a tax purpose. If a label is necessary
for tax purposes, the fund is most likely to be labeled "corpus."
Perhaps this would be the result under local law regardless of
-whether the instrument provides a label. In such case, all distri-
butions of unitrust shares would be in the second tier, there would
be no qualitative difference among them, and the beneficiaries
would share ratably in the distributable net income. This result
follows because, as we have noted, the operation of the tier system
depends upon the definition of income provided by the trust in-
strnment and applicable local law.44 There may be some doubt,
however, whether for tax purposes the trust instrument can depart
so radically from normal concepts of income and define it out of
existence by labeling every part of the fund corpus. Regulation
section 1.643(b)-1 provides, to the contrary, that "[t]rust pro-
visions which depart fundamentally from concepts of local law
in the determination of what constitutes income are not recognized
for this purpose." When, therefore, a required annuity is payable
from income (as the word normally is used), or from corpus, trac-
ing is required by section 662 (a) to determine the source of the
-I.R.C. §§ 643(b), 662(a).
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payment. Thus, for tax purposes the trustee would have to keep
traditional income-principal accounts and records of the source
of all distributions.
If, on the other hand, the courts uphold section 1.662(a)-2(c)
of the regulations, which provides that a required annuity payable
from income or corpus is deemed to be paid from income to the
extent income is available, then tracing will have been largely elim-
inated even for purposes of the tier system. In such case, in the
above examples, assuming the trustee had discretion as to the
source of payment, the discretionary distribution would be re-
ceived free of tax because distributable net income would be ex-
hausted by first tier distributions of required annuities. This
result can be prevented only if the instrument requires the annuity
to be charged to corpus, in which case, even according to the reg-
ulations, 45 such required distributions would be in the second tier.
Application of the Throwback Rule to the Unitrust
The throwback rule will apply in any year where there is an
"accumulation distribution" within the meaning of section 665(b)
and there is "undistributed net income" for any of the five prior
taxable years.40 In any year where the trust distributes less than its
distributable net income, there will be I I undistributed net income"
for that year in the amount by which the distributable net income
exceeds the distributions to beneficiaries plus the amount of taxes
imposed upon the trust. If within five years of that year the trust
makes an "accumulation distribution "-the amount (if in excess
of $2,000) by which the amounts distributed, with certain excep-
tions specified in section 665 (b), exceed distributable net income-
that accumulation distribution is allocated back to the preceding
years to the extent of the undistributed net income for those years.
The accumulation distribution is matched against the undistributed
net income of each preceding year in succession and treated, until
it is exhausted, as a distribution in each successive preceding
year.47 Thus the beneficiary pays the tax on the amounts as if
received in the preceding year.48 The beneficiary is also treated as
having received as part of the accumulation distribution the taxes
paid by the trust in the preceding year,49 the trust is denied a re-
45 Reg. See. 1.662 (a)-3 (b) (1956).
46 I.T.C. § 666.
47 I.R.C. § 666(a).
48I.R.C. § 668.
49I.R.C. § 666(b).
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fund for such taxes,10 and the beneficiary is given a credit for the
taxes against his tax liability- 1
The results of the throwback are not serious since the total of
the distributions which would have been included in the bene-
ficiary's income for the preceding years are to be included in his
income for the current year. However, the character of the items
is determined by reference to the composition of the distributable
net income of the particular year in question, and the current
year's tax attributable to this added income cannot exceed the tax
that would have been imposed had the distribution actually been
made in the preceding yearsY2 Thus bunching is eliminated. How-
ever, as can be seen, the application of the throwback provisions
may involve very serious tracing questions and considerable work
and trouble for the parties involved.
The instances in which this problem will arise in the case of the
unitrust are problematical. If the unitrust share is a percentage
high enough to cover the normal return on the trust corpus, the
problem will not normally arise since the distribution of income
would generally equal or exceed the distributable net income of the
trust, and thus prevent the presence of undistributed net income.
This would be especially true in the case of the unitrust where
growth investments and not income investments are emphasized.
However, if the shares are relatively small percentages as com-
pared to the normal return on the trust corpus, or if there is a
large amount of income to the trust in a single year, then there is
the possibility of having amounts which could be taxed in later
years under the throwback provisions.
This problem could perhaps be solved by requiring that in no
event shall the total distribution of the trust be less than the dis-
tributable net income of the trust. This, however, may create prob-
lems since it makes the trust begin to look like the conventional
trust rather than the unitrust. In other words, the current bene-
ficiary may attempt to surcharge the trustee for not investing in a
high yield investment as such investments could produce distri-
butable net income in excess of the amount otherwise distributable.
Capital Gains
In General. Under the scheme of the Code, the critical question in
determining where the burden of the tax on capital gains falls is
so I.R.C. § 667.
511.R.C. § 668(b).
52I.R.C. § 668(a).
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whether a given capital gain is included in the distributable not
income of the trust. It is the trust's distributable net income which
measures the maximum amount includable in the gross income of
the beneficiaries (and deductible by the trust) by virtue of distri-
butions to the beneficiaries. Thus, to the extent that capital gains
are excludable from distributable net income they are taxed to the
trust and not to the beneficiary.5
3
Section 643 of the Code defines distributable net income as the
taxable income of the trust with certain "modifications." The
modification which concerns us is contained in section 643(a)(3)
which provides, in pertinent part:
Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets shall be excluded
to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are not...
paid, credited, or required to be distributed to any beneficiary during
the taxable year ....
A preliminary question under the above provision arises from
the fact that in a unitrust no distinction is drawn between trust
corpus and trust income. All receipts constitute one fund and the
beneficiaries are given a share in that fund either by way of a per-
centage of the total value of the fund at a certain date or by way of
a fixed dollar amount.
Since in a unitrust capital gains and ordinary income constitute
one fund, will the proceeds of capital gains be considered to have
been allocated to corpus within section 643(a) (3)? Note that the
trust indenture would not, in haec verba, allocate such gains to
corpus. This, of course, is because for accounting purposes in a
unitrust no such provision is necessary, a direction concerning
allocation to corpus being meaningful only where the trust distin-
guishes between trust corpus and trust income. Section 643(a) (3),
however, was drafted in terms of this distinction. Nevertheless, it is
not to be thought that this section was designed to mandate the use
of trusts which recognize the distinction. It would seem that, prop-
erly construed, all this section provides is that if a trust, as is com-
monly the case, is based on the corpus-income dichotomy, capital
gains are not excluded from distributable net income if they are
allocated to income rather than corpus. This construction is sup-
ported by the regulation which provides that capital gains are
"ordinarily excluded" from distributable net income unless (aside
53 A beneficiary may still escape tax on capital gains (or ordinary income) which aro
included in distributable net income if his distribution is protected under section 663 (a)
as "Ia gift or bequest of a specific sum of money or of specifl property which is
paid or credited all at once or in not more than 3 installments."
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from the utilization concept of paragraph (a) (3), discussed below)
they are:
(1) Allocated to income under the terms of the governing instrument
or local law....
(2) Allocated to corpus and actually distributed to beneficiaries dur-
ing the taxable year .... 54
Of course, it would be possible to insert provisions in the unitrust
indenture to the effect that (a) "all receipts are to be allocated to
corpus," r or (b) "capital gains (and certain other items) are to
be allocated to corpus, other receipts being allocated to income."
Perhaps language to this effect would offer some protection against
a very literal interpretation of section 643 (a) (3). Such provisions,
however, are meaningless, given the nature of a unitrust, for the
operative provisions of such a trust, those determining the interest
of the beneficiaries and the amount of their distributions, do not de-
pend to any degree on the corpus-income dichotomy.
The more important question with respect to section 643 (a) (3)
and the unitrust is whether capital gains will be considered "paid,
credited or required to be distributed" to the beneficiary of a uni-
trust share. The proper interpretation of this statutory provision
has been discussed elsewhere by one of the authors60 There it was
concluded that the statute should be interpreted to include capital
gains in distributable net income (1) if the trust instrument re-
quires that the proceeds of a capital gains transaction be distrib-
uted currently to a beneficiary, (2) if a discretionary distribution
is traceable to a capital gain realized during the same taxable year
as the distribution, or (3), in accordance with paragraph (a) (3) of
regulation section 1.643(a)-(3), if, and to the extent that, the pro-
54 Reg. See. 1.643 (a)-3 (a) (1956).
55 Section 643(b) provides that for the purposes of subparts A, B, C and D, "the
term 'income,' when not preceded by the words 'taxable,' 'distributable net,' 'undis-
tributed net,' or 'gross,' means the amount of income of tho estate or trust for the
taxable year determined under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable
local law." Reg. Sec. 1.643(b)-i (1956) provides that:
Trust provisions which depart fundamentally from concepts of local law in the
determination of -what constitutes income are not recognized for this purpose. For
example, if a trust instrument directs that all the trust income shall be paid to A,
but defines ordinary dividends and interest as corpus, the trust will not be considered
one -which under its governing instrument is required to distribute all its income
currently for purposes of section 642(b) (relating to the personal exemption) and
section 651 (relating to "simple" trusts).
Aside from the question of the validity of this regulation, it vould Beem inapplicable
to the suggested trust provision to bvhich this material is footnoted, since the word in.
come is not used in section 643 (a) (3).
56 See Joyce, The Income Taxation of the Capital Gains of a Trust, 23 TAx L. IMR.
361 (1968).
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ceeds of a current capital gain have been "utilized" by the fiduci-
ary in making the distribution.
Of these three tests, the only one which would seem to have
applicability to a unitrust is the last, i.e., the test of utilization. The
tests of required distributions of capital gains and tracing to a
current capital gain would not be relevant since they presuppose
that the trust instrument creates a distinction, for trust accounting
purposes, between corpus (including original corpus, accumulated
income, accumulated capital gains, or current capital gains) and
income, whereas the unitrust makes no such distinction. Since in a
unitrust all receipts are allocated to, and all disbursements and dis-
tributions are charged to, one fund, it is not meaningful to speak of
mandatory distributions of current capital gains or distributions
which are charged by the trustee to current capital gains.
In applying the test of utilization it is necessary to give separate
consideration to the various kinds of shares which a beneficiary
could have in a unitrust.
The Percentage Share. Assume that the trust provides that each
year A is entitled to two per cent of the value of the fund valued as
of a particular date. On that date the fund is worth $500,000 of
which $5,000 is due to ordinary income and $10,000 is due to a capi-
tal gain realized by the trust during its taxable year. A is paid
$10,000. As indicated above, A is taxed on only that amount which
does not exceed distributable net income. Distributable net income
begins with taxable income of the trust; here that amount is
$15,000 ($5,000 ordinary income plus $10,000 capital gain). Is the
amount of capital gain excluded under section 643(a) (3)? If so,
distributable net income is only $5,000, which becomes the amount
taxable to A. If is it included, in whole or in part, distributable net
income will exceed, and A will be taxed on more than, $5,000.
If, as appears to be the case, paragraph (a) (3) of regulation sec-
tion 1.643(a)-(3) is justified by the statute, it would seem that part
of the capital gain will be considered paid under section 643(a) (3).
Since the $10,000 gain was part of the fund to which A's two per
cent was applied, it would seem clear that the gain was, in the
words of the regulation, "[u] tilized (pursuant to the terms of the
governing instrument...) in determining the amount which is dis-
tributed or required to be distributed."
A contrary argument can be made that none of the capital gain
is paid to A because his share in no way depends upon the realiza-
tion of the gain and would be the same without regard to the real-
ization. This argument, however, in no way defeats the rationale of
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the "utilization" principle, since that principle does not depend on
notions of realization. True, prior to realization, the gain cannot
enter distributable net income of the trust and there can be no tax
thereon. However, the unrealized gain is no less utilized when an
amount is distributed because of its value. When the gain is real-
ized, the only other effect is that a taxable event will have occurred.
This taxable event, coupled with the fact that the realized gain is
"utilized" to determine the amount distributable to the beneficiary,
will cause the gain to enter distributable net income so that the
beneficiary must pay part of the tax on the gain.
This would not mean, however, that all of the $10,000 is included
in distributable net income. Under section 643 (a) (3), gains are ex-
cluded "to the extent" that they are not "paid, credited, or re-
quired to be distributed." In terms of the regulation they are ex-
cluded to the extent they are not "utilized" in determining the
amount distributed. In a certain sense, of course, all of the $10,000
gain is "utilized" since it all goes into the fund to which A's two
per cent is applied. But realistically only two per cent of the gain
is "utilized" since A is benefited during the taxable year only to
the extent of his percentage share. It must be kept in mind that the
utilization concept is, in the last analysis, dependent on the word
"paid," and it would seem beyond serious argument that A here
has in no sense been "paid" the total $10,000 capital gain."'
Consequently, on the basis of the above analysis, distributable
net income would be $5,200 ($5,000 of ordinary income and $200 of
capital gain) and A would be taxed on only $5,200 of the $10,000
distributed to him. In effect, A is taxed on only two per cent of the
capital gain.
Fixed A'mounzt Share. Suppose in the above example A was en-
titled to a fixed amount of $10,000 a year. In such a case, it would
seem that none of the capital gain would be included in distribut-
able net income. Since A is to be paid $10,000 a year in any event,
whether or not there are capital gains (or ordinary income) it can-
not be said that the gain was "utilized" in determining the amount
to be distributed to A. The regulations contain an example to this
very effect 8s
57 Suppose in our example that the fund, without the addition of tho $15,000 income
of the taxable year, -was valued at $435,000. A's distribution then would be $9,000 (two
per cent of the sum of $435,000 and $15,000). Again the gains have boca utilized, but
it would be somewhat difficult to argue that A who had received only $9,000 had been
"paid" $10,000 of capital gains.
5Steg. Sec. 1.643(a)-3(d) .rX. (2) (1956).
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Combination of Percentage Share and Fixed Amount Share on a
Sliding Scale. Suppose that the trust provides that the beneficiary
shall receive:
(1) a certain percentage of the fund but no less than a certain
amount, or
(2) a certain percentage of the fund but no more than a certain
amount, or
(3) a certain amount but no less than a certain percentage of the
fund, or
(4) a certain amount but no more than a certain percentage of
the fund.
The problem common to all four possible situations is to deter-
mine under what circumstances the percentage is an operative fac-
tor since then, and only then, would the capital gains be "utilized"
in determining the amount to be paid to the beneficiary.
(1) Where the share is a percentage of the fund but no less than a
certain amount. Suppose that the trust provides that A shall be
paid two per cent of the value of the fund but no less than $10,000.
(a) Assume the value of the fund is $510,000 which includes a
$10,000 capital gain. The amount to be paid to A is $10,200, which
is determined partially through the application of the percentage
to the capital gain. The capital gain has thus been utilized and two
per cent of it, under the prior analysis, would be included in dis-
tributable net income.
(b) But suppose the value of the fund is $490,000, again including
a $10,000 capital gain. Here, two per cent of this value gives A less
than $10,000. The operative factor, here, therefore, is not the per-
centage but the fixed amount. A gets $10,000 in any event, and he is
in no way benefited by the presence of the capital gain.
Thus, in this category, part of the capital gains will be included
in distributable net income only where the application of percent-
age to a fund whose value includes current capital gains will result
in an amount greater than the fixed amount.
(2) Where the share is a percentage of the fund but no more than
a certain amount. Suppose the trust provides that A is to be paid
two per cent of the value of the fund but no more than $10,000.
(a) Assume the value of the fund is $490,000, including a $10,000
capital gain. Here the amount to be paid to A is $9,800, the result of
applying the percentage to the fund, including the gain. The gain is
thus utilized and in part enters distributable net income.
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(b) But suppose the fund is worth $510,000, including a $10,000
capital gain. Since A can be paid no more than $10,000 and since he
would have been paid $10,000 even if there had been no capital gain,
the operative factor here is the fixed amount and the gain, not hav-
ing been utilized, is not included at all in distributable net income.
In this category, therefore, part of the capital gains will enter
distributable net income only if the capital gains must be included
in valuing the fund in order to give the beneficiary, by applying
the percentage, the equivalent of the fixed amount.
(3) Where the share is a fixed amount but no less than a percentage
share. Suppose the trust provides that A is to be paid $10,000 but
no less than two per cent of the value of the fund.
This category is really the same as number (1) above. In both
catergories the beneficiary is to get the greater of the percentage or
the fixed amount. Thus, in this category, as in number (1), part of
the capital gains will enter distributable net income only where the
application of the percentage to the total value of the fund, includ-
ing the capital gains, will result in an amount greater than the fixed
amount.
(4) Where the share is a fixed amount but no more than a certain
percentage of the fund. Suppose the trust provides that A is to be
paid $10,000 but no more than two per cent of the fund.
(a) If the fund is worth $510,000 including a $10,000 capital
gain, the operative factor is the fixed amount since $10,000 is not
more than two per cent of the fund ($10,200). The gain is thus not
utilized and does not enter distributable net income.
(b) But suppose the fund is worth $490,000, including a $10,000
capital gain. Here the fixed amount is more than the percentage
and so the amount distributed is $9,800 (two per cent of $490,000).
Since the gain here is part of the fund to which the percentage was
applied, it would seem at first blush that it has been "utilized' " and
thus enters into distributable net income.
But the percentage here is a limiting factor with respect to A's
share and can only operate to reduce his distribution. The factor
that benefits A is the fixed amount which does not depend on the
presence of capital gains. Thus although the gain was utilized in
computing A's share, it in no way benefited him and should not be
considered "utilized" within the meaning of paragraph (a) (3) of
regulation section 1.643(a)-(3) or "paid, credited, or required to
be distributed" as those terms are used in section 643(a) of the
Code.
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The Significance of the Taxable Year. As has been discussed else-
where by one of the authors, 9 there is an apparently permissible
method of insuring that capital gains are always excluded from
distributable net income. Under section 643 (a) (3) capital gains
realized by a trust during its taxable year are excluded from dis-
tributable net income "to the extent that such gains are allocated
to corpus and are not... paid, credited, or required to be distrib-
uted to any beneficiary during the taxable year .... 11 10 Thus, if,
for example, a capital gain is realized by a trust in its first taxable
year, but is "paid" to a beneficiary on the first day of the second
taxable year of the trust, it would seem that the gain would not be
included in distributable net income for either year. It would not be
included in distributable net income for the first taxable year since
it was not "paid" during that year. It would not be included in
distributable net income for the second taxable year since it was
not realized during that year.61
In terms of a unitrust, since capital gains are considered "paid"
when the beneficiary is paid an amount in the determination of
which the gains were utilized, it would always be possible to keep
capital gains out of distributable net income. This would be done
by providing that, in calculating the amount to be paid to the bene-
ficiary during a certain taxable year of the trust, the amount of the
capital gains for that taxable year are to be excluded in determin-
ing the value of the fund to which the beneficiary's percentage is to
be applied.
To illustrate, assume that both the trust and the beneficiary re-
port on a calendar year basis and that the trust has realized a capi-
tal gain in its first year. If, under the terms of the trust, the bene-
ficiary's share for the first year is calculated by applying his
percentage to the value of the fund, including the capital gain of the
59 See Joyce, The Income Taxation of the Capital Gains of a Trust, 23 TAX L. iv.
361, 394-95 (1968).
60I.B.C. § 643(a) (3) (emphasis added).
61 These results are not affected by section 662(e) which provides that:
If the taxable year of a beneficiary is different from that of the estate or trust,
the amount to be included in the gross income of the beneficiary shall be based on
the distributable net income of the estate or trust and the amounts properly paid,
credited, or required to be distributed to the beneficiary during any taxable year
or years of the estate or trust ending within or with his taxable year.
This section depends on distributable net income, and capital gains are in distributablo
net income only if realized and paid during the same taxable year of the trust. Thus, the
fact that the trust and the beneficiaries may have different taxable years will not render
capital gains includable in distributable net income for any year as long as they are not
paid to the beneficiary during the same taxable year of the trust in which they woro
realized.
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first year, but is distributed, or is required to be distributed, on
January I of the second year, the capital gain for the first year will
not enter into distributable net income. The capital gains of the
second year will not affect this distribution since they will not have
been utilized -with respect to any payment during the second year.0'
This device is similar to that used in the so-called "Dean trust"
under the 1939 Code prior to the 1942 amendments in which ac-
cumulated income of the trust's taxable year was paid a day after
that taxable year ended. Prior to the 1942 changes a beneficiary was
taxed only on amounts which were paid to him (or as to which he
had the right to be paid) during the trust's taxable year out of the
trust's income for tliat same year. Thus, any income distributed to
a beneficiary in the succeeding taxable year of the trust was taxable
to the trust in its prior taxable year and could be distributed tax-
free to the beneficiary. With respect to ordinary income this device
was no longer available after the 1942 amendments and cannot be
used under the 1954 Code. -Under the analysis set forth above, how-
ever, it would still appear to be available with respect to capital
gains.
63
Distributions Effecting Sales or Exchanges
The purpose of the discussion under this heading is not to ex-
haust the topic of when a distribution from a trust results in a real-
ized gain or loss by the trust or a beneficiary; rather, it is to
investigate the extent, if any, to which the applicability of general
principles may be altered because of the differences presented by
the unitrust share.
Before analyzing distributions of a unitrust share, we will con-
sider the general principles which control sale or exchange conse-
quences of trust and estate distributions.
On a distribution in kind in satisfaction of a fractional share in
all assets, where the beneficiary receives exactly the assets be-
queathed, the trust or estate will recognize no gain or loss and the
beneficiary acquires a carryover basis in the property distributed s
62 Note that it is not necessary to value the trust at the beginning of the trust's suc-
ceeding fiscal year, but only to pay the amount at that time.
63 The throwback rules of sections 665 to 608 do not affect this device, since they
apply only to the distribution of prior undistributed net income uhich is defined gen-
erally as the excess of distributable net income over distributions. Thus rhere dis-
tributable net income does not include capital gains, the presence of capital gains cannot
contribute to undistributed net income.
6- Reg. Sec. 1.661(a)-2(f) (1956); Reg. see. 1.1014-4(a)(2) (1957); Rhev. ]Rul. 55-
117, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 233; O.D. 667, 3 Cum. BuLu,. G52 (1920); PolasLhy, 862-63.
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Where, however, such a distribution is in satisfaction of a fixed
dollar amount gift or bequest, the trust or estate will realize gain
or loss and the beneficiary will take the fair market value of the
property as his basis. 5 The difference in result arises because a
transfer of the property in kind in satisfaction of the fixed dollar
claim is treated as a sale or exchange of the property, resulting in
realization of gain or loss to the trust or estate.';
However, no sale or exchange is involved where a distribution in
kind is made of a fractional share. In such case, the beneficiary re-
ceives exactly what he was given-an interest in specific assets.0 7
Applying these principles to the unitrust share, where the share
is a fixed dollar annuity, it is clear that the beneficiary has a fixed
dollar claim. A distribution of property in kind in satisfaction of
the claim will be a sale or exchange of the property for the claim
and the trust will realize gain to the extent the property has ap-
preciated, and loss to the extent it has depreciated. The bene-
ficiary, of course, will have received a distributive share of any
trust income, rather than a tax-exempt gift or bequest, because the
annuity is payable annually in more than three installments.8 To
the extent the share is not taxed to the beneficiary under section
662(a) because it exceeds distributable net income, the receipt is
tax-free to the beneficiary since he will have exchanged a claim for
money with a basis equal to the value of the property received,
and there is thus no gain or loss. In either case, the beneficiary's
basis in the property is its fair market value. 9
Where the unitrust share is described as an "amount equal to"
or a "sum equal to" a certain percentage of the fund, the tax conso-
quences of a distribution in kind in satisfaction of the share should
be exactly the same as those just described for the fixed dollar an-
nuity. In other words, such a percentage share also gives to the
beneficiary a fixed dollar claim because each time the formula is ap-
plied, i.e., amually, the result is a claim fixed and payable in dollars.
Note that here the fixed dollar claim of the beneficiary will be
determined annually by application of the constant percentage to
65Reg. Sees. 1.661(a)-2(f)(1), (3) (1956); Reg. Sec. 1.1014-4(a)(3) (1957);
Polasky, 860-62. See also Rev. Rut. 67-74, 1967-10 I.R.B. 15 (March 6, 1967).
66 Kenan v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113
(D. Conn. 1935), aff'd per curian, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573
(1936); Polasky, 814, 862.
07 Polasky, 862-63.
Gs See I.R.C. § 663(a).
69 Reg. See. 1.661(a)-2(f) (3) (1956) ; Reg. See. 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957) ; Kenan v.
Comm'r, 114 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1940). See Polasky, 860-61. See also Rev. Rd. 67-74,
1967-10 I.R.B. 15 (March 6, 1967).
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the total fund. It might be argued, therefore, that no dollar amount
claim is ever fixed; that the amount ultimately to be received by the
beneficiary at any future time cannot be determined until that time,
and that, in reality the beneficiary takes a fractional share. The
argument, however, is illusory since the giving of an "amount" or
"sum," as we have seen,10 is the gift of a pecuniary legacy and
carries with it no interest in the specific assets in the fund. The fact
that the number of dollars given is determined by a formula does
not change the pecuniary nature of the gift; nor is its nature
affected by the fact that the annual dollar claim will always reflect
the appreciation and depreciation of the fund. Although this is a
characteristic of the fractional share, since the beneficiary has no
interest in the assets of the fund as such, the other vital character-
istic of such a share is lacking. The value of the assets in the fund
is merely an annual measuring stick to determine the only thing
the beneficiary has a right to-a number of dollars. Therefore, on a
distribution of property in kind in satisfaction of the unitrust per-
centage share a realizable event occurs.-,
It has been assumed that the unitrust share will not be expressed
so as to give the beneficiary a fractional share. Presumably, there
would be no desire to give the beneficiary a direct interest in the
assets of the trust fund and to make distributions in kind in satis-
faction of the share. This would present an unworkable arrange-
ment for periodic payments. Furthermore, in such case, any dis-
tribution of cash in satisfaction of such a claim would effect a sale
by the beneficiary of the interest in the specific asset for cash, and
and the beneficiary would realize gain or loss. For example, sup-
pose the fund was comprised only of Blackacre, value $100 and basis
$50, and cash of $100. If a beneficiary with a 10 per cent fractional
share were given $20 of cash in discharge of his claim, he would
have, in effect, sold his interest in Blackacre, value of $10 and basis
of $5, for $10, thus realizing a gain of $5 on the transaction 2 Also,
the transferor of the $10 will have purchased 10 per cent of Black-
acre for the cash and have a cost basis of $10 in that portion of
Blackacre. 3 Note also that if the trust assets had been Blackacre
and Whiteacre, each with a value of $100 and a basis of $50, and the
70 See text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra.
7lLindsay C. Howard, 23 T.C. 962 (1955); Brinckerhoff v. Comm'r, 168 F.2a 430
(2d Cir. 1948); Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1933). Sce also 1Bev. Rul. 67-74,
1967-10 I.R.B. 15 (March 6, 1967). Cf. Reg. See. 1.663(a)-l(b)(1) (1956).
72 See Rouse v. Comm'r, 159 F.2a 706 (5th Cir. 1947), affirming 6 T.C. 908 (1946);
Polasky, 863-64.
73 See Polasky, 864.
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beneficiary had distributed to him a 20 per cent interest in White-
acre, the beneficiary would have sold his 10 per cent interest in
Blackacre for 10 per cent of Whiteacre, again realizing a gain of $5.
In turn, the trust would have sold a 10 per cent interest in White-
acre for 10 per cent of Blackacre and would also have realized a
gain of $5.
Although this result would seem clear where the beneficiary re-
ceives a distribution in satisfaction of a gift or bequest of principal
which, if received in kind, is exempt from tax under sections 102(a)
and 663(a), there may be a different result as to the beneficiary
where the periodic unitrust share is satisfied. Although such
a share is a fractional share, it is not within the exemption pro-
vided by sections 102 and 663 because it is a periodic gift
under section 663(a). Under the regulations it is taxed as an an-
nuity so that it will be taxed to the beneficiary as a distributive
share of trust income and the beneficiary receives a basis in the
property equal to its fair market value." Thus, although the
periodic nature of the fractional share would not seem to affect the
tax consequences of the distribution in kind as far as the trust is
concerned, the beneficiary is not treated as if he had both sold his
interest for cash and also received a distribution of ordinary
income. Here, the gain on the "sale" seems to be disregarded. The
result to the beneficiary then is the same as if his interest were a
dollar amount share.
An argument can be made, however, that. this treatment is
too liberal to the beneficiary of a fractional share, the value
of which has appreciated. The fact that a distribution is taxable
to such a beneficiary under section 662 because of presence in the
trust of distributable net income in no way negates the fact that
there is also present gain due to appreciation of the beneficiary's
interest. Thus if, as in the above example, the beneficiary had ex-
changed his 10 per cent interest in Blackacre for a 10 per cent
interest in Whiteacre, he would have sold his interest in Blackaere,
basis $5, value $10, for a gain of $5. If the trust had no distributable
net income for the year of distribution so as to preclude taxation
of the taxpayer as a trust beneficiary, he presumably would still
be taxable on the gain of $5 since that result does not depend on the
presence of distributable net income in the trust. By the same
token, the presence of unrelated distributable net income should
not preclude taxation of the gain from the exchange. But, in this
74Reg. See. 1.663(a)-1(b)(2) (1956); Reg. Sec. 1.661(a)-2(f)(3) (1956).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 23 :TAX LAW REw
TAXATION OF A UINITRUST
latter situation, under regulation section 1.661(a)-2(f)(3) the
beneficiary appears to obtain a basis in Whiteacre equal to its
fair market value, thus precluding further taxation of the gain
due to appreciation of the beneficiary's interest. The seeming
anomaly of the suggestion that the beneficiary be taxed on more
dollars than he actually receives does not arise from the taxing of
the gain on the exchange of the fractional interest, but rather
from the principle of section 662 which deems what is in reality a
distribution of corpus to be a distribution of income to the extent of
the distributable net income of the trust. Such legislative tinkering,
at least in this instance, has failed to achieve consistency with
more legitimate tax principles.
If it is determined, under the principles discussed above, that
a trust has realized a capital gain by a distribution in kind in
satisfaction of a fixed dollar claim, then a further question
would arise as to whether the gain, or some portion thereof, had
been "paid" to the beneficiary within the meaning of section
643 (a) (3), thereby increasing distributable net income.
Here reference must be made again to the principle of utiliza-
tion (or benefit) and the difference in this respect between a per-
centage share and a fixed annuity unitrust. In the case of a fixed
annuity unitrust, the gain realized by a distribution in kind should
not be considered paid to the beneficiary because the presence
of the gain is irrelevant in determining the amount to be distrib-
uted to the beneficiary. On the other hand, in the case of a per-
centage share unitrust, it would seem that such percentage of the
gain should be considered paid to the beneficiary and thus included
in distributable net income, since, to the extent of the percentage,
the gain is -utilized to determine the amount distributed to the bene-
ficiary. In this respect, it should again be noted that the concepts of
utilization and realization must be kept distinct. In a percentage
share unitrust capital gain will be utilized whether realized or not.
However, the question of determining where the tax burden is im-
posed does not arise until the gain is realized. (It also bears repeat-
ing that under section 643(a) (3) a capital gain is excluded from
distributable net income unless it is realized and paid in the same
taxable year of the trust.)
In the case of a unitrust which gives a beneficiary a fractional
share, a gain realized by the trust by virtue of a distribution of an
asset different from that in which the beneficiary has the fractional
interest would seem clearly to be excluded from distributable net
income. In such a case, just as in the case of a fixed sum annuity, the
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gain realized by the trust would not be utilized in determining the
beneficiary's share and would thus not be "paid" within section
643 (a) (3).
The fact that capital gains enter distributable net income does
not necessarily result in their being taxed to the beneficiary of an
"in ind" payment. If the distribution to the beneficiary is ex-
cluded from the beneficiary's income by section 663(a) as a "gift
or bequest of a specific sum of money or of specific property...
which is paid or credited all at once or in not more than three in-
stallments," no part of the tax is paid by the beneficiary in spite
of the fact that he receives the gain. In such a case, under the prin-
ciples of section 662(b), all beneficiaries receiving taxable distri-
butions (up to distributable net income) will share the tax, and if
all the distributable net income is not distributed or distributable,
the trust Will share the tax with the beneficiaries.75 If, on the other
hand, the distribution in kind is not protected by section 663(a),
under section 662(b) the beneficiary of the "in kind" payment is
treated as having received a ratable portion of the capital gain
together with other beneficiaries.
The Marital Deduction and the Unitrust
IN GENERAL
The value of property passing from a decedent to his surviving
spouse is deductible from the gross estate as a marital deduction
under section 2056 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. With limited
exceptions, the deduction is available only for interests in prop-
erty which are not nondeductible "terminable interests" under
section 2056(b). A terminable interest is defined as an interest in
property which will terminate or fail due to lapse of time or on the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of some event or contingency. Such
an interest is not deductible if an interest in the same property also
passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than
the surviving spouse or her estate, by virtue of which such person
may possess or enjoy the property after termination of the sur-
viving spouse's interest. Thus, for example, a bequest by decedent
75 It should be noted that the fact that the distribution in kind is excluded from the
beneficiary's income by section 663 does not prevent the capital gain from being incInded
in the trust distributable net income. Section 663 (a) provides only that the exempt dis-
tribution "shall not be included as amounts falling within section 661(a) or 662(a)."
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of a property interest in trust, with the income payable to his sur-viving spouse for her lifetime and remainder to his children, will
be a nondeductible terminable interest. The interest terminates on
lapse of time and an interest in the same property has passed to
the children who may enjoy the property after the surviving
spouse's death.
A trust, however, can qualify for the marital deduction under
section 2056(b) (5). This most important exception to the nonde-
ductible terminable interest rule provides, in effect, that an interest
passing from the decedent, whether or not in trust, will be a de-
ductible interest if the surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the
income from the entire interest or a specific portion thereof, and
if the spouse is given a power to appoint the entire interest or such
specific portion to herself or her estate. In such a case, the statute
provides that the entire interest in the property from which the
surviving spouse is entitled to the income, and over which she has
the power of appointment, passes to the surviving spouse and no
interest passes to any other person. Thus, the interest of the
surviving spouse is not a nondeductible terminable interest because
no one other than the surviving spouse acquires an interest in the
property in question. Also, since the entire interest in the property
passes to the surviving spouse, the full value of the property
qualifies for the marital deduction.
The elaborate provisions of section 2056(b) (5) are exhaustively
interpreted by the regulations 7' which list five conditions that must
be satisfied to meet the Code provisions regarding the surviving
spouse's income interest and her power to appoint. 7 Under both
the Code and the regulations, the surviving spouse is required to
be the beneficiary for life of all the income of the entire trust prop-
erty, or a specific portion thereof. In order to have that right, the
surviving spouse must have:
substantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust property
during her life which the principles of the law of trusts accord to a per-
son who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust.
Such degree of enjoyment is given only if it was the decedent's inten-
tion, as manifested by the terms of the trust instrument and the sur-
rounding circumstances, that the trust should produce for the surviving
spouse during her life such an income, or that the spouse should have
such use of the trust property as is consistent with the value of the
trust corpus and with its preservation. 8
76 leg. See. 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
77 Reg. See. 20.2056(b)-5(a) (1958).
78 Reg. See. 20.2056(b) 7 5(f) (1) (1958).
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To protect the surviving spouse's right to income, the regula-
tions contain elaborate rules disqualifying trusts where the trustee
may accumulate income, or may retain unproductive property or
where the trustee has unusual powers regarding the allocation of
receipts and expenses between income and corpus70
THE FRACTIONAL SHARE REQUIREMENT
There may be some difficulty in qualifying a unitrust for the
marital deduction under the life estate power of appointment
exception to the terminable interest rule. Although the spouse can
be given the requisite power to appoint the trust property in favor
of herself or her estate, under the regulations the entire trust
would be disqualified because the surviving spouse would not be
entitled to all of the income from the entire trust property, or
from a specific portion thereof. Whether the current share be ex-
pressed as a fixed dollar annuity or as a percentage share, there is
no guarantee that the spouse will receive all the income. The spouse
would not, under the regulations, have an income interest in a
specific portion of the trust property. For an interest to qualify
under the specific portion language of the statute, the regulations
require that the rights over the income and the power of appoint-
ment must coexist as to the same interest in property, and that the
rights over income and the power constitute a "fractional or per-
centile share of a property interest so that such interest or share
in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionate share of the in-
crement or decline in the whole of the property interest to which
the income rights and the power relate." 0 Thus, for example, the
regulations would allow a marital deduction for one-half of the
property passing in trust where the surviving spouse was entitled
to one-half the income and had the requisite power of appointment
over at least one-half of the trust property. The deduction is en-
tirely disallowed by the regulations if the annual income of the
surviving spouse is limited to a specific sum, or she has power to
appoint only a specific sum.
The fractional share test would prevent any part of the assets
of a unitrust from qualifying for the marital deduction. If the
surviving spouse's current interest is expressed as a fixed dollar
share, even though this is considered to be an income interest it
will not meet the test of the regulations which requires a fractional
or percentage interest in income. The percentage unitrust share
79 Reg. Sees. 20.2056(b)-5(f) (1) to (5) (1958).
soReg. Sees. 20.2056(b)-5(b), (e) (1958).
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would not appear completely to meet this test since the percentage
is not in income, but in all trust assets, both income and corpus.
The percentage does not appear to bear any necessary relation-
ship to a percentage of income alone; the full amount that will be
payable under it each year cannot be translated into a percentage
of income. It is arguable that where the percentage equals or ex-
ceeds the normal return on the trust assets it is equivalent to an
interest in all the income and the entire interest should therefore
qualify for the marital deduction. The same argument could, of
course, be made where the fixed dollar share would equal or exceed
such return, but the regulations would not allow the deduction for
the fixed dollar share, nor, presumably, for the percentage share.
THE Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank RuLE
The portion of the regulations requiring that the income interest
be in a fractional share of the property was rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States," where the decedent's will gave an interest
in trust of one-half the residue of the estate from which the sur-
viving spouse was to be paid out of "income and corpus" the sum
of $300 per month and over which the spouse was given the requi-
site power of appointment. The district court allowed a marital
deduction for an amount equal to the value of a $300 monthly an-
nuity for the surviving spouse.8 - The Third Circuit reversed,'
holding there was no acceptable method of computing the specific
portion. The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit that
annuity tables could not be used to compute the specific portion,
but reversed the court of appeals and held that the marital deduc-
tion was allowable for the amount of trust corpus required to
produce income in the amount of the fixed monthly stipend of $300.
This specific portion was to be determined by use of an estimated
realistic rate of return available to a trustee under reasonable in-
vestment conditions. The fractional share test of the regulation, the
Oourt held, "in the context of this case ... improperly restricts
the scope of the Congressionally granted deduction."
The test for a "specific portion" set forth in Northeastern, would
appear to be met whenever the amount of corpus necessary to
81387 U.S. 213 (1967).
82 Northeastern Pa. Nat1 Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 P. Supp. 941 (M.D.
Pa. 1964).
S- Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1966).
84 387 U.S. at 218.
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produce the payments to the surviving spouse can be calculated
with reasonable accuracy. Thus, under the Northeastern rule, the
unitrust share which is expressed as a dollar amount, or a per-
centage share with a dollar minimum, will qualify for the marital
deduction in an amount of corpus which will produce the dollar
amount (assuming the presence of the requisite power to appoint).
In the case of a percentage unitrust share, where the percentage is
the same as or greater than any rate of return to be used in apply-
ing the Northeastern rule, then the entire value of the corpus
should be allowed as a marital deduction, up to the amount sub-
ject to the requisite power to appoint. If the percentage is stated
in an amount lower than such rate of return, then the specific por-
tion should be approximately the percentage of corpus which the
rate of the percentage share bears to the rate of return. Thus, if
the rate of return is four per cent and the share is three per cent,
the specific portion would be slightly more than three-fourths of
the corpus. This is only an approximation because, where the per-
centage is applied to the total fund at the end of the fund's year,
the beneficiary will normally be entitled to more than the stated
percentage of the original fund because of the presence of earnings.
The above analysis assumes that what the beneficiary receives
from the fund is income so as to receive the income from a specific
portion of the corpus within the meaning of section 2056(b) (5).
The holding and reasoning of Northeastern appear to support this
analysis, because there the $300 per month was payable to the sur-
viving spouse from income or corpus. Under the reasoning of Bur-
net v. Whitehouse, this is an annuity which is payable without re-
gard to income and is therefore a charge on principal. Nevertheless,
the Court in NortheasterA treated the annuity as if payable from
income. A percentage share should receive the same treatment
even though the beneficiary theoretically benefits from the stated
percentage of the value of each trust a~set, whether income or
corpus. The Commissioner may take the position, however, that a
percentage share gives an interest in the income only in the
amount of the percentage. Thus, a five per cent share would give
the surviving spouse a five per cent interest in income and the
balance of any distribution to her would be an invasion of corpus.
Such invasion for the benefit of the spouse would not disqualify
the trust, 5 but a marital deduction would be allowed for only five
per cent of the corpus since that is all the income the spouse re-
ceives. The limited utility of this possible result would obviously
85Reg. Sec. 20.2056(b)-5(j) (1958).
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discourage the use of the percentage share unitrust for the marital
deduction until such time as the law is clarified in favor of the
taxpayer.
Another problem in using a unitrust for the marital deduction is
that the spouse's power of appointment should be limited to only
so much of the corpus as is the specific portion from which the in-
come is payable. Unless the power is so limited, more of the trust
corpus will be included in the estate of the surviving spouse on her
death than was allowed as a marital deduction to the estate of the
spouse dying first. For example, if the surviving spouse is entitled
to $10,000 per year out of a trust of $400,000, and if a five per cent
rate of return is a reasonable rate of return, it would follow from
the Northeastern decision that the specific portion of the corpus
which can qualify for the marital deduction is $200,000. In order to
so qualify, the spouse need have the required power of appointment
only over such specific portion, i.e., the same specific portion from
which the income is payable, rather than over the entire corpus.
Therefore, it would seem to follow that the power need not be given
over the entire trust corpus, and should be limited to such part of
the trust corpus as is necessary under the Northeastern, rule to
produce annual income of $10,000-in our example, $200,000. Other-
-wise, the surviving spouse would have included in her estate more
than was allowed as a marital deduction.
In considering the above example, it is important to note that in
Northeastern the surviving spouse had the power to appoint the
entire trust corpus by will and the Court did not have to pass on the
fractional share test as it relates to the power to appoint. The
Court's holding, however, appears to upset the fractional share
test as it applies both to the income interest, which was before the
Court in Northeaster, and the power to appoint. In the above ex-
ample of the $10,000 fixed annuity, Northieastern would hold that
$200,000 was the specific portion of the corpus from which the
spouse was entitled to all the income at five per cent. If the dollar
amount, $200,000, constitutes a specific portion from which the
income of $10,000 is payable, it can hardly avoid being a specific
portion for purposes of the power of appointment.
Although Northeastern logically seems to require that a power
of appointment over a stated sum qualifies as a power to appoint
a specific portion, nevertheless, there is some language in the
Court's opinion which has a different, if not an opposite, thrust.
For example, the Court refused to concede that the issue is the
same where a power to appoint rather than an income interest is
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
involved. Indeed, the Court specifically distinguished Gelb v. Com-
missioner,86 in which the Second Circuit had held that the marital
deduction was allowable for that dollar amount of trust assets
which could be calculated actuarially as being subject to the sur-
viving spouse's power of appointment. The spouse had been given
all the income from the trust for her life and had the requisite
power to appoint the remainder. However, the trustees could in-
vade corpus for the support of decedent's minor daughter to the
extent of $5,000 per year. This power, contended the Commissioner,
prevented any part of the trust from qualifying for the marital
deduction because the surviving spouse's income right and her
power extended neither over the entire trust property nor over a
fractional or percentile interest in the property. The court, how-
ever, rejected the fractional share test and held that the dollar
amount of trust assets which could be computed actuarially as not
subject to the power to invade was a specific portion. The court
computed the deduction by substracting from the total value of
the trust property the maximum actuarial value of the power of
invasion ($5,000 per year multiplied by the combined average life
expectancies of the spouse and child). The remaining corpus
qualifed for the marital deduction as a specific portion.
The Northeastern Court may have felt Gelb was distinguishable
because the qualifying portion of the trust in Gelb was not a stated
sum. But the opinion also showed a greater awareness that the
problem of the power to appoint may involve considerations dif-
ferent from those of the income interest. The Court noted a gov-
ernment argument involving the Gelb facts and pointing out the
possibility of substantial tax avoidance if the Northeastern rule
were applied, and then dismissed it as involving a "quite different
problem, which is not before us." Here the Court may have been
mindful of the tax avoidance technique described by the dissent:
Assume a trust estate of $200,000, with the widow receiving the right
to the income from $100,000 of its corpus and a power of appointment
over that $100,000 .... Now suppose that when the widow dies the trust
corpus has doubled in value to $400,000. The wife's power of appoint-
ment over $100,000 applies only to make $100,000 taxable to her estate.
The remaining $300,0000 passes tax free to the children.8 7
This example deserves some expansion. If the dissent is correct
that the holding of the majority will apply to qualify for the mari-
so 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
87 Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 227
(1967) (footnote omitted).
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tal deduction a power to appoint a stated sum, then the marital
trust can be funded in the maximum amount by use of the formula
clause, the widow can be given all the income, but her power to ap-
point can be limited so as to reach the entire principal of the trust
at her death, but no more thMan the number of dollars that were
originally used to fund the trust. In this way the maximum marital
deduction is obtained and if the trust fund appreciates there is sub-
stantial tax saving at the death of the surviving spouse because the
appreciation is not subject to her power to appoint and will not
be included in her estate. This problem arises, of course, because
of our constantly expanding economy and the high probability of
long run appreciation of trust assets. The problem could be solved
by discounting the dollar amount originally subject to the power to
appoint in order to allow for the projected rate of appreciation of
trust assets over the life span of the surviving spouse.88 Thus, if
the marital trust contains $100,000 and appreciation of 100 per
cent is projected over the spouse's life span, the deduction would
only be allowable for $50,000-the present value of what will
eventually be included in the estate of the surviving spouse.
The device discussed by the dissent was not involved in North-
eastern because the surviving spouse had the power to appoint the
entire trust corpus and all of it was subject to tax in her estate.
The majority of the Court may have felt, therefore, that there was
no tax avoidance problem when only a fixed dollar income interest
is involved rather than a power to appoint a specific sum. It is
submitted, however, that there is a similar problem even when only
a fixed dollar income interest is in issue. Under Northteastern, the
right to the fixed dollar annuity is a right to all the income from a
specific portion of the corpus necessary to produce that amount.
The question is whether a right to income from a stated number of
dollars of corpus is a right to all the income from that number of
dollars. The answer would appear to be "no," since all the income
from those dollars would seem to include the income from future
growth of that dollar amount of corpus, which will never be re-
ceived by the trust beneficiary. In this sense, even in Northeastern
the surviving spouse did not have a right to all the income from the
amount of corpus which would currently produce $300 a month
because as the beneficiary of a fixed dollar annuity, limited to $300
a month, she could not receive the income from any appreciation of
that amount of corpus. Therefore, the marital deduction should
88See Fisher & Kol, Supreme Court Intcrprcts "Spceife Portion" for Marifal Dc-
duction Purposes, 27 J. TAXATIoN 12 (1967).
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be allowed for only some lesser amount of corpus which would,
over the life of the widow (taking into consideration additional
income yield from future appreciation of corpus), produce an
average of $300 a month. The holding of Northeastern was not,
however, so refined and would seem to allow the deduction for the
full corpus currently necessary to produce the stated annuity.
In summary then, although the logic of Northeastern would com-
pel a holding that the power to appoint a stated sum is a power
over a specific portion, that issue was not involved in the facts of
that case, and the logic may be thus restricted because of the
obvious tax avoidance possibilities in such a holding. Therefore,
when a power to appoint a stated sum is involved, the stated sum
may be denied status as a specific portion. This may occur even
though Northeastern itself appears to open the door to avoidance
of the statutory requirement that the surviving spouse receive
all the income.
THE ESTATE TRUST
A kind of trust that would seem fully and safely to qualify for
the marital deduction as a unitrust is the so-called "estate trust,"
whereby property is bequeathed in trust solely for the benefit of
the surviving spouse during her lifetime and with remainder over
to her estate. Even though the surviving spouse's life estate is a
terminable interest, it is not a nondeductible interest since no one
other than the surviving spouse or her estate takes an interest in
the property. 9 And, under the regulations, the entire interest is
considered as having passed from the decedent to the surviving
spouse.90 Hence, the entire value of the property passing in trust
qualifies for the marital deduction without having to meet the terms
of section 2056(b) (5), and the conditions imposed by the regula-
tions for the life estate power of appointment marital deduction
trust may be ignored. The surviving spouse need not be given the
income payable annually. Nor need she be given the requisite power
to appoint to herself or her estate. Indeed, the regulations, in
effect, provide that a bequest in trust qualifies for the marital de-
duction if the trust income is to be accumulated for a term of years
or for the surviving spouse's life and the augmented fund is to be
paid to the surviving spouse or her estate.9 There need be no con-
89 I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1) (A).
O0 Reg. Sees. 20.2056(e)-2(b) (1), (b) (2) (1958).
9'Reg. See. 20.2056(e)-2(b)(1)(iii) (1958). The regulation does not state explicitly
that such a bequest will qualify for the marital deduction. This, however, is its offect
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cern with the effect of administrative powers of the trustee con-
cerning allocation of receipts and expenses between principal and
income, nor with retention in the trust of unproductive property.
Thus, the unitrust, when it is an estate trust, may hold assets like
growth stocks or unproductive land and still qualify for the marital
deduction.
Gifts to Charity and the Unitrust
GiFTS oF C ARiTABLE RE ,AmDES
The gift or bequest of a remainder interest to a charity after a
prior estate is deductible under the estate tax, the gift tax, and the
income tax if the remainder is not subject to any contingency other
than the natural termination of the prior estate. 2 The amount of
the deduction for a remainder to charity after a life estate or a term
for years is determined by valuing the remainder on the basis of
the Treasury tables in sections 20.2031-7(f) and 25.2512-5(f)
of the regulations. These tables measure the value of annuities, life
estates, and remainder interests on the assumption of a three and
one-half per cent rate of return, compounded annually."
If the gift to charity is subject to a contingency, the regulations
provide that it is not deductible under the income, estate, or gift
taxes, even though the gift is susceptible of actuarial valuation,
unless the possibility that the charity will not take is so remote as
to be negligible. 94 The Supreme Court has approved the Treasury
position in Commissioner v. Sternberger's Estate,°  which held
that a remainder to charity, which was contingent upon the death
of testator's 27 year old divorced and childless daughter dying
since it provides that the property so bequeathed in trust is considered to have pasea
from the decedent to his surviving spouse. This provision, coupled with the Code provi-
sion of section 2056 (b) (1) (A) that precludes a nondeductible terminable interest when
no one other than the surviving spouse or her estate takes an interest in the property
bequeathed, makes the entire value of the property qualify for the marital deduction.
See also section 20.2056(b)-5(j) of the regulations, which allovs an invasion of corpus
for the benefit of the surviving spouse without disqualifying the trust for the marital
deduction. Although this regulation is concerned only with power of appointment trusts,
its rationale seems broad enough to include any trust which qualifles for the marital
deduction.
92 Reg. Sees. 20.2055-2(a), 25.2522(a)-2(a), 1.170-2(d)(2), 1.170-1(0), 1.170-1(d)
(1958). See generally Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Gifts, 40 VA. L. lEV.
394, 416 (1960). But cf. section 170(f), which in certain eases postpones the deduction
of a remainder interest in tangible personal property.
93 See Reg. See. 1.170-2(d) (2) (1958).
9-4Reg. Sees. 1.170-1(e), 20.2055-2(b), 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1958).
95 348 U.S. 187 (1955), reversing 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953) and 18 T.C. 836 (1052).
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without issue, was not deductible. Both the Tax Court and the
Second Circuit had allowed a deduction holding that. fle charity's
interest could be valued actuarially. The Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that no deduction was allowable unless the charity was
assured of receiving the property.96
The deduction for a gift of a charitable remainder may also bo
barred where the remainder is subject to a power of invasion in
favor of a noncharitable beneficiary. The regulations contain the
extreme language that the deduction "will be limited to that
portion, if any, of the property or fund which is exempt from the
exercise of the power." 97 This language, however, loses much of
its force when read in light of the rest of the regulations which
allow the deduction where the chance of the charity's interest being
defeated is "highly improbable" or "so remote as to be negli-
gible." The regulations, therefore, would seem to accord with the
cases which allow the deduction where the power to invade is lim-
ited by an ascertainable standard, which, under the circumstances
of the particular case, makes it virtually certain that the charity
will take an ascertainable amount of the property."" The deduction
is allowed for the ascertainable amount.
If the power to invade is not limited by a fixed standard which is
capable of measurement, then the amount passing to the charity is
not ascertainable and the deduction is disallowed. This was the
holding in Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner,;0 in which
the Supreme Court denied a deduction for a charitable remainder
where the trustee was authorized to invade the principal of the
trust for the "comfort, support, maintenance and happiness" of
the income beneficiary. In so doing, the Court approved and ap-
plied the language presently in the regulations that the charitable
bequest, to be deductible, must have, at the testator's death, a value
"presently ascertainable and hence severable from the non-chari-
table interest." 100 Although the Court recognized that invasion of
principal was extremely unlikely in view of substantial trust in-
9 348 U.S. at 199. If at the testator Is death his daughter had no issue and was incap-
able of having issue, the remainder to charity would be deductible. United States v.
Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934). There, of course, the contingency lacked sub-
stance, and, in the words of the regulations, was "so remote as to be negligible."
97Reg. Sees. 20.2055-2(b), 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1958).
98 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595 (1949); Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. CommI'r, 320 U.S. 256 (1943); Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279
U.S. 151 (1929). See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATn AND GIFT TAXES
363-65 (1962).
99 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
100 Reg. Sees. 20.2055-2(a), 25.2522(a)-2(a) (1958).
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come and the age and independent means of the income beneficiary,
it nevertheless denied the deduction because the possibility of in-
vasion of corpus was not limited by a fixed standard. The same
result was reached by the Court in Henslee v. Uiion Planters Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co.,11 where the trustee was authorized to
invade corpus for the "pleasure, comfort and welfare" of the life
beneficiary. No fixed standard was established and the amount
passing to the charity could not be accurately measured.
Applying these general principles to a unitrust, the major prob-
lem in its qualifying for a charitable deduction is establishing the
amount the charity is assured of receiving. Two requirements must
be met to receive the deduction: the value of the charitable interest
must be presently ascertainable, and any possibility that the char-
ity will not take must be so remote as to be negligible. In applying
these tests to the unitrust, let us begin with a share limited by a
dollar amount. Here, any invasion of corpus would appear to be
limited by a fixed standard. The charitable remainder could be
valued as if charged with a yearly annuity for the life expectancy
of the current beneficiary so as to establish the present value of theminimum interest that would pass to charity. This is the method
sometimes followed by the Internal Revenue Service and sustained
in a number of decided cases. 1 -02 However, apparently only one
circuit court of appeals has allowed the deduction for such an in-
terest over the objection of the Service. In Estate of Schildkraut v.
Commissioner,0 3 a surviving spouse was bequeathed a yearly
annuity of $12,000 with remainder of the trust property to go to a
charity. Assuming a three and one-half per cent rate of returl, the
court held that a direction to invade principal to make up the
difference between actual income and $12,000 a year was a fixed
standard, capable of being stated in a definite amount of money.
For this purpose, the court held that the widow's life expectancy
would be determined under the usual tables unless the Commis-
sioner could prove actual life expectancy was materially different.
In so holding, the court found not only that the value of the chari-
table gift was presently ascertainable but also that the remoteness
test of the regulations did not apply. Therefore, the court rejected
the Commissioner's argument that the widow could live long
103 335 U.S. 595 (1949).
1o2Rev. RuL 54-285, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 302; Estate of Jean S. Alexander, 25 T.C.
600 (1955); Estate of Helen Stow Duker, 18 T.C. 887 (1952); Estate of Ben F. Stern-
helm, 2 COH T.C. MEm. DEC. 311 (1943), rcv'd on other grounds sub noni. Wells Fargo
Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 145 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1944).
303 368 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 959 (1907).
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enough (to age 84, 11 years beyond her life expectancy) for annual
corpus invasions to wipe out the trust principal, and that this pos-
sibility was not so remote as to be negligible. The remoteness test
did not apply because, according to the court:
[T]his is not an "either-or" situation in which the happening of an
event, whose probability has to be ascertained, wipes out the charitable
interest entirely. Rather, this is a case with a series of non-volitional
possibilities of corpus invasion, e.g., surviving to age 72, to age 73, etc.,
each of which tends to diminish, but does not eliminate, the charitable
remainder.... we do not read the Supreme Court decisions as requir-
ing use in these circumstances of the "so remote as to be negligible"
test at all.'
04
Thus the court stressed two facts in rejecting the remoteness
test: a non-volitional power to defeat the charitable gift, and lack
of an "either-or" situation. It is true that these facts distinguish
Sternberger's Estate where the charitable bequest took effect only
if the decedent's unmarried, childless 27 year old daughter died
without descendants. There the charitable gift could be entirely
eliminated (either-or situation) by the volitional act of the life
beneficiary.
The distinction does not, however, justify rejection of the re-
moteness test in a situation where yearly invasion of principal is
required to pay an annuity. Although the non-volitional nature of
one outliving his life expectancy may make it less likely to occur
than a volitional act, the "remoteness" thereof may still not be
negligible. In Schildkraut, the possibility of the widow surviving
her life expectancy did not appear so remote as to be negligible.
Nor is the holding justified by the "either-or" distinction. Here the
remoteness test would properly require a determination of a time
to which the widow's chance of living was so remote as to be negli-
gible. In Schildkraut, if this were less than 84 years of age but more
than 73 years, then only a partial deduction should have been
allowed. By no means does the "either-or" distinction require an
"all or none" deduction.
In the case of the dollar amount unitrust share, Schildkraut
would allow a deduction for a gift of a charitable remainder based
on the present actuarial value of the remainder less an allowance
for invasion of corpus necessary to make up the difference between
the trust income and the annuity. There is, however, substantial
contrary authority which would deny the deduction entirely where
204 368 l.2d at 48.
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yearly invasion of corpus is possible and the annuitant has a more
than remote chance of living long enough to exhaust trust cor-
ps.105 These cases appear to be better reasoned on the remoteness
issue.
The value of a charitable remainder could be deductible even
where the unitrust share is not subject to a maximum dollar limit
but is expressed only in terms of a fixed percentage of trust assets,
or in terms of such a percentage with a minimum dollar payment.
The value could be computed by projecting the income buildup over
the life expectancy of the current beneficiary, reduced by an annual
charge in the amount of the stated percentage. If the percentage
share would not exceed annual trust income, then the value of the
remainder would be computed under the usual tables whereby the
principal is multiplied by the factor for remainders. Since no dim-
inution of corpus is likely here, both the ascertainable and remote-
ness tests of the regulations are met and a deduction should be
allowed. The situation here appears to be no different than the
usual case of a gift of remainder to charity after a simple life
estate. Where the percentage would exceed annual trust income,
the amount of corpus diminution per year would appear to be meas-
urable after allowing for a declining amount of income per year.
The full present value of the remainder would not be deductible,
but, under the reasoning of Sclildkraut, could be allowed for the
amount the charity would take, after allowing for corpus diminu-
tion over the life expectancy of the current beneficiary.""' Again,
however, since diminution of corpus is likely and could extend
beyond the life expectancy of the current beneficiary, the taxpayer
would be faced with the substantial authority contrary to
Schildkraut on the remoteness issue.
105 Estate of Choffin v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Fla. 1963) ; Florida Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 62-2 U.S.T.C. 12,082 (S.D. Fla. 1902) (20 per cent chance
charity would not take); Estate of George M. Moffett, 31 T.C. 541 (1958) (20 per cent
chance), aff'd 269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26 (Ist
Cir. 1955) (1 chance in 11); Estate of Jean S. Alexander, 25 T.C. 600 (195) (8.6
per cent chance). But see Estate of Helen Stow Duker, 18 T.C. 887 (1932) where the
deduction was allowed although the chances that the beneficiary vould live to consume
the entire corpus were greater than 1 in 10.
108 ee Estate of Ben F. Sternheim, 2 CCH T.C. Ymtm. Drc. 311 (1943), rcv'd on othler
grounds sub nam. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 145 F.2d 132 (9th
Cir. 1944). See also Rev. Rul. 60-162, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 376, vhero failure to provide
for depletion of subsurface resources sufficient to keep the corpus intact resulted in a
diversion of corpus each year to the life beneficiary, so that a deduction for a gift of
the remainder to charity depended upon ascertaining the maximum feasible rate at vhich
subsurface resources would be withdrawn.
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GIFTS OF PRESENT INTERESTS TO CHARITY
Transfers of income interests in trust for the benefit of a charity
also qualify for favorable tax benefits. Under the income tax, a
deduction is allowed for the value of the income interest, subject
to the percentage limitations of section 170(b) (1).107 The deduc-
tion, however, is disallowed where the grantor retains a reversion-
ary interest in the corpus or income of the trust which is worth
more than five per cent of the trust property.1° *Where no such
reversionary interest is retained, the extra 10 per cent allowance
of section 170(b) (1) may be disallowed where the transfer is in
trust since the contribution must be made "to" and not merely
"for the use of" the designated charity.' ° The value of a charitable
gift of income is deductible under the estate and gift taxes without
limitation."0 No deduction at all is allowed, however, where the
charity may not receive the beneficial enjoyment of the interest.
The regulations under the income, estate and gift taxes identically
provide:
The deduction is not allowed in the case of a transfer in trust conveying
to charity a present interest in income if by reason of all the conditions
and circumstances surrounding the transfer it appears that the charity
may not receive the beneficial enjoyment of the interest. For example,
assume that assets placed in trust by the donor [decedent] consists of
stock in a corporation the fiscal policies of which are controlled by the
donor and his family, that the trustees and remaindermen are likewise
members of the donor's [decedent's] family, and that the governing
instrument contains no adequate guarantee of the requisite income to
the charitable organization. Under such circumstances, no deduction
will be allowed. Similarly, if the trustees are not members of the donor's
[decedent's] family but have no power to sell or otherwise dispose of
closely held stock, or otherwise insure the requisite enjoyment of in.
come to the charitable organization, no deduction will be allowed.1"
Where a charity is given a current share in a unitrust, the de-
duction for its value appears to be in no way controlled by this
portion of the regulations. The share given will not depend in any
way on the presence of income and the charity will have the bene-
107 Reg. Sees. 1.170-1(d) ; 1.170-2(d) (2) (1958).
108 I.R.C. § 170(b) (1) (D).
109 John I. Appleby, 48 T.C. No. 33 (1967); Reg. See. 1.170-2(b)(1) (1966). Seo
Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Gifts, 46 VA. L. REV. 394, 414 (1960); Sorllon,
Charitable Transfers in Gift and Rstate Planning, PROCEEDINGS OP NEW YORIC INIVEIR.
SiTY TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 191, 215, 218-20
(1966). See also Alice Tully, 48 T.C. No. 24 (1967).
1Lo I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522.
"l'Reg. Sees. 1.170-1(e); 20.2055-2(b); 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1958).
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ficial enjoyment of the interest given irrespective of whether the
unitrust holds such property as shares of stock in a family corpo-
ration, unproductive real property, or marketable securities.
However, there appears to be no reason why the portions of
these regulations embodying the remoteness and ascertainable
principles do not apply. The deduction for the current share would
not be allowed if the value of the interest passing was not presently
ascertainable, or if any possibility that the charity would not take
is not so remote as to be negligible.
An example of an interest that would be clearly deductible is a
gift to a charity of a dollar annuity for a term of years. The value
is presently ascertainable and there is no condition present which
could defeat the gift. But suppose such an annuity were given for
the life of an individual. Although its value could be ascertained,
is the remoteness test satisfied, i.e., is there not more than a remote
possibility that the measuring life will expire prior to the end of
its expectancy, indeed, at any time after the gift? Schildkraut might
be applied to reject the remoteness test, but certainly cautious plan-
ning would require the gift to last at least as long as the life
expectancy of the individual. Although the Commissioner does
not appear to have raised the remoteness test in this area, his
failure to do so may be due to "the infrequency of gifts of current
interests and the resulting de minimis nature of the problem. '
If the charity is given a current percentage share rather than a
dollar annuity, the interest passing would appear to be presently
ascertainable as an income interest. Thus, for example, if the per-
centage equalled the current rate of return on trust property, it
could be valued as an ordinary income interest. If it exceeded or
were less than such rate, appropriate adjustment would be made.
The remoteness test would also be satisfied if the gift were for a
term of years, but would give difficulty if it were for the life of an
individual.
Revenue Ruling 67-195, however, appears to deny the deduction
of a percentage interest given to a charity.11 3 There, the decedent
established a testamentary trust which provided that the net in-
come up to 3 per cent of the value of the trust property be paid
annually to a charity for a term of five years. An estate tax chari-
table deduction, computed under the 3 per cent tables of regula-
tion section 20.2031-7, was denied on the ground that these tables
apply only where the beneficiary has a right to receive the entire
112 See Martha F. Mason, 46 B.T.A. 682 (1942).
.13 1967-25 I.R.B. 6 (June 19, 1967).
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income, or a specific fraction of the entire income. "Moreover,"
states the ruling, "no generally acceptable formula is known by
which the value of charity's interest may be determined."
Aside from the irony involved in disqualifying a gift of income
equal in amount to the income factor used by the tables, the revenue
ruling appears wrong under the rationale of Northeastern Penn-
sylvania National Bank. There the Court held that a specific por-
tion under section 2056(b) (5) could be computed by use of an
estimated realistic rate of return under reasonable investment con-
ditions. Thus there could be found the amount of trust corpus
which was necessary to produce income in the amount of the fixed
annuity payable to the surviving spouse, and which accordingly
qualified for the marital deduction. There appears to be no reason
why this rationale should not be applied to the charitable deduc-
tion. In Revenue Ruling 67-195, a deduction could have been given
in the ratio which 3 per cent bore to a reasonable rate of return.
Grantor Trusts and the Unitrust
IN GFF.AL
Taxation of the so-called "grantor trust" is controlled by sec-
tions 671 to 678, subpart E of subehapter J. Such a trust, to be dis-
tinguished from the true trust, which is controlled by subparts A
through D, is one in which the grantor reserves the power to re-
voke or the right to receive income or is a so-called "Clifford
trust." 114 This latter term embraces trusts in which the grantor re-
tains a reversionary interest in income or corpus, or in which he
retains certain broad powers of enjoyment or control over the
beneficial enjoyment of others in the trust assets. Also taxed under
these provisions are persons other than the grantor of a trust
where that person has a beneficial power to take for himself income
or corpus. 15
Where the grantor or another is treated under subpart E as the
owner of all or a portion of a trust, section 671 provides that there
is included in computing the taxable income of the grantor or the
other person:
those items of income, deductions, and credits against tax of the trust
which are attributable to that portion of the trust to the extent that
such items would be taken into account under this chapter in computing
taxable income or credits against the tax of an individual. Any remain-
ing portion of the trust shall be subject to subparts A through D.
114 I.C. §§ 673, 674, 675, 676, 677.
I's I.R.C. § 678.
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Under the above language it seems clear that income taxable to
the grantor under subpart E is treated as if received directly by
him, and is not treated as if received by the trust and taxable to the
grantor as a beneficiary of the trust. This construction is borne out
by the regulations, the legislative history, and Treasury rulings,"1 6
with a minor exception present with respect to support of de-
pendents.-17 Thus, where any amount is taxable to the grantor or
another under subpart E, the trust merely excludes this amount
from the gross income of the trust, and the computation of the dis-
tributable net income of the trust is not affected by that amount?' 8
Where the grantor or another is treated as the owner of any
"portion" of a trust, section 671 provides he is taxable on the "in-
come attributable to that portion." Nowhere in the Code, however,
is there a definition, for purposes of subpart D', of the terms "por-
lion" and "income." Thus, with respect to the term "income," no
distinction is drawn between its meaning for local law or trust
accounting purposes and its meaning for income tax purposes.
This distinction is clearly recognized for purposes of subparts A
through D by section 643 (b) which gives the word income its local
law meaning when it is used alone, thus generally excluding from
its meaning any item of capital gains or losses. This definition was
made applicable to subparts A through D which govern the taxa-
tion of true trusts, but was not extended to subpart E which deals
with grantor trusts. Hence, in subpart E, the word income would
seem to be used in its broad tax sense and thus to include not only
items of ordinary income, but also capital gains and losses. This
construction of the statute is supported by the regulations which
employ the term "income" to denote tax income, and the term
"ordinary income" to denote income for trust accounting pur-
poses.119
Definition of the word income, however, leaves unsolved the con-
nected problem of the meaning of "portion." Income from a por-
tion of the trust cannot be determined unless somehow the latter
term is defined. Construed literally, that term as used in subpart
116 Reg. Sees. 1.671-2(c), (d), 1.671-4 (1956); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. A211-12 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4025, 4351-52 (1054) ;
Rev. Rul. 60-370, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 203; Rev. Rlul. 61-175, 1961-2 Cumx Bu L. 128.
This was also held to be the rule under the 1939 Code. Welch v. Bradley, 130 F.2d 109
(1st Cir. 1942). But see Sarah A. W. Coursey, 33 B.T.A. 1068, 1072 (1930).
117..C. §§ 677(b) (second sentence), 678(e); Reg. See& 1.677(b)-l(b), 1.678(a)-
1(b) (1956).
'is See Note, Taxation of Capifal Gains lcalizcd by Trusts, 12 TAX L. ]Iv. 99, 104
(1956).
"19 Reg. See. 1.671-2(b) (1956). Sce also Reg. See. 1.677(a)-l(g) (1056).
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E would seem to mean only some specific trust property, a frac-
tional interest in the trust, whether divided or undivided, or per-
haps an interest represented by a dollar amount. It would not seem
to extend merely to a right, for example, to the capital gains of
the trust, or to its ordinary income, neither being a definite part of
the corpus..12 0 The regulations, however, construe "portion of a
trust" liberally to include powers and interests confined to income
or corpus.1 21 Indeed, under the regulations the word portion ap-
pears to be unnecessary to the statutory scheme. The effect of the
regulations is to tax the grantor only upon ordinary income where
he has a power to control, or an interest in, only ordinary income.
122
Likewise, only income allocable to corpus is includable by the
grantor where he has an interest in, or a power over, corpus alone,
and if satisfaction of the interest or exercise of the power would
not affect ordinary income in a manner which would cause such
income to be included. 23 On the other hand, if the grantor retains
an interest in, or power over, both ordinary income and corpus, or
an interest in, or power over, corpus alone which has the effect of a
taxable interest in, or power over, ordinary income, both the ordi-
nary income and the capital gains of the trust are taxable to the
grantor. 24 These provisions of the regulations construing the
terms "income" and "portion" are best illustrated by the exam-
ples in regulation section 1.677(a)-1(g).
The application of the above provisions to a unitrust is not
immediately apparent. Where the grantor retains an interest in, or
120 See Note, Taxation of Capital Gains Bealized by Trusts, 12 Tx L. REv. 9, 108
(1956).
121 Reg. Sec. 1.671-3 (1956).
122 Thus, if a grantor is treated under section 673 as owner by reason of a reversionary
interest in ordinary income alone, capital gains of the trust will not be included in his
income. Likewise, a power over ordinary income only which is a taxable power under
sections 674 to 678 will subject the grantor to tax only upon the trust ordinary income
and not upon its capital gains. Reg. Sec. 1.671-3(b) (1) (1956).
123 Thus, the grantor-owner of a reversionary interest in the corpus of a trust, whilhl
interest is not affected by the provisions of section 673, will be taxed, under section
677(a)(2), on capital gains of the trust since they will be accumulated for future
distribution to him, but the trust ordinary income will not be taxed to him. Reg. See.
1.671-3 (b) (2) (1956).
124 For example, a reversionary interest in corpus which is taxable under section 673
requires inclusion of both ordinary income and capital gains in the income of the
grantor. Similarly, a power over corpus which can affect income received within a period
such that the grantor would be taxed under section 673 if the power were a reversionary
interest, will make taxable to the grantor both trust ordinary income and trust capital
gains. Sections 674, 676. Likewise, a grantor or another person is taxed on both ordinary
income and capital gains of the trust if he has a power over corpus under section 675
or section 678. Reg. Sec. 1.671-3(b) (3) (1956).
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power over, assets of a unitrust, the retained interest or power
cannot conveniently be labeled as one in, or over, income or corpus.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that there is no provision
in subpart E, such as that in section 662(a) (2) of subpart C, which
in effect treats trust distributions as proceeding first from income,
to the extent of distributable net income. Thus, for example, a dis-
tribution of a unitrust share to the grantor raises the problem of
whether to trace to the source of the distribution, or to apply some
other rule of allocation of trust receipts and expenses. Similar
problems of allocation arise where the grantor is to be taxed under
subpart E because of control over beneficial enjoyment of trust in-
come or corpus. These problems are best considered in the context
of the specific statutory provisions.
SECTIONS 673, 677 AND 662: THE GRANTOR
WHo Is A CUBENT BBNBFicIy
Section 673(a)
Under section 673(a), the grantor is treated as the owner of any
portion of a trust if, because of a retained reversionary interest,
the corpus or the income therefrom "will or may reasonably be
expected to" revert to the grantor's possession or enjoyment
within ten years of the inception of that portion of the trust. When
this section applies, a reversionary interest in the income alone
will cause the grantor to be taxed only on the ordinary income of
the trust.1'25 If the reversionary interest is in the corpus of the trust,
all income, including capital gains, is taxed to the grantor.2 -
In the context of the unitrust of which the grantor is a current
beneficiary, there will always be present a reversionary interest
within section 673. This proposition will shortly be examined in
detail; for now it is sufficient to note that whether the grantor's
share is a percentage share or a fixed dollar share, he will recover
an amount of the corpus of the trust within ten years of its incep-
tion.
Sections 6 77(a) and 6 6 2 (a)
'Where the grantor creates a trust under which trust income is or
may be paid to him currently, or accumulated for future distribu-
tion to him, such income is taxed to the grantor currently under
252Reg. See. 1.671-3(b)(1) (1956).
126 Geg. Sec. 1.671-3(b) (3) (1956).
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section 677(a). Where the grantor is a current beneficiary of a per-
centage unitrust share, amounts of current income are both cur-
rently paid, and amounts are also accumulated for future distri-
bution to him because of the application of the percentage to all
items of trust assets, including current and accumulated income.
This proposition will also shortly be examined in detail. Here it
should be noted that the amount of income that will be considered
currently paid, and the amount that will be considered accumulated
for future distribution to the grantor, will be affected by the prin-
ciple stated in section 1.671-3(a) (3) of the regulations:
If the portion of a trust treated as owned by the grantor... consists
of an undivided fractional interest in the trust, or of an interest repre-
sented by a dollar amount, a pro rata share of each item of incomo, de-
duction, and credit is normally allocated to the portion.
Where the grantor retains a conventional interest in income,
such as a cumulative right to receive ten per cent of trust income in
the discretion of the trustee, the application of the regulation is
clear. To the extent the income is paid, or accumulated for future
distribution, to the grantor, the grantor will take into account
as his own ten per cent of all items of income, deductions and
credits (excluding capital gains and losses to the extent they
are not considered income). In the case of the percentage share
unitrust, however, the application of the regulation would seem
to require modification because of the application of the percentage
not only to current income, but also to accumulated income. Also,
in the case of the fixed dollar annuity, the principle of the regula-
tion seems to be avoided by reason of the application of the rule of
Burnet v. Whitehouse.'
27
Another problem of general applicability to be noted here is the
relationship between subparts A to D, which govern the taxation
of the trust and its beneficiaries, and the provisions of subpart
E, which govern the taxation of the grantor. If we assume there
are other beneficiaries of the trust besides the grantor, a problem
of priority is raised: If subparts A to D are first applied, and
assuming distributions to nongrantor beneficiaries exhaust the
distributable net income of the trust, it could be argued that no
amounts are accumulated for future distribution to the grantor,
and that section 677(a) (2) will therefore have no application to
him. This is not, however, the result because income taxable to
the grantor under subpart E is treated as if received directly
127 283 U.S. 148 (1931). See discussion in the text beginning at note 147 infra.
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by the grantor and is excluded from the income of the trust."
Only items of income which are not taxable to the grantor under
subpart E are subject to the provisions of subparts A to D.1" As
we shall see, where the grantor has received a distribution, this
principle can lead to him being taxed under both subpart D, and
subparts A to D.
The Grantor-Beneficiary of a Percentage Share
Assume that G, -who has a life expectancy of ten years, creates a
trust whereby he is to receive five per cent of the value of the fund
each year for his life, remainder over. The original value of the
fund is $10,000. In the first taxable year of the trust the tax income
is $1,000 (ordinary income) increasing the value of the fund to
$11,000 and thus entitling G to a distribution of $550.
How much of the $1,000 tax income will be taxable to G? In
order to answer this question, four separate sections must be
considered: 673, 677 (a) (1), 677 (a) (2), and 662(a).
1. The Amount Taxable to G Uzder Section 673. Since $500
of the distribution to G is due to the application of the five per
cent to the value of original corpus, G has in substance regained
five per cent of the original trust corpus. Mforeover, in succeeding
years part of G's distributions will continue to be due to the
application of the percentage to the declining balance of the
original corpus. Although. it is mathematically impossible for G
to recapture all of the corpus in this manner, he wifl, if he lives
for ten years, regain about forty per cent of it.1 0 This amounts to
the retention by G of a reversionary interest in the trust corpus and
thus brings into play section 673 which provides that:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust
in which he has a reversionary interest in either corpus or the income
therefrom if, as of the inception of that portion of the trust, the interest
will or may reasonably be expected to take effect in posssion or enjoy-
ment within 10 years commencing with the date of the transfer of that
portion of the trust.131
12s eg. Sees. 1.671-2(c), 1.671-4 (1956).
29-Reg. See. 1.671-2(d) (1956).
130 The forty per cent figure is merely an approximation (off by about 3/20 per cent).
The exact percentage of original corpus to be regained, in terms of decimal fractions,
can be calculated by using the formula: P=1-(1-X)D, where P is the percentage to
be regained, expressed as a decimal fraction, X is G's percentage, expr"e asL a dccimal
fraction, and n is the number of years. Thus, to find the percentage of original corpus
that G will regain over ten years, we calculate: P-1(1--.05)O.
131 Note that in our hypothetical there is no direction to the trustee to pay any of G 's
distribution out of original corpus. Indeed, such a direction would not be meaningful
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Under this section, assuming as we have that G's life expectancy
is ten years on the date the trust is created," 2 it would seem that
he would be considered to have a reversionary interest in about
forty per cent of the original corpus, which interest will take effect
in possession or enjoyment within ten years of the inception of the
trust. In the first year, therefore, G would be taxed on the income
from $4,000, i.e., $400.133
2. The Amount Taxable to G Under Section 677(a)(1): The
Oppenheimer Principle. Since G is entitled each year to five per
cent of the total value of the fund, $50 of the $550 distributed to G
is due to the application of his percentage to the increase in value to
in a unitrst which does not distinguish between corpus and income. This factor, how-
ever, should not change the result under section 673. Certainly, this section does not
depend on the grantor's recapturing the identical property placed in trust. For example,
if G establishes a five year conventional trust whose income is payable to A and whose
corpus will revert to G at the trust's termination, G will be taxed under section 673
from the inception of the trust on all the tax income oven though the corpus, on termi-
nation, contains different property than that originally placed in trust. Indeed, thls
would be so even if the trust directed the trustee to pay the value of the annual income
to the beneficiary out of original corpus assets so that at the end of five years G might
be receiving assets which constituted trust and tax income at the time they were received.
The grantor should be considered to have retained a reversionary interest in the
original corpus whenever he has retained the right to regain part or all of tho valuc of
the original corpus, whether he regains this value in the form of the specific assets of
the original corpus or a substitute therefor. The purpose of section 673 is to treat a
grantor who will, within ten years, get back what he placed in trust as though the
grantor had never placed it in trust. If G places $10,000 in trust and directs the trustee
to pay him back one-tenth of the corpus each year, G will receive back within ten years
exactly what he gave away, whether or not he receives the same $10,000 11e placed Ill
trust. These same principles are applicable in our case as to the amount of G's distribu-
tion due to the application of the five per cent to the value of the original corpus.
132 Cf. Reg. Sec. 1.673(a)-1(c) (1956).
133 In future years G will not be taxed under section 673 only oi the income front
$4,000, i.e., only on the income from forty per cent of the original valuo of the original
corpus. To do so would be to ignore the possibility that the value of the original corpus
may fluctuate during that period. If, for example, the value of the original corpus
appreciated over the ten years, the dollar value of the amount distributed to G by virtue
of his forty per cent recapture of corpus will be more than $4,000. To reflect any fluctua-
tion G should be taxed each year on the income from forty per cent of the original corpus
at its current value. See Reg. See. 1.671-3(a) (3) (1956). This cannot be accomplished,
however, by taxing G each year on forty per cent of the entire income since to do so
would be to tax G not only on the income from forty pex cent of the original corpus (in
which he has a reversionary interest) but also on the income from forty per cent of the
accumulated and undistributed income of prior years (in which G has no reversionary
interest). (Some of the income of each year is accumulated for G but that is taxed to him
under section 677(a) (2), see infra.)
It is possible to calculate the income due from forty per cent of the original corpus
each year by -using the following formula:
2/5 (forty per cent) X value of the total fund - value of accumulated incomeo
2/n ty pcen value of total fund X cur
rent tax income.
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the original corpus represented by the tax income of $1,000. G has
in effect been paid $50 of current tax income. This would seem to
bring him squarely within section 677 (a) (1) which provides that:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust,
whether or not he is treated as such owner under section 674, whose
income without the approval or consent of any adverse party is, or in
the discretion of the grantor or an adverse party, or both, may be ...
distributed to the grantor ....
G would appear to be taxable on $50 of income under this section. '
134Note that section 677(a) (1) taxes to a grantor not only tax income which is
distributed to him but also income which may be distributed to him. Since our hlypotbet-
ical trust does not indicate that the trustee is required to pay G's distribution out of
original corpus, it may seem that the entire $550 is taxable to G under the "may be"
portion of section 677(a) (1). This would be on the ground that the entire $550 dis-
tributed to G could have been distributed to him out of the current tax income. However,
even aside from the fact that a direction to pay out of original corpus hns no meaning
in a nitrust context, this position would be inconsistent with the previous finding that
G has a section 673 reversionary interest. The latter finding was based on the theory
that $500 of G's distribution is a recapture of part of the original corpus b~eause that
part of his distribution is the result of the application of his percentage to the value of
the original corpus. In fact, the argument on section 677(a) hero is no more than a
restatement of the argument, previously discussed, that there is no section 673 rever-
sionary interest since the amount determined by applying the pereentage to the original
corpus need not be paid out of original corpus. It is submitted, however, that the prior
analysis resulting in a section 673 reversionary interest is proper and that the "may
be" portion of section 677(a)(1) has no applicability here. It is, to be sure, literally
true that $500 of the $1,000 income may be distributed to G in satisfaction of that
much of his distribution, where no direction is given to pay out of original corpus. The
purpose of section 677(a)(1), however, does not reach our situation and to apply it
literally here would distort the pattern of subchapter E. As discussed above, the purpose
of section 673 is to treat a grantor as not having transferred property which lie vill
regain in less than ten years. The result of so treating him is that the income from said
property is taxed to him from the outset. The result is vit to tax him ona an mount of
income equal to the value of what be will regain. This is so even though, as stated
previously, the $4,000 reversion may not be paid in the form of the ame nEsets placed
in trust, and indeed, may be paid from what was, when received, tax income (e.g., if the
benefieiary's trust income -was to be paid out of original corpus).
The above analysis regarding the design of section 673 is essentially the same as that
with respect to the relationship between sections 676 and 677. For example, if instead
of retaining a $4,000 reversion, G had retained the power to revoke $4,000 of original
corpus, G should again be taxed only on the income from $4,000 and not on $4,000 of
the income. To tax G on $4,000 of income under section 676 would be to treat G as
having retained the right to revoke more than $4,000, i.e., the right to revohe an amount
sufficient to generate $4,000 of income. The purpose of section 677(a)(1), on the other
hand, is to treat the grantor as not having transferred any part of corpus, whdetber or
not it will revert to him or can be revoked by him, whose inwome will or inay inure to
the benefit of the grantor.
If G creates a trust of $100,000, income to himself for life, remainder to A, and there is
$5,000 of tax income during the first year, G is treated under section 677(a)(1) as not
having transferred any of the $100,000 with the consequence that the entire $5,000 is
taxed to G. The same result would occur if the trustee had discretion to pay G the income
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This literal application of section 677(a).(1) raises the question
whether this amount is to be added to the amount taxable to G
under section 673. Or, on the other hand, may G successfully
argue that the $50 is subsumed in the amount taxable to him under
section 673? A similar argument was rejected by the Tax Court in
Ruth W. Oppenheimer.1 5 There the taxpayer was the life bene-
ficiary of the income from an undivided one-third of the corpus.
She also had the right to take "property of the corpus ... of a
value not to exceed [$25,000] in any one calendar year." Taxpayer
conceded that she was taxable on the income from $25,000 a year
but argued that since the income from one-third of the corpus
(which she had reported) was in excess of the income from $25,000
of corpus, "no additional amount is to be added to her income
by reason of her right to take corpus." The Tax Court, however,
held that:
[O]f the income which was . . .[the taxpayer's] by reason of her
right to take corpus, only one-third thereof may be said to have been re-
ported by her when she reported the income distributed to her by rea-
son of... [her life interest in the income from one-third of the corpus].
The remaining two-thirds of the income attributable to the $25,000...
was over and above the income received and reported by her .... 131
Thus, the court held the taxpayer taxable not only on the
income from one-third of the entire corpus, but also on two-thirds
of the income from $25,000. The propriety of this holding can be
seen by assuming that the taxpayer withdrew the $25,000 from
the trust and invested it elsewhere. All of the income from that
$25,000 would be taxable to her and she would still receive one-
third of the income from the diminished corpus. This is the same
amount of income as was taxed to her in Oppenheimer, one-third
of the income from all of the corpus together with two-thirds of the
income from $25,000.
or accumulate it and add it to corpus for remainderman A. If G or a nonadvorso party
retains the right to receive or the right to determine whether to receive, the income from
corpus placed in trust, it is not improper to treat G, for income tax purposes, as never
having created the trust.
To be distinguished, however, is the section 676 (and 673) situation. If G 1as irro-
vocably surrendered the benefit of the income from say $95,000 of $100,000 placed in
trust, but retained the right to the benefit of the income from $5,000 of the $100,000 by
virtue of a reversion in, or a right of revocation over, $5,000 of corpus, it is clearly
improper to treat him as having retained the benefit of the income from any more than
$5,000 merely because his reversion or his revocation nay be satisfied by assets which,
when received, constituted tax income.
135 16 T.C. 515 (1951), reviewed by the court (2 dissents).
'so 16 T.C. at 526.
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Similarly, in our hypothetical, G is treated, under section 673,
as having retained ownership over $4,000 and is taxable on all
of the income attributable to that amount. The additional benefit
that is his by virtue of the application of five per cent to current
income is five per cent of the income from the remaining corpus.
In terms of the Oppenheimer analysis, if G had retained the $4,000,
as he is deemed to have done under section 673, he would be
taxable on (1) all the income from that $4,000, plus (2) five per
cent of the income of the remaining $6,000-i.e., under our hy-
pothesis, $400 plus $30 (five per cent of $600 which is considered the
income from $6,000). Thus, of the $50 of income originally con-
sidered, only $20 is subsumed in the $400 taxable under section 673.
3. The Amount Taxable to G Uqzder Section 677(a)(2). The
application of sections 673 and 677(a)(1) does not exhaust G's
interest in the current income of $1,000. To be sure, in the year the
income was realized G received, in effect, only $50 of it, five per cent
of the income. He will, however, in each of the succeeding years of
the trust receive five per cent of the declining balance of this
$1,000. Thus, in the second year he will receive five per cent
of ($1,000-$50); in the third year, five per cent of ($1,000-[5%
($1,000-$50)]), and so on. Hence, in the first year, the trust is
accumulating income for future distribution to G. This makes
applicable to G section 677 (a) (2), which provides that:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust,
whether or not he is treated as such owner under section 674, whose in-
come without the approval or consent of any adverse party is, or, in the
discretion of the grantor or an adverse party, or both, may be ... held
or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor ....
The amount of the remaining income which will be taxable to G
under section 677(a) (2) will not be the full $950 since the applica-
tion of G's percentage to the declining balance will never exhaust
the original amount. The exact amount G will receive over any
given number of years can be calculated by using the same formula
employed to determine his reversionary interest under section
673.137 The problem is to determine the number of years over which
G will receive distributions of the accumulated current income.
Certainty can be obtained by using G's life expectancy. For ex-
ample, using an expectancy of ten years from the inception of the
trust, the above formula would result in about thirty-five per cent
of the $1,000 current income being accumulated for future distrihu-
137 See note 130 supra.
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tion to G. There is, however, a possibility G will live longer than his
life expectancy. The significance of such a possibility under section
677(a) (2) will be discussed under another heading.18 It is sufficient
to note here that, unless a time is chosen beyond which G has only
a remote chance of surviving, it is impossible to calculate the pre-
cise amount that will be considered accumulated for G under sec-
tion 677(a) (2) since it is impossible to tell how long G will
live beyond his life expectancy. The only other alternative (and
this would seem to be a logical extension of the Treasury's posi-
tion, later discussed) would be to treat G as immortal so that he
would be taxed as though he would receive all but the tiniest
fraction of the current income in the future.l13
In order to assure a limit on the amount that will be hold accumu-
lated for future distribution to G, the trust indenture should in-
clude a provision to the effect that G's percentage will be applied
to the increase in value of the trust corpus represented by current
tax income only for that number of years which constitute his life
expectancy as of the inception of the trust. Such a provision would
both limit the amount includable to G under section 677(a) (2), mid
allow it to be precisely calculated.4 0
Assuming that G's life expectancy of ten years will control the
accumulation question, because of the presence of the suggested
provision or otherwise, the application of the formula would result
in a section 677 (a) (2) accumulation for G of about thirty-five per
cent of the $1,000 over the course of nine years, or $350. However,
$350 would not be the amount taxable to G under section 677(a) (2),
because here again the principle of Ruth TV. Oppenheimer comes
into play: since G is taxed on the income from $4,000 because of his
reversionary interest under section 673, the only additional benefit
he receives by virtue of the application of his five per cent share to
the declining balance of the first year's income is with respect to
the income from the remaining corpus-$6,000. To illustrate again,
if G had retained $4,000 of the original $10,000 corpus, as he is con-
sidered to have done for purposes of section 673, he would be tax-
138 See text at notes 171-84 infra.
139 It is theoretically impossible for G to receive all the income because his share Is
computed on the basis of a percentage of a declining balance.
140 For example, if in the first year of the trust G has a ten year life expectancy, the
first year's income, and its declining balance, will be included in the value of the fund for
the next ten years only; the income in the second year of the trust will be included for
only nine years, etc.
Note, of course, that if there are other beneficiaries besides G, the amount considered
accumulated for G under section 677(a) (2) will be reduced pro tanto.
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able on (1) all the income from $4,000, plus (2) five per cent of the
income from the remaining $6,000 (under section 677(a) (1)), plus
(3) five per cent of the declining balance of the income from the re-
maining $6,000 over nine years (under section 677(a) (2)). Thus, of
the first year's income of $1,000, G would be taxed as follows:
(1) on $400-the income from $,000-under section 673;
(2) on $30-five per cent of $600, the income from the remaining
$6,000 of corpus-under section 677(a)(1) and the Oppenheimer
principle;
(3) on $210-five per cent (over nine years) of the declining bal-
ance of $600, the income from the remaining $6,000 of corpus-
inder section 677(a) (2) and the Oppenheimer principle.
14'
The total amount taxable to G in the first year under the grantor
trust provisions is thus $640.
4. The Amount Taxable to G Ugider Section 662(a). The provis-
ions of subpart E relating to grantor trusts do not exhaust G's
taxability in the example under discussion. Under the scheme of the
Code, as heretofore explained, income taxed to the grantor or an-
other under subpart E (sections 671 to 678) is considered to be re-
ceived directly by the grantor or such other person. Any income
over and above the amount governed by subpart B, is governed by
subparts A to D (sections 641 to 669) .142 That latter amount, in our
hypothetical, is $360 ($1,000 less $640 taxable to G under subpart
E) ; and the short of it is that G, assuming he is the only current
beneficiary (as he is in our hypothetical), will be taxed on that
amount under section 662.
Section 662 requires that a beneficiary-and the fact that G is the
grantor does not make him any less a beneficiary here-include in
his gross income any amounts distributed to him up to the distribu-
table net income of the trust. The distributable net income of our
hypothetical trust in the first year, disregarding items of deduction,
is $360 calculated as follows: Under section 643, distributable net
income is the taxable income of the trust with certain modifications,
none of which, it is assumed, are applicable here. Although the
trust realized $1,000 of income in the year in question, it reports
as gross income only the amount in excess of the amount (here,
141 Applying our formula used with respect to the corpus under section 673, note 130
supra, we find that G will receive about forty per cent of $600 over ten years, or about
$240, from which we subtract the $30 attributable to the first year since it is already ac-
counted for under section 677(a) (1).
S ee I.R.C. § 671; Reg. See. 1.671-2(d) (1956).
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$640) taxed to the grantor or other person under subpart E.143 Dis-
regarding items of deduction, the gross income of the trust, $360, is
its taxable income which in turn is the distributable net income of
the trust. Since distributable net income is $360, and since G has
had a distribution to him of $550, G is taxed on $360 under section
662.
It may at first seem anomalous that G, who has already been
taxed under subpart E on more than what was distributed to him,
should be taxed on $360 more because of his distribution. The
anomaly, however, is only apparent. We start with $1,000 of tax in-
come, all of which is subject to income tax. Because G, who created
the trust, retained certain interests in it, subpart E taxes $640 of
the $1,000 of income to him as though he received it (even though
he actually received that year only $50 of it, the other $500 of his
distribution being a partial recapture of the original corpus). The
remaining $360 of tax income is covered by the rules with respect to
the division of taxability between the true trust and its beneficiaries
in subparts A to D. One of these rules, embodied in the interplay of
section 662 and section 643, is that any distribution, even if its
source could be traced to original corpus or prior accumulated in-
come, is deemed to be a distribution of current tax income to the
extent that it does not exceed the distributable net income. So here,
although $500 of G's distribution is in reality a distribution of
original corpus, $360 of it is deemed to be a distribution of the
trust's current income of $360.
Stated more briefly:
(1) $610 of the $1,000 is taxed to G, not because of distribution
of any part of the $1,000 to him, but because of his retained future
interests in the corpus and in $950 of the $1,000 of income;
(2) $30 is taxed to him because of a distribution to him of $50
of the $1,000 of income; and
(3) $360 is taxed to him because of the distribution to him of
$500 of original corpus.'44
143 See Reg. Sec. 1.671-4 (1956).
14 Suppose that G's right was not to five per cent of the value of the fund, but, to
five per cent of the current income only. In such a case, assuming the other figures are
the same, under section 677(a) (1) of subpart E, G would be taxed on $50. This would
make distributable net income $950. Could it now be said that under section 662, G is
taxable on an additional $507 It would seem not. In this situation, the reason for taxing
G under section 677(a) (1) is the very same as that which would be used under section
662-that is, the distribution of $50 to him. To tax G on $100 would be to tax G twice
for the very same reason. Clearly if the trustee bad discretion to give G five per cent
of the income, but did not, G would still be taxed under section 677(a) (1) on $50 but
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Although our hypothetical grantor was taxed on all of the cur-
rent income in our hypothetical example, this is not always the
necessary result. The presence of other beneficiaries would, of
course, automatically reduce the amount taxable to the grantor
under sections 673 and 677(a) (2). Even where the grantor is the
sole beneficiary, the amount taxable to him under section 677(a) (2)
would be affected by the number of years he could share in accumu-
lated income. Also, the interplay among various factors such as the
size of his percentage share, the value of trust corpus-including
the effect of appreciation and depreciation thereof-and the
amount of net current trust income, can operate to reduce the size
of his distribution to a point where amounts treated as distributed
to him as a trust beneficiary under section 662(a) will be in excess
of the trust distributable net income. This can happen, for example,
where his percentage share is large in relation to net current trust
income.
The Grantor-Beneficiary of a Fixed Dollar Annuity
Assume that G, with a ten year life expectancy, creates a trust
from which he is to receive a life annuity of $1,000 a year, payable
in any event, remainder over. The original corpus is $100,000.
The taxable income of the trust in its first year is $5,000, all of
which is ordinary income. How much of this amount is taxable to
G?
Before examining the individual sections in detail, it is necessary
to analyze the nature of the above trust. Note that it does not
specify the source of the annuity payment. There are several possi-
bilities in this regard. For example, the grantor-beneficiary may
direct that the annuity be paid from original corpus, or ratably
from original corpus, accumulated income, 4" and current income,
or first from current income with corpus to be invaded if current in-
come is insufficient. Or the trustee may be given discretion as to the
source, explicitly (i.e., by specific trust provisions) or implicitly
(where the trust is silent as to source).
At first it would seem that these possible variations would raise
complications with respect to the analysis of the grantor's taxa-
bility under sections 673, 677 and 662. Suppose that the trustee was
vested with discretion as to the source of the annuity payment. In
such a case it could be argued that the grantor has retained no
not again under section 662 since there was no distribution. The situation should be
no different because the distribution is mandatory.
145 Here, of course, income refers to tax income.
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reversionary interest within section 673; the fact that the trustee
may pay the annuity from corpus would not seem to amount to a
retained interest. Moreover, although it is possible at the inception
of the trust that, because of insufficient earnings, the annuity may
have to be satisfied, in effect, by a recapture of original corpus, such
a possibility should not be equated with a section 673 reversionary
interest in corpus. This follows because, on our facts, G's interest
(considering the possibility an interest) is not one which "will or
may reasonably be expected to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment within 10 years." 146 On the other hand, since the trustee may
select the source of the payment, it would seem that the current in-
come "may be" distributed to the grantor and would thus be taxa-
ble to him under section 677(a) (1).
It is submitted, however, that the above results are unsound. In
the case of a unitrust it would seem sufficient to note that since no
distinction is drawn between corpus and income items, directions as
to source of distributions are not meaningful. More fundamentally,
it is submitted that where, as in our hypothetical, the fixed sum
annuity is made payable in any event, directions (or lack thereof)
with respect to the source of payment-indeed the source itself-
should be considered irrelevant to the application of sections 673
and 677. As authority for this suggestion, reliance is placed
squarely on the Supreme Court's decision in Burnet v. White-
house. 147 There the testator's will established a $5,000 life annuity
payable to the taxpayer in all events. The testator died in 1918.
Prior to November 14, 1920 the annuity was paid from the corpus
of the estate, but after that date it was paid from income. The
Commissioner took the position that the taxpayer was taxable on
payments made to her during 1921. The Board of Tax Appeals
and the court of appeals, however, held that these payments were
exempt bequests. 4 In affirming this holding, the Supreme Court
reasoned as follows:
146 Emphasis added. Even under such an argument there might be situations, howover,
where the possibility of insufficient income may be properly viewed as equivalent to a
section 673 reversionary interest. Suppose, for example, G creates a trust whoroby he is
to receive a life annuity of $10,000 per year payable in any event, and the corpus of
the trust is only $50,000. In this situation it is highly probable, to say the least, that
G will recapture all of the $50,000 of original corpus within ton years.
147 283 U.S. 148 (1931), discussed in Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity as Income: The
Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts and Bequests as Income, 23 TAX L. REV. 231
(1968).
-48 The particular statute involved was section 213 of the Revenue Act, of 1921, which
provided, pertinently, that "the term 'gross income' . . . Does not include . . . The
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent (but the income from
such property shall be included in gross income) .... "
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The most plausible argument submitted for the Commissioner is this:
An annuity given by will is payable primarily out of the income from
the estate. The residuary estate of Bennett produced enough during
1921 to meet all bequeathed annuities. The payments received by MIrs.
Wbitehouse during that year were, in fact, made from such income.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the bequest was one of corpus; and
the payments were taxable under Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161.
As held below, the bequest to Mrs. Whitehouse was not one to be paid
from income but of a sum certain, payable at all events during each
year so long as she should live. It would be an anomaly to tax the
receipts for one year and exempt them for another simply because
executors paid the first from income received and the second out of the
corpus. The will directed payment without reference to the existence or
absence of income.
Irwin v. Gavit is not applicable. The bequest to Gavit was to be paid
out of income from a definite fund. If that yielded nothing, he got noth-
ing. This Court coneluded that the gift was of money to be derived
from income and to be paid and received as income by the donee. Here
the gift did not depend upon income but was a charge upon the whole
estate during the life of the legatee to be satisfied like any ordinary
bequest.149
To be sure, the precise holding of Mtelhouse was that an an-
nuity payable in any event, even though paid from current income,
was exempt in the hands of the recipient as a bequest of.property.
The reasoning of that case, however, is fully applicable to our
situation. It is clear from its opinion that the Supreme Court held
as it did because the annuity was payable without regard to the
presence of income so that the bequest was in reality a bequest of
corpus, i.e., a bequest of property of the estate not a bequest of the
income from property of the estate. The source of the payment was
properly considered irrelevant since it had nothing to do with the
essence of the rights transferred to the annuitant.
Likewise, in our situation, the grantor, by making the annuity
payable in any event, has in reality retained, pro tanto, the prop-
erty formally placed in trust, regardless of any directions, or lack
thereof, with respect to the source of the annuity payment. If, as in
our hypothetical, a grantor places $100,000 in trust and directs that
he be paid an annuity of $1,000 for life, he has retained an interest
in the property and not in the income from the property. The gran-
tor in such a case, in precisely the same sense as the annuitant in
Burnet v. Whiteouse, has no interest in, and in no way benefits
from, the income from the property unless and until the property is
149 283 U.S. at 150-51.
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exhausted by the annuity payments. Any provision, or lack thereof,
with respect to the source of payment in no way affects this nature
of the grantor's interest.
As has been indicated previously, the result of Burnet v. White-
house has been changed with respect to nongrantor beneficiaries
(subparts A to D) by specific legislation which has the effect of
treating periodic gifts and bequests of corpus as gifts and bequests
of income to the extent that the distributions to the beneficiaries do
not exceed the distributable net income of a trust (or estate). How-
ever, as has also been noted previously, no such statutory rule
exists in the grantor trust area (subpart E). Absent such a statu-
tory provision, the reasoning of Burnet v. Whitehouse would seem
to control. As will be seen, the ramifications of this analysis will be
present in all the Code sections which apply to our case.
1. The Amount Taxable to G Under Section 673.Under the above
analysis, G has retained an interest in the corpus which will take
effect in possession each time an annuity payment is made to him.
Thus, over the course of ten years G will in effect recapture $10,000
of original corpus. This will render him taxable, from the inception
of the trust, on the income allocable to $10,000. Therefore, in the
first year of the trust the amount taxable to G under section 673 will
be $500.'°
2. The 'Amount Taxable to G Under Section 677(a)(1). Recall
that the effect of section 677(a) (1) is to tax the grantor on tax in-
come which:
is, or, in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both,
may be ... distributed to the grantor ....
This section is designed to tax a grantor who has retained an
interest in (or power over) income. But under our analysis, the
grantor-beneficiary of a fixed sum annuity payable in any event
has not retained any interest in income, regardless of the source of
payment. This means that, even if the trustee is required to, or in
his discretion may, pay the annuity out of current income, the gran-
tor will not be taxed under this section even though the statutory
language literally applies. In Burnet v. Whitehouse, the Commis-
sioner relied in part on section 219 (a) (4) of the 1921 revenue act
which taxed beneficiaries on I[i] ncome which is to be distributed to
the beneficiaries periodically .... "The Supreme Court replied sue-
150 $10,000 (reversionary interest)
$100,000 (value of original corpus) x $5,000 (income)
See Reg. See. 1.671-3 (a) (3) (1956).
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cinotly: "But clearly enough, we think, this section applies only to
income paid as such to a beneficiary." ""1 What the Court seems to
be saying is that income is not "paid as such" even if it is the
source of the payment, i.e., even if it is "paid," where the payment
does not depend upon the existence of income. This approach seems
clearly to be the proper one in light of the purpose of section 677(a)
(1). The purpose of that section is to tax a grantor on current in-
come which will or may inure to his benefit. The purpose is not to
tax him on income whose existence is a matter of economic indiffer-
ence to him, even though he may actually receive what, when real-
ized, is income. The existence of income in the case of a trust to pay
a current beneficiary a fixed sum regardless of income, benefits not
the current beneficiary, but the remaindermen, that is, those whose
interest would be depleted by the annuity payment in the absence of
sufficient income.
Consequently under section 677 (a) (1), properly interpreted, the
grantor would not be taxed on any of the current income. This
should be so even when the annuity payments have exhausted ori-
ginal corpus because at that time, as well as at the outset of the
trust, the grantor's payment does not depend on the existence of
income. His payments at that time would in reality be made from
accumulated income of prior years.
3. The Amount Taxable to G Unzderq Section 677(a) (2). As noted
previously, the effect of section 677(a) (2) is to tax a grantor upon
income which:
is, or, in tbe discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both,
may be... held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor
The question arises whether G, as a beneficiary of a fixed sum an-
nuity, will be taxed on current undistributed income under this sec-
tion on the ground that he may receive it in the future. Recall that
in discussing this question in connection with the taxability of a
grantor who has a percentage share, we saw that G was presently
taxable on the current income that would or might be received by
him in future years due to the application of the percentage to in-
come accumlaions. In that situation, our concern with the lan-
guage in section 677(a) (2)---"may be ... accumulated for future
distribution to the grantor"--was with respect to whether its
application, in the absence of a fixed term, would be limited by G's
1s1 283 U.S. at 151.
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life expectancy or by some other standard which would establish a
fixed number of years beyond which G would not be considered to
share in any accumulation of current income.
Similar considerations are present in the case of a grantor-bene-
ficiary of a fixed sum annuity payable in any event. On the one
hand, under the analysis generated by Burnet v. Whitehouse, the
payments made to the grantor are in reality payments of corpus
(until original corpus is exhausted). Thus, the fact that a trustee
may pay future annuities out of current income which has been ac-
cumulated will not render the grantor taxable under the provisions
of section 677(a) (2) which tax the grantor on income which "Imay
be... accumulated for future distribution to the grantor." Just as
in the case of the "may be... distributed" language of section
677(a) (1), the fact that the payment may be made from income
items is irrelevant where the payment does not depend on income.
If the fact that current income items may be currently used to
satisfy the annuity does not render the grantor taxable under sec-
tion 677(a) (1) (since the annuity is payable regardless of the exist-
ence of income), the fact that the current income items may be ac-
cumulated and distributed to the grantor in satisfaction of future
annuities should likewise not render the grantor taxable under the
"may be accumulated" language of section 677(a)(2) (since the
annuity is payable regardless of the existence of the income which
is accumulated).
On the other hand, it may happen that the original corpus will be
depleted before the termination of the grantor-beneficiary's an-
nuity. If, for example, the grantor is, as in our hypothetical, a life
beneficiary, there is the possibility that the grantor will live long
enough to deplete the original corpus. That possibility, on our
facts, is extremely remote, to say the least. But it is a theoretical
possibility. There is also the possibility that the original corpus
may suffer depreciation. Such possibilities may have the effect of
requiring that future annuities be paid from accumulated income
and if that happens, the grantor will have had the benefit of that
income."' As noted in connection with the application of section
677 (a) (2) to a grantor-beneficiary of a percentage share, the effect
of such possibilities under that section will be fully discussed under
a later heading.1 53 It is sufficient to note at this time that it cannot
be concluded with certainty that the degree of remoteness of the
possibilities will be the decisive factor. It cannot therefore be con-
152 See, e.g., Samuel v. Comm 'r, 306 F.2d 682, 689 (lst Cir. 1962).
153 See text at notes 171-84 infra.
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eluded here that under no circumstances will the grantor of our
hypothetical be taxed under section 677(a) (2). However, for pur-
poses of further discussion, we will assume that none of the first
year's income will be taxed to G under section 677 (a) (2).
4. The Amount Tamable to G Ukder Section 662(a). Thus far we
have determined that of the $5,000 of income for the first year, G
will be taxed on $500 under section 673 and on no amount under sec-
tion 677(a) (1). We have also assumed that G would not be taxed on
any amount under section 677(a) (2). In accordance with our prior
discussion, the $500 taxable to G under section 673 is excluded from
the calculation of the trust taxable income and thus from the trust
distributable net income. This, however, will leave the trust with
distributable net income of $4,500 (disregarding deductions).
Therefore, even though the payment to G is in reality a distribution
of $1,000 of original corpus, G will be taxed on that distribution,
$1,000, under section 662, for the reasons outlined in our discussion
of the grantor-beneficiary of a percentage share.
The Grantor-Beneficiary of a Combination Share
As noted heretofore, the unitrust may state the share of the bene-
ficiary as the greater or lesser of a percentage share and a fixed
amount. Such a share raises the question of the extent to which the
prior analyses, employed with respect to the percentage share or
fixed amount share considered singularly, will have to be varied.
1. We consider first the combination share stated as the greater
of a percentage and a fixed amount, e.g., five per cent but no less
than $5,000, or $5,000 but no less than five per cent.
a. Section 673. As we have seen, both the percentage share and
the fixed sum will result in a reversionary interest under section
673. Where the share is stated as the greater of a percentage share
and a fixed sum, the reversionary interest can be calculated by
determining which element will probably be affirmatively operative.
Suppose that the original corpus of the trust is $100,000 and the
grantor's share is stated as the greater of five per cent or $1,000. In
this situation, the percentage share will ordinarily result in the
greater payment to the grantor, and, accordingly, will be the factor
employed to determine the reversionary interest. If, on the other
hand, the share were stated as one per cent but no less than $5,000,
the fixed sum would result in the greater payment and would be the
factor used to calculate the reversionary interest.
Of course, the above conclusions are based on the assumption
that there will be no drastic depreciation or appreciation in the
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value of the original corpus during the first ten years. Depreciation
or appreciation may result in the operative factor (percentage or
fixed sum) varying from year to year within the first ten years,
especially if the percentage and the fixed sum will produce almost
equivalent payments. In such cases, precise calculation is not possi-
ble and an estimate would have to suffice. In this connection, recall
that section 673 speaks in terms of an interest which "may rea-
sonably be expected to take effect in possession or enjoyment
within 10 years." The estimate would be made under this general
principle.
b. Section 677(a) (1). Our prior discussion indicated that section
677 (a) (1) will result in taxation of part of the income where the
share is only a percentage share, but not where the share is only a
fixed dollar share.
Thus, where the share is stated as the greater of a percentage or
a fixed sum, taxability of the grantor under section 677 (a) (1) will
turn on whether, and the extent to which, the percentage share is
affirmatively operative. Suppose that the original corpus of the
trust is $100,000 and that the grantor's share is five per cent but
not less than $5,000. In year one of the trust there is ordinary in-
come of $5,000 increasing the value of the fund to $105,000. G is
thus entitled to $5,250. The percentage element has operated to give
G $250 more than he would have received by virtue of the fixed sum
alone. To this extent, therefore, G has been paid current income and




c. Section 677(a) (2). Here separate consideration must be given
to the "is held" and the "may be held" language of section
677(a) (2).
() "is held." Where the gTantor's share is stated only as a fixed
sum, the "is held" language will not apply unless it can be deter-
mined that, from a consideration of the size of the fixed sum, the size
of the original corpus, and the duration of the share, the annuity
will, or most probably will, exhaust original corpus and will thus
have to be satisfied by accumulated income. The "is held" lan-
guage, however, will always have application where the share is
stated only as a percentage share since the percentage is applied to
all assets, including those which constitute accumulated income.
Therefore, where the share is stated as the greater of a fixed sum
and a percentage, the grantor will be taxed under section 677 (a) (2)
-"is held"-(a) to the extent that the percentage element is
254 Note that appropriate adjustments will have to be made because of tlhe Oppen.
hzeimer principle; see text at note 135 supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 23:-TAX LAW REVIW
TAXATION OP A UNITRUST
affirmatively operative, or (b) to the extent that it can be deter-
mined that the fixed sum will have to be satisfied out of accumulated
income.
For example, suppose that the original corpus is $200,000, that
the grantor has a life expectancy of twenty years, and that the
share is stated as the greater of $5,000 or one per cent. In this situa-
tion the percentage share is not affirmatively operative and the
original corpus will most likely not be exhausted during the gran-
tor's life. Thus, no amount would be taxed to the grantor under the
"is held" language of section 677 (a) (2).
Suppose, however, that, in the above example, the original corpus
was only $25,000. Here, of course, the fixed sum would be operative
and would exhaust the corpus in five years. Moreover, assuming a
normal return on the original corpus and accumulated income, it is
reasonably certain that the grantor's annuity will consume all
accumulated income. Therefore, under the "is held" language of
section 677(a) (2), all of the income would be taxed to the grantor.
On the other hand, suppose the original corpus is $200,000, that
the life expectancy of the grantor is ten years, and that his share is
stated as the greater of five per cent or $5,000. Here it is reasonable
to expect that the percentage element will be affirmatively opera-
five during the grantor's life. Therefore, to the extent the
percentage will operate affirmatively, the grantor would be
taxed under the "is held" language of section 677 (a) (2). Suppose,
e.g., that in the first year there is ordinary income of $10,000 in-
creasing the value of the fund to $210,000. G's share is $10,500 of
which $5,500 is due to the independent operation of the percentage
element. As noted above, G has in effect been paid $500 of the cur-
rent income and is taxed on that amount under section 677(a) (1),
as modified by the Oppenheimer principle. Moreover, assuming no
drastic depreciation in the value of the fund, in the future years of
the trust G will receive, by the affirmative independent operation of
the percentage element, five per cent of the accumulated income of
$9,500 on a declining balance. Therefore, using the formula em-
ployed previously, G would be taxed on about thirty-five per cent
of the income under the "is held" language of section 677(a) (2).
(i) "may be held." The analysis here is, in part, essentially the
same as that under the "is held" language. That is, the income
which would be taxed to G under the "is held" language would be
taxed to G under the "may be held" language even if there were
no "is held" language. But the "may be held" language could
result in the taxation of additional income on the ground that cer-
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tain contingencies may occur which would result in more of the
accumulated income being distributed to G. The kinds of contin-
gencies which may increase the amount taxable under the "may be
held" language, and the significance under the language of the
degree of remoteness of the contingencies in question, will be dis-
cussed hereafter. 5
d. The Amount Taxed to G Under Section 662(a.). Finally, it
must be remembered that any amounts not taxed to G under the
above sections of subpart E enter distributable net income, and,
under section 662(a), are taxable to G to the extent of his distribu-
tion of corpus.
2. The combination share may also be stated as the lesser of a
percentage share and a fixed sum.
a. Section 673. As was the case where the share was the greater
of the percentage and the fixed sum, the section 673 reversionary
interest can be calculated by determining the operative factor.
Here, however, since the grantor is entitled to the lesser of the
percentage and the fixed sum, the operative factor will be the
one which operates as the maximizing factor.
Suppose that the original corpus is $100,000, that the grantor's
life expectancy is at least ten years, and that his share is stated as
five per cent but no more than $1,000. In this situation the operative
factor is the fixed sum, i.e., the grantor will recapture during the
first ten years $10,000 of original corpus, but no more. If the share
were stated as five per cent, but no more than $10,000, the operative
factor will be the percentage. Under the formula used for calcu-
lating reversionary interests with respect to percentage only
shares, G will recapture about forty per cent of the original corpus,
but no more.-56
b. Section 677(a)(1). As we have seen, where the grantor's
share is stated as a fixed sum only, none of the income should be
taxed to the grantor under section 677(a) (1). Where, however, the
share is a percentage share only, part of the income will be taxed
to the grantor under the "is distributed" language of section
677(a) (1).
If the share is stated as a fixed sum, but no more than a per-
centage, the share, for the purposes of section 677(a) (1), is identi-
cal with the fixed sum only share. In such a combination, the per-
'55 See text at notes 171-84 infra.
156 Note that in this situation the percentage factor is the maximizing factor oven
though the share is stated as five per cent but no more than $10,000,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 23 :TAX LANV REVEW
TAXATION OF A UNITRUST
centage can never operate affirmatively and thus no income would
be taxed to the grantor under section 677(a) (1).
The situation becomes complicated, however, if the share is
stated as a percentage, but no less than a fixed amount. Where
the amount distributable to the grantor is less than the fixed dol-
lar sum, the share can properly be viewed, under the section
677(a) (1) "is distributed" language, as identical with a percent-
age only share. Suppose the original corpus was $10,000, that the
income was $1,000, and that G's share was five per cent but no more
than $1,000. G's distribution is $550 of which $50 is a distribution
of current income (although not all is taxed to him under section
677(a) (1) because of the Oppenhleimer principle). However, where
the percentage results in a distribution higher than the ixed sum, a
proration is necessary. Suppose that in the above hypothetical, G's
share is stated as five per cent but no more than $500. In such a
case, G's distribution is only $500, not $550, and it is therefore
proper to say that only one-eleventh of the distribution was due to
the operation of the five per cent on the income of $1,000.117 Thus,
only about $45 is within section 677(a) (1) as income which "is
distributed." 
'l
c. Section 677(a)(2). As under section 677(a) (1), where the
combination is stated as a fixed amount, but no more than a per-
centage, the share should be treated as though it were a fixed sum
only share since the percentage factor can never operate affirma-
tively. It should be noted, however, that since the percentage ele-
ment may operate to reduce the grantor's distribution, this factor
must be considered in determining whether to tax the grantor un-
der section 677(a) (2) on the ground that the fixed sum will or may
exhaust corpus and thus require the distribution of accumulated
income.
Where the share is stated as a percentage but no more than a
fixed sum, the maxim urn amount of current income which will be
taxed to the grantor can be calculated by viewing the share as a
percentage only share. No more will be taxed to the grantor than
would be the case if the share were a percentage share only since
the fixed dollar amount is a maximum and thus can never operate
to require the distribution of more accumulated income than that
which will be distributed to the grantor by virtue of the applica-
tion of the percentage share.
157 $1,000 (income) $500 (distribution)
$11,000 (total value of fund)
-6b This again is subject to the Oppeadeimcr principle.
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There may, however, be a situation where the fixed dollar maxi-
mum will operate to reduce the distribution of accumulated income
below the amount which would be distributed by virtue of the per-
centage share, just as under section 677(a) (1) the fixed dollar
maximum may reduce the amount of current income which is cur-
rently distributed below what would be distributed by virtue of
the percentage. Suppose G establishes a trust with an original
corpus of $100,000 and retains an annual life interest of "five per
cent but no more than $2,200." Suppose further, that in year one
the trust realizes income of $10,000, increasing the fund to $110,000.
The percentage share results in $5,500, so that the fixed dollar
maximum is operative and G is entitled to a distribution of $2,200.
Under our prior analysis (disregarding the Oppenheimer prin-
ciple), G is taxed under section 677(a) (1) on $200 since that is the
pro rata portion of the distribution which is due to the application
of his percentage share to current income and is thus the amount of
current income which "is ... distributed" to him. The $2,200 dis-
tribution reduces the fund to $107,800, of which $98,000 is original
corpus and $9,800 is accumulated income of year one. The question
under section 677(a) (2) is how much of that $9,800 "is or may be"
held for future distribution to G. We know that some of it will bo
distributed since we know that in succeeding years G's five per
cent will be applied to it. As was the case where G had only a per-
centage share, we are not certain as to how many years the five per
cent will be applied to it unless the instrument so provides or unless
section 677(a) (2) is construed as limiting the number of years to
G's life expectancy. However, even if we knew the number of
years, we could not determine how much would be distributed
since (1) unless and until the fund falls below $44,000, the fixed
dollar maximum will operate and thus necessitate a proration, not
only under section 677(a) (1) as to current income currently dis-
tributed, but also under section 677(a) (2) as to current incomo
which "is or may be" held for future distribution, and (2) pro-
ration under section 677(a) (2) would require a knowledge, not
only of the amount of (a) undistributed original corpus and (b)
undistributed current income (both of which are knowable), but
also (c) future income, which is not precisely ascertainable. If we
1new, e.g., that in year two of the trust the income would be $10,000,
thus increasing the total fund to $117,800, we would know that 4905890
of the $2,200 distributed in the second year was due to the original
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500 490corpus, 5 of it was due to current income, and - of it was
5890 5890
due to the accumulated income of year one.1 9
There seems to be no precise solution to the question. We know
that some of the current income will be distributed later, but we
cannot accurately determine how much because one of the ele-
ments necessary to the determination cannot be presently known.
It would seem clearly improper to tax the grantor under section
677(a) (2) in our supposed situation as though he had a percentage
share only. Such an approach could only be justified if the "may
be" portion of section 677(a) (2) were construed to extend to the
utterly remote possibility that, for a given number of years after
the income is realized, (1) there will be no income at all, and (2)
the original corpus will depreciate to the point where five per cent
of the original corpus plus accumulated income was no more than
$2,200.
Perhaps the most satisfactory approach would be to assume that
future income will be generated at the same rate as current income
and prorate accordingly. This at least would seem to be a more
rational and realistic application of the "is or may be" language of
section 677(a) (2).
d. The Amount Taxable to G Uizder Section 662(a). Finally, as
in our other hypothetical examples, all income not taxable to G
under subpart E is governed by subparts A to D and may be taxed
to G under section 662 to the extent any distribution of corpus to
him does not exceed distributable net income.
THE GitA~TOR WHO Is NoT A CURE2NT BENEFIcIARY
The Short-Term Trust--Section 673(a)
Under section 673(a), the grantor is treated as the owner of any
portion of a trust if, because of a retained reversionary interest,
the corpus or the income therefrom "will or may reasonably be
expected to" revert to the grantor's possession or enjoyment
within ten years of the inception of that portion of the trust. As
previously noted, when this section applies, a reversionary interest
in the income alone will cause the grantor to be taxed only on the
ordinary income of the trust, whereas, if the reversionary interest
is in the corpus of the trust, all income, including capital gains, is
3-59 Five per cent of the total fund is $5,890. Undistributed original corpus is $98,000,
five per cent of which is $4,900. Undistributed income of the first year is $9,800, five per
cent of which is $490. Income of the second year is $10,000, five per cent of which Is $00.
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taxed to the gTantor.Y6 0 Thus, if a grantor establishes a conventional
trust to pay the income to A for five years, the trust then to ter-
minate and the entire corpus to revert to the grantor, the grantor
will be taxed under section 673(a), from the outset of the trust, on
all the income.
Suppose, however, that a grantor establishes a five year unitrust,
under which A is to receive five per cent of the value of the fund
each year for five years, the trust to terminate at the end of five
years and the balance of the fund to be paid to the grantor. Hero
the entire original corpus will not revert to the grantor at the ter-
mination of the trust since some of it Will be received by A over
the five year term of the trust. Under section 673, therefore, the
grantor will not be taxed on all of the income, but only on the in-
come attributable to the percentage of corpus which will revert
to him on the termination of the trust.'"' In addition, however, a
certain portion of the income from the amount of original corpus
which will not revert to the grantor will be accumulated for dis-
tribution to the grantor at the termination of the trust. This addi-
tional income will be taxed to the grantor under section 677(a) (2)
in accordance with the principles developed below in connection
with the over ten year percentage share unitrust 0
If the five year unitrust were one under which the current bene-
ficiary were entitled to a fixed dollar annuity payable in any
event, instead of a percentage share, the current beneficiary, under
the rationale of Burnet v. Whitehouse, is in effect receiving corpus
distributions. Therefore, even though the beneficiary is not thereby
insulated from taxation on current income (because of the statu-
tory provisions in subparts A to D which change the Whitehouse
rule vis-a-vis the beneficiary), the reversionary interest of the
grantor should be reduced to the extent that the beneficiary will
receive part of the original corpus over the five years.
03
'Go Reg. Sees. 1.671-3(b) (1), (3) (1956).
161 The percentage which will revert to the grantor can be calculated by the use of
the formula which has been discussed in connection with the amount taxable to a
grantor who is a current beneficiary of a percentage share. See note 130 supra.
162In the conventional under ten year trust, i.e., where all the trust income
is distributed to the current beneficiary but the entire corpus will revert to the grantor
within ten years, it is unnecessary to apply section 677 (a) (2) since the grantor will be
taxed on all the income under section 673. Theoretically, however, section 677 (a) (2)
would be applicable in such a situation to any tax income (capital gains) which is not
distributed to the beneficiary but added to the corpus which reverts to the grantor.
163 The application of section 677 (a) (2) to the under ten year fixed dollar anunuity
trust will not differ from the application of that section to the over ton year fixed dollar
annuity trust, as to which, see the text at note 165 infra.
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The Long-Term Trust--Section 677(a)(2)
If the grantor has retained a reversionary interest which will
take effect ten years (or more) after the inception of the trust,
section 673 does not apply. However, if income is accumulated for
future distribution to the grantor at the termination of the trust,
he will be currently taxed on such accumulations under section
677 (a) (2).164
In applying this latter rule to a unitrust, difficulties arise be-
cause the unifrust does not proceed on the usual dichotomy of
income and corpus. Since beneficiaries are not entitled to distribu-
tions of trust income, but rather to an amount representing a per-
centage of all trust assets or to a fixed dollar amount payable
irrespective of te sufficiency of current trust income, the grantor's
reserved interest cannot be conveniently labeled as an interest in
either income or corpus. Moreover, there is no provision in subpart
E, such as is found for subparts A through D in section 662(a) (2),
which in effect treats trust distributions as proceeding first from
income.
Regulation section 1.671-3(a) (3) provides an apparent solution
to the problem:
If the portion of the trust treated as owned by a grantor... consists
of an undivided fractional interest in the trust, or of an interest repre-
sented by a dollar amount, a pro rata share of each item of income, de-
duction, and credit is normally allocated to that portion. Thus, -where
the portion owned consists of an interest in or a right to an amount of
corpus only, a fraction of each item (including items allocable to corpus,
such as capital gains) is attributed to the portion. The numerator of
this fraction is the amount which is subject to the control of the gran-
tor... and the denominator is normally the fair market value of the
trust corpus at the beginning of the taxable year in question.
In the case of the conventional trust, the application of this regu-
lation is clear enough. Assume a grantor creates a trust the corpus
of which wil revert to him after ten years, and ten per cent of the
current income of which is payable to the current beneficiary, with
the balance of income to be accumulated for the grantor. Under sec-
tion 677(a) (2) the grantor will take into account as his own ninety
per cent of all items of ordinary income, deductions and credits,
l64Reg. See. 1.671-3(b)(2) (1956). See Comin'r v. Wilson, 125 F.2d 307 (7th Cir.
1942) (taxing capital gains of trust to grantor rvho retained a reversionary interest
under section 167 of the 1939 Code-the predecessor of Bection 677 of the 1954 Code);
Graff v. Comm'r, 117 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1941); but of. Comm'r v. Branch, 114 F-2d 985
(1st Cir. 1940).
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together with all of the capital gains and losses of the trust to the
extent they are not paid or payable to the current beneficiary.
This seems clearly to be the proper result since ninety per cent of
the annual income, and all capital gains to the extent they are not
currently paid or payable, will eventually be received by the
grantor. The case of the unitrust, however, is not so evident.
a. The Grantor Who Is Not a Benefiiary-A Percentage Share
Unitrust. Suppose that the grantor creates a unitrust with a term
of more than ten years, under whch the current beneficiary is to
receive annually ten per cent of all trust assets. On its face, the
above regulation would seem to require substantially the same
result as under the conventional trust: that the grantor be taxed
under section 677(a) (2) upon ninety per cent of all items of trust
income, both ordinary and capital gains. This appears to follow
from the fact that the grantor has an undivided fractional interest
in the amount of ninety per cent. However, except for the last year
of the trust, this result would seem to be wrong because the grantor
will not eventually receive ninety per cent of each year's accumula-
tion due to the fact that the accumulation is added to the fund and
will be depleted by future distributions to the current beneficiary
by application of that beneficiary's annual ten per cent interest to
all trust assets. Thus, the amount accumulated for future distribu-
tion to the grantor in any current year, except for the last year of
the trust, will not be ninety per cent of income, but rather, ninety
per cent reduced by future distributions to be made therefrom over
the term of the trust to the current beneficiary. In the above ex-
ample, the beneficiary will take ten per cent of the declining balance
of any accumulation, and depending on the size of the accumulation
and the length of the trust term, accumulations in the early years of
the trust could be practically exhausted, leaving very little to be
taxed to the grantor.
b. The Grantor Who Is Not a Benefiiary-A Fixed Dollar
Share Unitrust. In the situation of a ten year unitrust where the
beneficiary is to receive a fixed annuity the tax consequences to the
grantor under section 677 (a) (2) appear to be substantially dif-
ferent. In the above example, where the beneficiary was entitled
only to a percentage share, the principle of regulation section
1.671-3(a) (3) seems properly to apply with the modification that
the grantor's fractional share must be reduced for future distri-
butions to the current beneficiary out of accumulations of income.
This modification, however, does not deny the fact that the bene-
ficiary of a percentage share benefits pro rata from each item of
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income since each such item is utilized in determining the amount
which is required to be distributed to the beneficiary. Such utiliza-
tion, in substance, makes one the beneficiary of the item utilized,
so that the beneficiary is properly treated as receiving a pro rata
portion of each item of income.116 But consider the case where the
beneficiary is entitled to an annuity in a fixed number of dollars,
payable in any event, rather than a percentage of all trust assets.
Then, in accordance with the rationale of Burnet v. Wiielouse,
since the annuity does not depend on the presence of income (at
least to the extent of original corpus), the annuity is a charge on
corpus, and all income is in effect being held for future distribution
to the grantor, until such time as current distributions exhaust
original corpus.'66
c. Capital Gains. In the situation under discussion (a unitrust
in which the grantor has retained a reversion which will take effect
more than ten years after the inception of the trust) the tax treat-
ment of capital gains earned by the unitrust will not differ from
that accorded to ordinary income. In the percentage share unitrust,
if the capital gains are utilized in computing the share of, and thus
paid to, the current beneficiary, the amount taxable to the grantor
as capital gains would be the percentage not taxed to the current
beneficiary, reduced by the amount to be distributed out of accumu-
lations to the current beneficiary in future years of the trust. If
capital gains, current and accumulated, are not to be utilized in
fixing the share of the current beneficiary, then all such gains are
accumulated for future distribution to the grantor and are taxed
to him under section 677(a) (2).1T Similarly, in a fixed annuity uni-
trust, the principles discussed above apply equally to capital gains.
Since in this latter situation none of the income is really paid to the
annuitants until corpus is depleted, all of the income, including
capital gains, is taxed to the grantor.
There is one significant difference between the treatment of
capital gains and ordinary income. As discussed before, there is
still available the Dean trust device whereby the capital gains of a
trust realized in a taxable year are not paid (i.e., not utilized in
265 Cf. Reg. See. 1.643 (a)-3 (a) (1956).
26E6 Recall that although the same arguments can be made where the succes-or benefl-
ciaries are third party "remaindermen" and not a, grantor with a "reverLion," the
statutory change of Burnet v. Whitehouse with respect to nongrantor buncfieiaries re-
quires that the annuitant bear the tax, to the extent of distributable net income. Here,
of course, that result would be changed since any income taxed to the grantor would
not be included in distributable net income.
167 See leg. Sec. 1.677(a)-(l) (g) Ex. (2) (1956).
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computing the amount payable to the unitrust beneficiary) until the
succeeding taxable year.68 In such a case it would appear that the
only change as regards the amount taxable to the grantor under
section 677(a) (2) would be in reducing by one the number of years
that the capital gain will be accumulated in the case of a beneficiary
of a percentage share.'6"
d. Combination Shares. We have already analyzed in detail the
application of section 677(a) (2) to a grantor-beneficiary of a uni-
trust share. It can be readily seen that what we are now discussing
is merely the converse of that situation. Accordingly, where, under
the principles discussed in that prior section, income would be
taxed to the grantor on the ground that it is held for future distri-
bution to the grantor, such income would not be taxed under the
"is held" language of section 677(a) (2) where the grantor is not
the current beneficiary.
Moreover, where the "may be" language of section 677(a)(2)
is involved, we have seen that the question turns on the extent to
which the degree of probability of the occurrence of certain con-
tingencies will be given significance. That subject will be discussed
shortly. It is sufficient to note here that if the "Imay be held" lan-
guage is interpreted as "may, under any possibility, be held," then
any income taxable under section 677(a) (2) to a grantor-bene-
ficiary of a combination share would be taxable under section 677
(a) (2) to a grantor who has retained a reversion after a combina-
tion share. If the language is interpreted as "may, under any non-
remote possibility, be held," any amount not taxable to a grantor-
beneficiary of a combination share would be taxable to a grantor
who has retained a reversion after a combination share. However,
amounts taxable to a grantor-beneficiary of a combination share
may or may not be taxable to a grantor who has retained a rever-
sion after a combination share.
It would appear that whether the amount to be paid the current
beneficiary is a percentage share or a fixed dollar amount depends
in each case on which one of the two is the operative factor. Thus,
168 See text at notes 59-63 supra.
169 For example, assume there was an eleven year trust where the beneficiary A gets
ten per cent of the fund each year-but the capital gains are not paid (utilized) until
the year after they are earned and in succeeding years. If the trust in the first year had a
$1,000 capital gain and $9,000 ordinary income, the amount of ordinary income not held
for the grantor would be calculated by multiplying the percentage by the ordinary in-
come and its declining balance eleven times. However, the amount of the capital gail
not held for the grantor would require application of the formula only ten times since
it is not until the second year of the trust that the beneficiary receives any of the gain.
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in some years one may be operative and in some years the other.
And it is possible, where different beneficiaries have different
shares, that the operative factor will vary from beneficiary to bene-
ficiary. This, of course, means that the determination of the
amount taxable to the grantor under section 677(a) (2) becomes
an impossible task because of the inability to apply a constant fac-
tor to income accumulations in determining the amount of such
accumulations the current beneficiaries will receive over the teim
of the trust.
Reversion Taking Effect at Death of Nongrantor-Beneficiary
Subsection (c) of section 673, dealing with reversionary interest
taking effect at the death of the income beneficiary, provides:
The grantor shall not be treated under subsection (a) as the owner
of any portion of a trust where his reversionary interest in such portion
is not to take effect in possession or enjoyment until the death of the
person or persons to whom the income therefrom is payable.
The substance of this subsection is to exempt the grantor from
tax on income, otherwise taxable under section 673(a) because of
a less than ten year reversionary interest, to the extent that the
income is payable to a beneficiary for life. Thus it is not necessary
to the operation of this subsection that all the tax income be pay-
able to a life beneficiary. Suppose a conventional trust provided
that A (with a five year life expectancy) was to receive one-half the
income for life, that income did not include capital gains (which
were to be accumulated along with one-half of the ordinary income)
and that on A's death corpus (with accumulations) was to be paid
to the grantor. In this situation section 673(c) would exempt the
grantor from tax on one-half the ordinary income.
Applying this analysis to a unitrust, it would seem that where
there is a life beneficiary of a percentage share, section 673(c)
would exempt the grantor from tax on so much of the income as
was distributed to the beneficiary by virtue of the application of
the percentage to the current income. The remaining income would
be taxed to the grantor under section 673(a) if the beneficiary's
life expectancy were less than ten years. If the life expectancy were
more than ten years, section 673 (a) would not apply regardless of
section 673 (c) and the analysis would be precisely the same as was
applied to a unitrust with a fixed duration of more than ten years.
However, where a life beneficiary of a unitrust is a beneficiary of
a fixed dollar share, section 673(c) would not seem to have any
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applicability. This would certainly seem to be the case where, as in
a unitrust, the indenture is silent as to the source of annuity pay-
ments since it could not be said that the beneficiary is a person to
whom income is payable. 170 Moreover, even if the trust directed
payment wholly or partially from income, under the reasoning of
Burnet v. Whitehouse the beneficiary whose annuity, since pay-
able in any event, is really paid from original corpus, should not
be considered a person to whom income is payable. This result
would correlate with the prior analysis of section 677(a) (2) under
which the grantor who has retained a reversion after a fixed sum
annuity, would be taxable on all the income on the ground that it
is or may be held for future distribution to him.'
The Effect Under Section 677(a)(2) of Contingencies
Affecting the Grantor's Right to Accumulations of Income
The discussion heretofore has been concerned with the amount
taxable to the grantor under section 677 (a) (2) without considera-
tion of how various contingencies affect the result. Here considera-
tion is given to whether the amount so taxable may be affected by
the possibility that the accumulation of income may be altered by
the happening of certain possible events.
First, there is the possiblity that an accumulation of income
otherwise taxable to the grantor might be reduced in order to make
required payments to the current beneficiary. This will not happen
where the current beneficiary is entitled only to a percentage share
over a fixed number of years. As indicated above, in this situation
the amount to be accumulated for the grantor can be precisely cal-
culated as a percentage of current income reduced by the current
beneficiary's interest in the accumulation over the term of the
trust. However, where the beneficiary of a percentage share is en-
titled to annual payments for life, although it is possible to calcu-
late precisely the accumulations for the grantor on the basis of the
beneficiary's life expectancy, it is possible that the beneficiary may
live longer than his expectancy and thus reduce the amounts accu-
mulated for the grantor. Or, where the beneficiary's share is a fixed
170 Again, of course, no problem would be present if the beneficiary had a lif o expect-
ancy of more than ten years.
'71 See text at notes 165-66 supra. Subsection (b) of section 673 provides another
exception from the operation of subsection (a) where the income of the trust is irro-
vocably payable for a period of at least two years from the inception of the trust to a
qualified charitable beneficiary. Pertinent here are the same considerations discussed with
respect to subsection (c), the only difference being that where the beneficiary is a charity
the income must be payable for at least two years, and not for life.
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sum annuity for life, it may happen that the payments will exhaust
original corpus and thus have to be satisfied from accumulated
income.
Second, it is possible that the amount accumulated for the gran-
tor may be inereased due to the happening of an event. For ex-
ample, where the term of the trust (fixed sum annuity or percent-
age) will end upon the earlier of the expiration of the stated term
or the death of the current beneficiary, the death of the current
beneficiary prior to the end of the term could increase the amount
of the accumulation that the grantor will receive. 172
Should the fact that a contingency may reduce or increase the
amount accumulated for future distribution to the grantor be
taken into consideration in determining the applicability of sec-
tion 677(a) (2) ? The section taxes to the grantor income which "in
the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both may
be" accumulated for future distribution to the grantor. A literal
reading of the statute seems to require that the word "may" be
construed as referring only to a possibility of accumulation be-
cause of the discretion of the grantor or trustee to accumulate.
In support of this construction it could be said that had Congress
intended a broader meaning, it would have taxed the grantor when
income "may be" accumulated "in the discretion of the grantor
or a nonadverse party, or otherwise."
Under such a construction of the statute, contingencies, other
than that involved in the possibility that a grantor or trustee could
exercise discretion to accumulate, could be taken into account, if
at all, only in determining what income is accumulated for the
grantor. The effect of considering such contingencies under the
"is" language of section 667(a) (2) would be to construe "is" as
meaning "is or probably is." Under such a construction, if there
were a substantial probability that the contingency would occur,
whether it would reduce or increase amounts otherwise taxable
under section 677 (a) (2), the amounts considered to be accumu-
lated would be adjusted accordingly. To use our prior example, if
a trust were to terminate at the end of twenty-five years unless the
beneficiary died before that, and the beneficiary had a life expec-
tancy of twenty years, the determination of the amount which is
accumulated under section 677(a) (2) would be made on the basis
of a twenty year trust. Conversely, if the trust were to end in
twenty-five years or the death of the beneficiary, whichever was
172 See LR.C. § 673(c).
17s See Rollins v. Helvering, 92 F.2d. 390 (8th Cir. 1937).
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later, and the beneficiary had a life expectancy of thirty years,
the determination would be based on a thirty year trust.
The problem involved in the above analysis is not peculiar to the
unitrust and has arisen many times in connection with the conven-
tional grantor trust.74 Under section 167 of the 1939 Code (the
predecessor of section 677) the Treasury took the position that
the grantor was taxable upon accumulations unless he divested
himself "permanently and definitively, of every right which might,
by any possibility enable him to have such income, at some time,
distributed to him, either actually or constructively." 171 Moreover,
many of the decided cases have taxed the grantor upon accumula-
tions not only when his receipt of them depended upon the discre-
tion of the trustee, 76 but also when his receipt of the accumulations
depended upon a contingency not within his or the trustee's con-
trol.177 In none of these cases was the issue of remoteness discussed,
although the First Circuit has stated that "the statute means that
if under any circumstances or contingencies any part of the ac-
cumulated income might inure to the benefit of the grantor such
portion of the income is taxable to him." 17 Several cases, however,
have held against taxing accumulations to the grantor when his
possibility of taking was extremely remote"1 9 Typical of these is
William E. Boeing, where the corpus and any accumulated income
was to revert to the grantor if his son died before the age of 30 and
the grantor survived him. The Board of Tax Appeals stated that it
did not think the statute "covers or was intended to cover the situa-
tion where there is no definite provision for such future distribu-
tion to the grantor, but only the bare possibility that upon certain
contingencies over which the grantor has no control the corpus and
.74 See generalhj 6 MEETENS, LAW oP FEDERAL INCOmr, TAXATION § 37.14 (1957);
KENNEDY, FEDERAL INco E T xATIoN OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 6.16 (1948).
175 Reg. 111, See. 29.167-1(b) (1943).
.76 Helvering v. Evans, 126 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1942).
177 Estate of Wadewitz, 32 T.C. 538 (1959) (grantor would take accumulations if he
survived his wife); Wenger v. Comm'r, 127 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1942) (grantor could call
for distribution to him of accumulations in case of "any accident, sickness, calamity,
misfortune, adversity, bereavement or loss, financially or otherwise"); Kent v.
Rothensies, 120 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1941) (income to be accumulated for two years and
then paid to the grantor if living and if not used to make up any deficiency of incomo
up to an annual fixed amount payable to the current beneficiary) ; Altmaler v. Comm 'r,
116 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1940) ; and Kaplan v. Comm'r, 66 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1933).
178 Kaplan v. Comm'r, 66 F.2d 401, 402 (1933).
179 Henry Maxtyn Baker, 43 B.T.A. 1029 (1941); Christoper L. Ward, 40 B.T.A. 225
(1939), rev'd on another issue, 119 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1941); William E. Booing, 37
B.T.A. 178 (1938), rev'd on another issue, 106 F.2d 305 (9th Cir.), cort. d(enied, 308 U.S.
619 (1939).
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accumulations may revert to him." 180 A similar rationale was ex-
pressed in Commissioner v. Betts,'8' where the grantor could not re-
ceive the accumulated income except by surviving his mother, wife,
his children and their descendants.
'Under the decided cases, therefore, apparently the rule is that
the grantor will be taxable upon accumulations of income although
the eventual distribution of the accumulation to him depends upon
a contingency, unless there is only a remote possibility of the con-
tingency occurring. 8 2 Under such a rule the fact that a grantor
might take accumulations due to the death of the current benefici-
ary before the end of the trust term will be disregarded where such
death is highly unlikely, and will be taken into account where such
death is not an unlikely possibility.'8 A weighing of probabilities
will be required.
The Treasury, however, apparently has not yet conceded that
remoteness is a relevant factor. Regulation section 1.677(a)-1(c)
provides that:
[T]he grantor is treated as the owner of a portion of a trust if he has
retained any interest which might... enable him to have the income
from the portion, at some time, distributed to him either actually or
constructively .... If the grantor strips himself permanently and
definitively of every interest... he is not treated as an owner under sec-
tion 677 after that divesting.
This regulation is essentially identical with the regulation
under the 1939 Code with the exception of the omission of the
phrase "by any possibility." This latter phrase, however, only
underscored the language remaining, which requires the grantor
not to have any interest in order to avoid tax.
It would thus appear that the question whether the word "may"
as used in section 677 disregards remote possibilities that the
grantor will receive accumulated income, or whether it takes them
into account, is in a somewhat unsettled state.18 There is thus no
assurance that income which may be necessary to fund a fixed an-
nuity will not be taxed to the grantor; and, more importantly,
where the trust term is for the life of the current beneficiary, there
is the possibility that all accumulations will be taxed to the grantor
180 37 B.T.A. 178, 185 (1938), rev'd on another issue, 100 F.2d 305 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 619 (1939).
is' 123 F.2. 534 (7th Cir. 19-1).
382 See MCTCHATSox, I Con TAxATioN op ESTATES AwD TRUSTs 05 (1903).
183 See William E. Boeing, 37 B.T.A. 178 (1938), rev 'Id on another isile, 108 F.2I
305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 619 (1939).
-84 See KENNEDY, PEDE:RL f1comE TAXATION op TRUSTS &ND ESTA rs § 0.10 (1943).
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because of the possibility, however remote, that the beneficiary will
die in the first year of the trust.
GBANVTOR'S RETAiNED POWERS
Subpart E taxes a grantor of a trust where the grantor has re-
tained an interest in, or a power over, the corpus of the trust or the
tax income.' s5 Retained interests are governed by section 673 and
section 677. Retained powers are governed by sections 674, 675, 676
and 677.186 As in the case of the retained interest, the retained
power which renders the grantor taxable may be a power over
corpus alone, tax income alone, or both.
We have already analyzed the tax consequences of grantor's re-
tained interests in a unitrust under section 673 and section 677.187
The consequences of retained powers remain to be considered.
It should first be noted that unlike retained interests in a uni-
trust, retained powers are not necessarily affected by the unitrust's
departure from the conventional income and corpus dichotomy.
Suppose that a grantor establishes a unitrust whereby A is to re-
ceive five per cent of the value of the fund for life, remainder to B.
The grantor retains the power to revoke the entire trust. The conse-
quence of this retained power of revocation is the same under sec-
tion 676 (a) as it would have been if the trust were a conventional
trust whereby A was to receive income for life, and B was to re-
ceive the remainder. In both cases, the grantor would be taxed on
all of the income. Similarly, for example, a power to borrow corpus
without security will have identical effect whether the trust is a
unitrust or a conventional trust.
The operation of the retained powers section of the Code can be
affected by the no distinction between income and corpus aspect of
the unitrust only where the retained power is directed to an interest
which has this unitrust nature, as where the grantor retains the
power to make himself a percentage share beneficiary. Even here,
moreover, the operation of the power sections may not be affected
by the unitrust nature of the interest subject to the retained power.
For example, an "excepted" power under section 674(a)(4) to
allocate among charitable beneficiaries, and the excepted power of
185 See Beg. See. 1.671-1 (1956).
'Be Section 677 thus applies to both interests and powers. The interests are covered
by reference to income which is distributed or is hold for future distribution. Powers
are involved in the provisions respecting income which nay be distributed or may bo
held for future distribution.
187 Note that the prior analysis involved retained powers to the extent that the "may
be" portions of section 677(a) (1) and section 677(a) (2) were considered.
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an independent trustee to sprinkle income or corpus, are nontax-
able powers even under a unitrust.
Second, where a grantor has retained a power over a unitrust
interest, the tax consequences should be precisely the same as where
he has retained the interest itself. The underlying theory and de-
sign of subpart E, with respect to grantors, is to treat a grantor as
never having transferred property, for income tax purposes, where
he has not surrendered, at least for a sufficient time, substantial
dispositive control over the income derived from the property. No
distinction in this respect is made between (1) retaining dispositive
control over income by virtue of a retained interest in it and (2) re-
taining dispositive control over income by virtue of a retained
power over it. 188 Both are properly considered equivalent since in
both the beneficial enjoyment of the income is subject to the
grantor's wishes. Indeed, the Code contains explicit correlations
where different results otherwise would occur, depending on
whether a power or an interest was involved. This is true for both
income and corpus interests and powers.
For example, with respect to corpus, if G creates a five year trust,
corpus to revert to him on termination, G is taxed under section 673.
If instead G creates a twenty year trust, but reserves the power to
revoke the trust after the fifth year, he has no section 673 reversion-
ary interest but is taxed in precisely the same way as though he did,
by virtae of section 676 (a) .1s9 If, on the other hand, he reserved the
power to revoke only after the twelfth year, he is not taxed from
the outset under section 676 just as he would not be taxed from the
outset under section 673 if his reversionary interest took effect in
the twelfth year.90
288 All of the sections which delineate the ptowcers or interests which result in taxation
to the grantor begin with the statement that: "The grantor shall be treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust .... 2
189 Section 676 (a) provides: I The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion
of a trust. where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title to such portion
is exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both." (Emphasis added.) See
Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F.2d 341, 344-45 (4th Cir. 1941) (decided under section IGO
of the 1939 Code).
190 Section 676(b) of the Code provides:
[Section 676(a)] ...shall not apply to a power the exercise of which can only
affect the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period eommencig after the
expiration of a period such that a grantor would not be treated as the owner under
section 673 if the power were a reversionary interest. But the grantor may be
treated as the owner after the expiration of such period unles the power is relin-
quished.
Note that G would be taxed under section 676 after the twelfth year-just as he w7ould
be taxed on the income from the property which reverted to him after a twelve year trust.
See also section 674(a) (2).
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Similar correlation is found in the income area. For example, by
virtue of the "is" or "may" provisions, section 677(a) (1) equates
a grantor's interest in current income with a grantor's power over
current income, and section 677 (a) (2) similarly equates a grantor's
interest in accumulated income with a grantor's power over ac-
cumulated income.
There is no apparent reason why powers and interests should not
also be correlative with respect to unitrust shares. If, for example,
a grantor retains the power to make himself a beneficiary of a cur-
rent percentage share of the fund, the tax consequences under sec-
tion 676 (and section 677) should be no different from what they
would be if the grantor had, in establishing the trust, made himself
such a beneficiary. 191 The same should be true, to take another ex-
ample, for a retained section 674 power to add beneficiaries other
than himself.
1 92
CAPITAL GAINS AND Tm GRAINTOR-BExEFICIARY
Retained Interests
Where the grantor retains an interest in a unitrust share, such as
a percentage share, fixed dollar share, or a combination share, we
have seen that the applicable provisions are sections 673 and 677 of
subpart E, and section 662 of subparts A to D.
a. Section 673. When a grantor retains a section 673 reversionary
interest in corpus, he will be taxed on capital gains as well as ordi-
nary income.1 9 3 If his reversionary interest is in the entire original
corpus, all of the capital gains as well as all of the ordinary income
will be taxed to him.1 4 If his reversionary interest is only in part of
the original corpus, he will be taxed on a pro rata share of capital
gains and ordinary income.9 5 Thus if his reversionary interest is in
one-half of the corpus, and the income for a certain taxable year
consists of $1,000 ordinary income and a $2,000 capital gain, the
grantor will be taxed on a total of $1,500, of which $500 will be
taxed to him as ordinary income and $1,000 as capital gain.
'9'In which case sections 673 and 677 would be applicable, as discussed in tho text
at notes 131-42 supra.
192 Note that this analysis has no relevance to the taxability of a grantor under sec-
tion 662, i.e., under subparts A to D. If a grantor is taxable by reason of a rotainod
power but there is no distribution to him, he will not be taxed at all under subparts A
to D.
198 Reg. See. 1.671-3(b) (3) (1956).
194 Reg. Sec. 1.671-3(a)(1) (1956).
3.5 Reg. See. 1.671-3(a) (3) (1956).
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Applying these principles to the unitrust, the grantor-beneficiary
of a unitrust share, whose share is such as to give rise to a section
673 reversionary interest (e.g., a percentage share), will be taxed
on that percentage of capital gains -which corresponds to the per-
centage of original corpus in which he is considered to have re-
tained a reversion.
b. Section 677(a)(1). In a conventional trust the capital gains
are normally allocated to corpus and are not considered trust in-
come. Therefore, if a grantor retains only the right to trust in-
come, he will not receive the proceeds of capital gain transactions.
In such a case, he will not be taxed on the gains under the "is...
distributed" language of section 677(a) (1). 10O On the other hand, if
a grantor retains the right to income and directs that income in-
cludes proceeds from capital gain transactions, or if he retains the
right to income aizd capital gains, he will receive the gains and will
be taxed on them under the "is... distributed" language of section
677 (a) (1), since the word "income" ' in that section includes capital
gains, as well as ordinary income. 197
Similarly, if a conventional trust contains a provision by which
income nay be distributed to the grantor, this provision will nor-
mally not comprehend capital gains and the grantor will thus not be
taxed on such gains under the 'may be ... distributed" portion of
section 677(a) (1). However, if under the instrument income in-
cludes capital gains, or such gains are otherwise available for cur-
rent distribution to the grantor, the gains will be taxed to the
grantor.
Under our prior analyses, it was concluded that (1) the "is...
distributed" language has no applicability with respect to a grant-
or-beneficiary of a fixed sum annuity, and (2) the "may be ... dis-
tributed" language of section 677(a) (1) has no applicability with
respect to a grantor-beneficiary of a percentage share or fixed sum
annuity. This leaves the situation of a grantor-beneficiary of a per-
centage share under the "is... distributed" language.
Suppose the grantor is a five per cent beneficiary and that in a
certain year the trust has $1,000 of ordinary income and $2,000 in
capital gains. As discussed previously, since part of G's distribu-
tion is due to the application of his percentage to the tax income of
$3,000, $150 of income has been distributed to him within the mean-
ing of section 677(a) (1). Of that $150, $100 should be considered to
have been received as capital gains since $100 of the $150 is due to
126 1eg. Sec. 1.677(a)-1(g) Ex. (1) (1956).
197 Of. Reg. Sees. 1.671-3(b) (2), 1.671-2(b), 1.677 (a)-l(a) (19,5).
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the application of his percentage to the $2,000 capital gains. Such
a result is supported in principle, if not in haec verba, by the regula-
tions.9 8
C. Section 677(a)(2). If a conventional trust contains a provi-
sion whereby income is to be accumulated for future distribution to
the grantor, this provision will not normally comprehend capital
gaini and such gains will thus not be taxed under the "is held" lan-
guage of section 677 (a) (2). However, if under the instrument in-
come includes capital gains, or such gains are otherwise to be accu-
mulated for the grantor, he will be taxed on them under this
section. Similar principles would apply with respect to the "may be
... held" language of section 677(a) (2).
With respect to the unitrust, it is necessary to consider sepa-
rately the "is ... held" and the "may be... held" language with
respect to both the percentage share and the fixed dollar share.
(i) Section 677(a) (2)--"is . . . held or accumulated for future
distribution to the grantor"
Percentage Share. As we have seen, when the grantor rotains
a percentage share, he will be taxed under the "is... held" portion
of section 677(a) (2) since in the years succeeding that in which the
income is realized, part of his distribution will be the result of the
application of his percentage to the current income which has been
accumulated. We saw also that the amount so taxed to him could
not be accurately determined unless we knew the number of years
during which his percentage would be applied to such income.
For the purpose of discussing the capital gains question, how-
ever, we will assume that we know that the nunber of years is ten.
By using the same formula employed to determine the reversionary
interest under section 673, we determine that over ten years the
grantor would receive about thirty-five per cent of the declining
balance of current income and would thus be taxed on thirty-five
per cent of current income under the "is ... held" language of sec-
tion 677(a) (2). Thus, as was the case with respect to a percentage
share under the "is... distributed" portion of section 677 (a) (1),
under the "is ... held" language of section 677(a) (2) thirty-five
per cent of the capital gains should be taxed to the grantor as
198 Reg. See. 1.671-3(a)(3) (1956). The above discussion, for the sake of clarity,
omits the reference to the Oppenheimer principle. The mentioned result, however, would be
modified by that principle so that under section 677(a) (1), $90 rather than $150 would be
taxed to G-of which $60 (two-thirds of $90) would be taxed as capital gain and $30
(one-third of $90) would be taxed as ordinary income.
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capital gains and thirty-five per cent of the ordinary income should
be taxed as ordinary income.'
Fixed Dollar Share. Unlike the case of a percentage share, the
satisfaction of a fixed dollar annuity wll not normally involve a
distribution out of accumulated income of prior years and the "is
... held" language of section 677(a) (2) will thus be inapplicable.
(ii) Section 677(a) (2)--"may be ... held"
Percentage Share. The analysis of the capital gains here is essen-
tially the same as in the case of the percentage share under the
"is ... held" language discussed immediately above. The only
significance of the "may be" language is with respect to the
number of future years over which the percentage Nll be con-
sidered to be applied where the instrument does not specify. 'When
that number is determined, however, the mentioned formula can be
used to calculate the applicable percentage, and, as indicated with
respect to the "is... held" language, that percentage of the capital
gains should be taxed as capital gains under the "may be" lan-
guage of section 677(a) (2).
Fixed Dollar Share. Recall that the amount of current income
which will be taxed to the grantor-beneficiary of a fixed dollar
share under the "may be ... held" language of section 677(a) (2)
will turn on the extent to which that language is held to make rele-
vant the degree of probability that the accumulated income of prior
years will be used to satisfy annuities of future years.
Of course, if the degree of probability is considered irrelevant
with the result that all of the current income is taxed to the grantor
under section 677(a) (2) ("maybe... held"), so much of the cur-
rent income as is capital gain will be taxed to the grantor as capital
gain.
If, however, less than all of the current income is taxed to the
grantor, we are presented with the question of how much, if any, of
the amount of income taxed to the grantor under the "may be" por-
tion will be taxed as capital gains.
Suppose it is determined that under the "may be... held" lan-
guage of section 677(a) (2) $5,000 of current income is taxable to
the grantor, out of a total current income of $10,000 ($5,000 of
which is ordinary income and $5,000 capital gains). How much of
the $5,000 will G be taxed on as capital gaivs? It would seem arbi-
399 Again, this result must be modified by tho Oppcnlirncr principle.
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trary to say that the entire $5,000 should be taxed as capital gains.
It seems equally arbitrary to say it should all be considered ordi-
nary income. Nor does either of these positions find support in the
statute or legislative history. The proper approach would seem to
be that of proportionate allocation, i.e., to tax one-half (the ratio of
capital gains to total income) of the $5,000 as capital gains and one-
half (the ratio of ordinary income to total income) of the $5,000 as
ordinary income. Once again, the regulations can be said to support
this result in principle.
200
d. Section 662 (Subparts A to D). For the purposes of section
662 the grantor-beneficiary is treated in the same manner as a non-
grantor beneficiary. As we have seen, under section 662 a benefi-
ciary is taxed on any distribution to him to the extent that the
amount distributed does not exceed the distributable net income of
the trust. Under section 643 distributable net income may or may
not include current capital gains. To the extent such gains are not
included in distributable net income, the distributable net income
amount is reduced-which may result in the beneficiary receiving
part or all of his distribution without tax to him.
Current capital gains are included in distributable net income if
they are allocated to income (trust income) or are "paid, credited,
or required to be distributed" to the beneficiary.201 If, however,
such gains are "paid, credited, or required to be distributed" to a
grantor-beneficiary, they will be taxed to him under section 677 (a)
(1) which taxes income (capital gains as well as ordinary income)
which is or may be distributed to the grantor. Being taxable to the
grantor under subpart E they would not be governed by subparts
A to D and thus would not be included in determining the amount
of distributable net income. To that extent, therefore, distributable
net income would be reduced and the grantor may receive part of
his distribution without tax to him. 2
200 Reg. See. 1.671-3(a) (3) (1956). The principles set forth above will be equally
applicable to combination shares. E.g., where the particular combination results in a
section 673 reversionary interest the grantor will be taxed on that percentage of capital
gains (as capital gains) which corresponds to the percentage of original corpus in which
he is considered to have retained a reversion. Or where the particular combination ro-
sults in taxation to the grantor under section 677(a) (1) or section 677(a) (2), tlh
applicable principle will depend on the extent to which the percentage element or fixed
dollar element is affirmatively operative.
201 I.R.C. § 643(a) (3).
202 The amount taxed to a grantor under section 662 will always be duo to a corpus
distribution to him since any distribution to him which in substance is an income dis-
tribution will be taxed under section 677. Morcover, since, on the abovo analysis, dis.
tributable net income will never include current capital gains, and since on i Similar
analysis distributable net income will never include current ordinary income taxable
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Retained Powers
a. Grantor Trust Provisions (Subpart E). As was previously
indicated:
(i) The operation of the retained powers sections of subpart D
(sections 674, 675, 676 and 677) will be affected by the unitrust's
departure from the income and corpus dichotomy of a conventional
trust only where the retained power is directed to an interest which
has this unitrust nature, i.e., a unitrust share, and
(ii) Where a grantor has retained a power over a unitrust inter-
est, the tax consequences should be precisely the same as where he
has retained the interest itself.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that where a grantor has re-
tained a power over a unitrust interest, he will be taxed on capital
gains, as capital gains, to the same extent that he would have been
if he had retained the interest itself. Suppose a grantor with a ten
year life expectancy, establishes a trust with a corpus of $10,000
and reserves the right to make himself a beneficiary of an annual
five per cent of the fund for life. Suppose further, that in the first
year of the trust there is income of $1,000, .$500 capital gains and
$500 ordinary income.
G would be treated as though he had retained an annual five per
cent interest which would result in G's being taxed:
(1) under section 673, on forty per cent of the capital gains as
capital gains ($200), and forty per cent of the ordinary income as
ordinary income ($200) ;
(2) under section 677(a) (1), as modified by the Oppenheimer
principle, on five per cent of the income from $6,000 (that is, on five
per cent of the $600 ($30)). Prorating the capital gains and the
ordinary income to this $30, G would be taxed on $15 as capital
gains and $15 as ordinary income; and
(3) under section 677(a) (2), on five per cent (over nine years) of
the declining balance of $600, again modified by the Oppenheimer
principle, i.e., on $210. Prorating the capital gains and the ordinary
income to this $210, G would be taxed on $105 as capital gains and
$105 as ordinary income.
Thus, of the total of $640 taxed to G under subpart B, $320 would
be taxed to G as capital gains and $320 as ordinary income.
under section 677, distributable net income in any given year will consist only of that
amount of current ordinary income which neither is nor may be (1) distributed to tho
grantor, or (2) held for future distribution to the grantor.
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b. Section 662-Subparts A to D. It will be recalled that under
a prior hypothetical 203 where the entire $1,000 of income was ordi-
nary income, the remaining $360 was taxed to G under subparts A
to D, i.e., under section 662. Here, however, $500 of the $1,000 is
capital gain. Three hundred and twenty dollars of it has been taxed
to G under subpart E. The remaining $180 of capital gain will not
be taxed to G under section 662 since, as explained above, that $180
will not be included in distributable net income. Distributable net
income will only include the remaining $180 of ordinary income,
and G will thus be taxed under section 662 only on $180 because of
his corpus distribution of $500 (five per cent of original corpus of
$10,000).
c. The Irish Case. In the above discussion, G's taxability was
partially analyzed on the basis of section 673. That section, how-
ever, is not strictly applicable where G did not retain a reversionary
interest in original corpus, but rather a power over original corpus.
The applicable section, therefore, is section 676 (power to revest
corpus) or section 674 (power to dispose of the beneficial enjoy-
ment of corpus). Section 673 was used in the analysis because the
Code correlates section 673 reversionary interests in corpus with
section 674 and section 676 powers over corpus.
In terms of section 676 and section 674, what G had was a power
to revest in himself forty per cent of the original corpus over ton
years. Viewing G's interest as such, it becomes necessary to con-
sider the case of Irish v. Commissioner.°4
In that case, the grantor, in 1935, established a trust of $250,000
worth of securities. The trust indenture provided that the income of
the trust should be paid to the settlor for life, with remainder over.
It also provided that the grantor could withdraw "from the prin-
cipal in any one year... a sum not exceeding $18,000, such right of
withdrawal not to be cumulative."
In 1935 and 1936 the trust realized capital gains of less than
$18,000. These gains were allocated to corpus and thus not dis-
tributed to the grantor. For those years the grantor reported, and
paid tax on, only the ordinary income of the trust (that is, what
had been distributed to him). The Commissioner assessed a de-
ficiency for the entire amount of capital gains for both years. The
grantor "conceded that he was taxable under Sec. 166 [the prede-
cessor of section 676] ... on the capital gains on that portion of the
203 See text at notes 142-45 supra.
204 129 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1942).
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trust corpus which he could revest in himself under the right to
withdraw up to $18,000 of corpus in any one year." 20-
The Third Circuit, however, held that the entire amount of the
capital gains was taxable to the grantor. In its opinion it stated
that:
[T]he present situation is clearly covered by See. 167(a)(2) [the
predecessor of section 677 (a) (2)] of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and
1936.2°6 By the terms of the trust indenture not only was the peti-
tioner entitled to receive for life the distributable trust income as
determined by the law of Pennsylvania but also, under his right to
withdraw corpus, he could obtain the capital gains derived from the
sale of trust assets so long as such gains did not aggregately exceed in
any one year the withdrawal limit of $18,000. To that extent it was
therefore within the settlor's "unfettered command" or uncontrolled
discretion to enjoy by withdrawal of corpus (not exceeding $18,000 in
any one year) the equivalent of any or all capital gains from the sale
of corpus assets. For the years in question the capital gains which the
petitioner could thus have received were $644.20 and $2,073.67. The
fact that he did not elect to enjoy such corpus gains in the years in
which they accrued is wholly immaterial for the tax is assessable ac-
cording to what may be done under the trust rather than what is done
under it.
207
If the reasoning of Irish were applied to our hypothetical grantor
who retained the right to revest in himself $500 of corpus in the
first year by making himself a five per cent beneficiary, he would
for that reason be taxable under section 677 on $500 of the $1,000
income.' 08
The court's decision, however, seems clearly to be based on a
misconception of the design and purpose of the predecessors of sec-
205 129 F.2a at 470.
206 See. 167(a)(2), which is identical in the Rlevcue Acts of 1934 and 1936, 26
U.S.C.A. fIt. Rev. Acts page 727 and page 895, provides in part here material as follows:
§ 167. Income for Benhefit of Grantor
(a) Where any part of the income of a trust-
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income, be distributed
to the grantor;
then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the not
income of the grantor.
(Original footnote renumbered.)
207 129 F.2a at 471-72.
208 In a unitrust, the Irish rationale would effectuate this result wvbether tho tax income
was all ordinary income, all capital gains, or a combination since there is no principal
and income dichotomy (as was present in Irish) which would prevent the amount of dis-
tribution from being satisfied out of one kind of item (e.g., ordinary income, as in Irish)
as opposed to another (e.g, capital gains, as in Irish).
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tion 676 and section 677. Where a grantor retains the power to re-
vest in himself a part of the original corpus, section 676 treats him
as never having transferred that part of corpus. The result is that
the grantor continues to be taxed on the income from that part. To
tax the grantor on an amount of income equal to the amount of
corpus which can be revested in the grantor would be to treat the
grantor as having retained more than he can revest.
If the grantor in Irish had retained $36,000 worth of securities,
funded the trust with only $214,000 worth of securities, and re-
tained only the right to the ordinary income, none of the capital
gains attributable to $214,000 worth of securities in the trust would
have been taxed to him-he would be taxed only on the gains de-
rived from the $36,000 worth of securities he retained.
It has been suggested that the result "was perhaps justified by
the literal language of section 167 of the 1939 Code, taxing the
grantor on 'any part of the income... [which] may... be distrib-
uted' to him at his discretion." 209 The point of this suggestion
would seem to be that the language of section 677 under the 1954
Code is more clearly indicative of the nontransfer approach which
is the basis of all the grantor sections of subpart E. 210 This seems
also to be the view of the Treasury, under whose regulations Irish
would have been taxed only on a pro rata share of the capital
gains. n
Conclusion
The reader who has come this far can only conclude that the
Internal Revenue Code is at best a clumsy, and very often an un-
wieldy, tool for dealing with the problems of a trust annuity like
the unitrust. The structure of the Code, assuming as it does that the
trust observes the usual distinction between trust principal and
209 Note, Taxation of Capital Gains Realized by Trusts, 12 TAx L. 11Ev. 99, 100
(1956).
210 However, even under the 1939 Code, the nontransfer approach, resulting in propor-
tionate taxation had been followed in other cases, essentially indistinguishable from,
and decided both before and after, the Irish case. See, e.g., Barber v. United States, 251
F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1958); Ruth W. Oppenheimer, 16 T.C. 515 (1951); Sarah A. W.
Coursey, 33 B.T.A. 1068 (1936). But cf. Estate of Wadewitz, 32 T.C. 539 (1959) (non-
grantor trust).
211See Reg. Sec. 1.671-3(a)(3) (1956). This, however, does not mean that Irish
would have fared much better under the 1954 Code. Since Irish could withdraw $18,000
a year from corpus, he would be taxed under section 676 on the income duo to $180,000
($18,000 for ten years). He thus would be taxed on 18/25 of the capital gains each year
(in addition to all the ordinary income by virtue of his retained right to a distribution
of such income).
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trust income, simply cannot deal efficiently with a trust form in
which this distinction is ignored. The problems begin with the very
constitutionality of the statute. Fortunately for the statute the
provisions in question appear to be a constitutional, albeit a ques-
tionable, exercise of congressional taxing power. The operation of
the tier system in subparts A to D of subchapter J is understood
only after traveling a long road of legislative history, beginning
with the years prior to 1942. In the area of capital gains serious
questions arise due to the notion of "utilization" of such gains in
computing a beneficiary's share, a notion not generally relevant to
the conventional principal and income trust. The marital deduction
might be allowable for the trust annuity depending on the extent to
which the Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank case has
done away with the "fractional share" requirement of the regula-
tions, an unsettled question at best. Finally, gifts to a charity of
interests in a unitrust invite a disallowance of the deduction by
application of the "not so remote as to be negligible" rule.
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty of applying the Code and
the reglations to the unitrust in the above areas, the problems are
at least manageable and are not such as to prevent the use of this
advantageous form of trust by the careful practitioner. The
grantor trust area is, however, something else. It is in this area
that the Code, in assuming the use of a conventional principal and
income trust, creates such a maze of tax problems for the unitrust
as almost to preclude understanding. It would seem that the only
rational conclusion to be drawn from the discussion is that the
grantor should, under no circumstances, retain an interest in or
power over a unitrust. Why then, the reader may ask, was the sub-
ject labored so long and hard? The authors are frank to admit that
it was only by working through the area that the massive com-
plexity of the subject was seen. We then felt it should be recorded
since a good deal of the discussion has value for trust forms besides
the unitrust. Also, and most importantly, as the unitrust becomes a
better understood trust form, someone may wonder about its use
for grantor retained interests or powers. He will have a discussion
available. If he nevertheless uses it for that purpose, the discussion
may be helpful in the ensuing litigation over the proper application
of subpart E of subchapter J.
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